



THE
Rule of rea-
son, contayning the
Arte of Logike.

Set forth in English, and new-
ly corrected by Tho-
mas Wilson.

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THE
PRACTICE OF

THE ART OF
WRITING

AND THE
ART OF

TEACHING
THE ART

OF WRITING
AND THE ART

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OF WRITING
AND THE ART



To the most excellent Prince, and our most redoubted

soueraigne Lord Edward the sixth, by the grace

of God King of England, Fraunce, and Ireland, defendour of the faith, and of the Churches of

England, and Ireland, in earth the supreme

head: your most faithfull and obe-

dient subiect Thomas Wilson, wi-

sheth long life, with most

prosperous raigne.



F MY POUVER

and abilitie, were as answerable to my good will, most excellent Prince and soueraigne Lord, this token of myne humble duetie, which I now offer vnto your Maiestie, should be as great and precious, as by reason of the contrary, it is base and slender. Where-

fore, I most humbly beseech your Maiestie, in no worse part to accept this little offer, then as the present of a true faithfull Subiect, which would haue brought better, if his power had beene thereafter. But following the example of poore men, in the auncient histories of *Plutarch*, and other Writers much commended: I offer vnto your highnes, parte of such fruites, as haue growen in a poore Students Garden. This fruite being of a straunge kinde (such as no English ground hath before this tyme, and in this sorte by any Tillage brought forth) may perhaps in the first tasting, seeme

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somewhat rough and harsh in the mouth, because of the straungenesse: but after a litle vse, and familiar accustoming thereunto, I doubt not, but the same will waxe euery one day, more pleasaunt then other. But in simple and plaine wordes, to declare vnto your Maiestie, wherein my wit and earnest endeouour, hath at this season trauailed: I haue assayed through my diligence, to make *Logike*, as familiar to the Englishman, as by diuers mens industries, the most parte of other the liberall Sciences are. For, considering the forwardnesse of this age, wherein, the very multitude are prompt and ripe in all Sciences, that haue by any mans diligence, beene set forth vnto them: weighing also that the capacitie of my Countrie-men, the English nation, is so pregnant, and quicke to achieue any kinde, or art of knowledge, whereunto it may attaine, that they are not inferiour to any other: and farther, pondering that diuers learned men of other Countreies, haue heretofore, for their furtherance of knowledge, not suffered any of the Sciences liberall, to be hidden in the Greeke, or Latine tongue, but haue with most earnest trauaile, made euery of them familiar to their vulgar people: I thought that *Logike*, among all other being an Arte, as apt for the English wits, and as profitable for their knowledge, as any the other Sciences are, might with as much grace be set forth in the English, as the other Artes, heretofore haue beene. And therefore, I haue so farre as my slender practise hath enabled me, enterprised to ioigne an acquaintance betweene *Logike*, and my Countrie-men: from the which they haue beene heretofore barred, by tongues vnacquainted. Notwithstanding, I must needs confesse, that the Printer hereof your Maiesties seruauant, prouoked me first herevnto, vnto whom I haue euer found my selfe greatly beholding, not onely at my being in Cambridge, but also at all tymes els, when I most needed helpe. But as touching the thing it selfe, though I haue not done it with so good perfection, as the worthines of the Art requireth, or as some other better learned could do: yet I hope, that whereas now it is dedicated vnto your highnes, & so made commo to al:

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my good will shall want no fauourers, in that I haue first laboured, to bring so noble a maiestresse, both of reason and iudgement, acquainted with so noble a Countrey, and here to bee made of a straunger, a free Denison. Wherein I take not vpon me so cunningly, and perfectly to haue written of the sayd Arte, as though none could doe it better: But because no Englishman vntill now, hath gone through with this enterprise, I haue thought meete to declare, that it may be done. And yet herein I professe it to be but a Spurre, or a Whetstone, to sharpe the Pens of some other, that they may polish, and perfect, that I haue rudely and grossely entered. And albeit, I doe herein take vpon me no more, but to be as a poore meane man, or a simple person, whose charge were to bee a Lodesman, to conueigh some noble Princes, into a straunge lande, where she was neuer before, leauing the enterpayning, the enriching, & decking of her, to such as were of substance, and furniture according: yet if this worke may not at the first enterance, haue the saufe conduct and protection, of your most noble royall Maiestie, I trust it shall in processe appeare, and proue, that I haue not altogether in vaine, taken vpon me this straunge labour, but rather to verry good purpose and effect, attempted the same. I knowe your Grace, for your owne studie, little needeth any helpe, of such an English enterprise, being so well trauailed, both in the Greeke, and in the Latine, for the same purpose, thorough the helpe of those right worthie men, *Sir John Cheke*, and *Sir Anthonie Cooke*, your Maiesties teachers, & Scholemasters in all good literature. But to feede and satisfie the thirst and desire of such English-men, as for default of the sayd tongues, could otherwise not come to the knowledge of *Logike*: I haue iudged it labour worth, to giue the precepts and rules thereof in English, that all men, according to the gift, that to euery one is measured, may bee the more prouoked, to followe the examples of your Maiestie, aswell in studiousnes, and desire of knowledge, as also in the exercise of all vertue, and Princely worthinesse, wherein your Grace hath made a goodly entrie. In which most godly

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trade, if your Grace shall continue together with the feare of God, and the most reuerent obseruation, of his most holy Commaundements, and Gospell (wherein at this day all England, to their incomparable ioye and comfort, doth see and finde your Maiesties chiefe delight to be) it can not be doubted, but that the same shalbe to the wicked a terrour, to the godly a comforte, to this Realme of England, a perpetuall defence and safegarde, and to all Christian Kinges, either now liuing, or hereafter to come, an exâple of Kingly worthinesse, and a mirrour of Princely gouernaunce. And whereas to the most noble Kinges of *Israell* and *Iuda*, the Lord for their sondrie vertues, gaue sondrie giftes of grace, (as to *Dauid* his dearling, puisaunce and might against his enemies: To *Salomon*, wisedome and riches: To *Aza*, innocencie of life, and purenesse of Religion: To *Iosaphat*, prudence of Kingly regiment, to set good Ministers and Officers vnder him: To good King *Iosias*, the aduancement of Gods true seruice, and the rooting vp of Idolatrie: To *Iothan*, a long and a prosperous reigne, and all good rest and quietnesse:) all these noble giftes, of Regall excellencie, shall the Lord your guide, and gouernour, vouchsafe to powre vpon your highnesse, to endue you withall, in whom are now planted such graffes, of his heauenly grace, as the fruites hereafter is most like to be incomparable. Which thing that it may so bee, your Maiestie hath and perpetually shall haue, the daylie, and incesseant prayers, of all vs your most faithfull louing subiects, for the long & prosperous reigne of your highnesse, to the glory of God, & the honor and Princely dignitie of your Realmes, and Dominions, long to endure. *Amen.*



GVALTERVS HAD-

DONVS CANTABRIGIENSIS,

Legum Doctor & Regius in iure

Ciuili professor.



*Rammatice, lingua nos est affata Britanna,
Curreret vt latys lingua Britanna rotis.
Nunc Logice venit, & nostris se vocibus affert,
Ut ratio nostros possit habere sonos.
Ante, peregrinis linguis instructa fuisti,*

Anglia, nunc propria discere voce potes.

Grammaticen laudant omnes, quia verba polinit:

Qualis erit Logice nos ratione regens?

Attulit hanc, nostras Thomas Wilsonus ad aures,

Vtilis & patria sic fuit ille sua.



THOMAS WILSON-

nus, Lectori. S. D.

S*I sit amor Logices, vel honesti sit tibi cura,
Qua tibi sunt vsu nota, docere decet.
Instruit ars mentem, vel discere, vel ipse doceto,
Vtere quando placet, corrige, quando libet.*

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The Arte of Logike. 1



IN EVERY CAUSE that man doth handle, this one lesson should first be learned. Neuer to enter vpon any matter, nor yet once to talke without good aduise. For Artes therefore were inuented, wisemen are yet for the same cause esteemed, and sage Counsaillours had in much honour. In consideration whereof, Aristotle,

in whome nature hath powred her graces plentifully, teacheth by precepts, in all our doings, to take good aduise. It is alwaies right needefull (saith he) by these fower especiall points, to examine euery matter, before we take in hand to teache it any other. First, to knowe whether the thing be or no, whereof we entreate. Again, what it is in substance, and by the owne nature. Thirdly, what maner of thing it is. Fowerthly, wherefore, or to what ende it is: Now in talking of Logike, I neede not to question, whether Logike be or no. For, he that knoweth reason to be in man, and the same giuen by the great might of God: must needs confesse, that Logike also is in man, and that only by God. For, there is none other difference, betwixt the one and the other, but that Logike is a Greeke word, and Reason is an English word.

And therefore, he that speaketh Logike, speaketh nothing els but reason, yea, there be many Greeke wordes, made English, whereof all men haue not the meaning. As for example, A yong man of Cambridge, sitting in his chamber, with two or thre of his fellows, and happening to fall in talke of a woman, then lately married to a scholer, when euery one had sayd his rhetoricke, as well of the man, as of the woman, comparing the qualities of the one, with the properties of the other, saying their pleasure euery one of them, of her beautie and her body, *pro & contra*: this yong man chopping in with his reason, sayd: I can not tell my maisters, but surely I for my part, take her for a catholike woman, let other men thinke what they liste. When his fellows

Fower questions necessarie to be made of any matter, before we dispute.

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heard this vile report, they laughed apace, as known by their learning, what this word meant. For (Catholike being a Greeke word, signifieth nothing in English, but vniuersall or common. And we call in English a common woman, an euill woman of her bodie. Therefore, though termes be darcke, and the meaning vnknewen to many, yet the truth enclosed, is alwaies one, and giuen vs of God, vse what termes we list. This then perceiued, that Logike is the Rule of Reason, I thinke it as needlesse, to aske whether it be, or no, as to aske, whether any man can speake, or no. Thus ye see we must trie Logike by the seconde question, learning thereby to knowe first of all, what is the substance and nature thereof.

The definition of Logike.

What Logike is
in substance.

What manner of
thing Logike is.



Logike is an Arte to reason probable, on both parts, of all matters that be put forth, so farre as the nature of euery thing can beare.

In declaring what manner of thing Logike is, wee must vnderstand that all things happening, or the which doe fall in controuerisie, and may through reason fully be examined, are in this question euermore considered. It happeneth therefore to Logike, and accidentally also belongeth to the same vpon all things to entreate, which commonly by wit are examined, or may through reason at all be discussed. Neither can we do any thing, without the helpe of reason, to guide all our actions.

Wherefore, or
to what ende
Logike is.

Man, by Nature hath a sparke of knowledge, and by the secret working of GOD, iudgeth after a sort, and discerneth good from euill. Before the fall of Adam, this knowledge was perfect, but through offence, darkened & folowed, and the bright light was taken away. Wise men therefore considering the weakness of mans wit, & the blindnesse also, wherein we are all diuined: inuented this Arte, to helpe vs the rather, by a naturall order, to finde out the truth. For though before Adams fall, knowledge was naturall, and came without labour, yet no one man can now of himselfe, attaine the truth in all things, without helpe and diligent learning.

The

The Arte of Logike.

2

The deuision of Logike.



This Arte is diuided in two partes. The first part standeth in framing of the things apely together, and knitting words for the purpose accordingly, and in Latine is called *Iudicium*.

Iudicium.

The second part consisteth, in finding out matter, and searching stufte, agreable to the cause, and in Latine is called *Inuentio*.

Inuention.

For you muste vnderstand, that when one goeth about to proue any thing, hee must first inuent somewhat to proue his cause, the which when he hath doen: he must vse iudgement both in framing the same reason so inuented, and also to see whether it serueth for the purpose, or not.

And now some will say, that I should first speake of the finding out of an argument, before I should teache the way howe to frame an argument. True it is, that naturally wee finde a reason, or we beginne to fashion the same. And yet notwithstanding, it is more meete that the ordering of an argument should be first handled: forasmuch as it shall no more profite a man, to finde out his argument, except he be first knowne, howe to order & same, & to shape it accordingly, (which he doth not yet perfectly knowe) then stones or timber shall profite the Mason, or Carpenter, which knoweth not howe to worke vpon the same. A reason is easlier found, then fashioned, for euery man can giue a reason naturally, and without arte, but how to fashion and frame the same, according to Arte, none can doe at all, except they be learned. Therefore, because euery mans witte, can giue lightly a reason of diuers things, without any learning at all, euen by the instinct of nature, and yet not bee able to set the same in order Scholerlike, either to proue, or to confute: I purpose first to shewe the maner of making an Argument (as which is more needfull) next after that, the maner of finding of an Argument, and the places where all Arguments doe rest. And last of all, the captious or deceitfull arguments, as they be in Aristotle.

The Arte of Logike.

A brieue declaration in Meetre, of the seuen liberall
Artes, wherein Logike is comprehended
as one of them.



Rammer doth teache to utter words:
To speake both apt and plaine.
Logike by Arte, setteth forth the trueth,
And doth tell what is vaine.
Rhetorike at larges paintes wel the cause,
And make that seeme right gaie,
Which Logike spake but at a word,

And taught as by the way.
Musike with tunes, delites the eare:

And makes vs thinke it heauen:
Arithmetike by number can make

Reckenings to be euen,
Geometrie things thicke and broade,

Measures by line and square:
Astronomie by starres doth tell:

Of soyle and eke of faire.

The difference betweene Logike
and Sophistrie.

The difference
betweene Lo-
gike and Sophi-
strie.



Logike, otherwise called Dialecte (for they are
both one) is an Arte to trie the coine fro the chaffe,
the trueth from euerie fallshoode, by defining the
nature of any thing, by diuiding the same, and also
by knitting together true arguments, and untwip-
ping all knottie subtelties, that are both false and wongfully
framed together.

Sophistrie is euer occupied, either in prouing the trueth, al-
waies to be false, or els that, which is false to be true, so that euer-
more, one part of the argument is either false, by vsing some am-
biguous worde, or by not well applying it to the purpose, or els
not framing it, according to the rules: so that a skillfull artificer,
may soone put the vaine Sophister to silence, by opening the
fraude, and declaring the craft of his inuention. Whereas othe-
wise an argument, made by the rules of Logike, can not be auoi-

ded

ded, but must needes be true, whosoeuer say naye. And so much moze is Logike to be preferred before Sophistrie, as he is the moze to be esteemed, that telleth a true tale, then he which telleth a lye. And euen as a Grammarian is better liked, that speaketh true and good Latine, then he is that speaketh falsse: euen so Logike of it selfe is good, when Sophistrie on the other side is naught. And well may wee say, that Sophisters are like those, which plaie with falsse Dice, and would make other beleue that they are true, or els properly to terme them, they bee like those that goe for honest men, and are none.

The difference betweene Logike and Rhetorike.



Both these Artes are much like, sauing that Logike is occupied about all matters, and doth plainly and nakedly set forth with apt words, the summe of things, by the way of argumentation. Again of the other side, Rhetorike useth gate painted sentences, and setteth forth those matters with fresh colours, and goodly ornaments, and that at large. In so much that Zeno being asked the difference, betweene Logike and Rhetorike, made answer by demonstration of his hand, declaring that when his hand was closed, it resembled Logike, when it was open and stretched out it was like Rhetorike.

The difference betweene Logike and Rhetorike.

The office of Logike.



Logike professeth to teach truly, orderly, and plainly. And here we may see, how vniuersall this commonditie is, & how largely it extendeth, not only to knowe worldly affaires, but also to knowe God, and all his heauenly workes, so farre as nature may comprehend.

The office of Logike.

There bee foure partes of this office, or duetie, whereunto Logike is bound. That is: To define the nature of euery thing, to deuide, to knit true arguments, and vnkneit falsse.

The partes of Logikes duetie, or office.

Of Questions.



This same maner of knitting wordes in due order, being one of the partes of Logike, or rather Logike it selfe, sheweth the maner of Questions, which otherwise are either propositions, or severall wordes. A

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question

The Arte of Logike.

question is either a worde or sentence put forth, as when I aske what such a thing is, & would knowe an other mans aduise therein, as thus: What is man? What is truely? What is ambition,

Euery question is either single or double. A single question, resteth in a single word, as thus. What is friendship? What is Philosophie? A double question standeth not in one worde, but in two severall sentences, as thus. Is the studie of Philosophie praise worthe, or is it not?

Likewise a proposition, which is a sentence, vttered in plaine words expressly, signifying either truely or falshood, is either single, or double. A single proposition, as thus. Wicked men can not abide to reade the word of God. Of the which you may make a double proposition, by adding somewhat thereunto, as thus. Wicked men, not onely can they not abide to reade the worde of God, but also they seeke, by all meanes possible, to ouerthrowe the same.

Of the five predicables, otherwise called the five common words which are spoken of other.



When we goe about to expound any matter, first we must begin with the definition, to knowe the verie nature of the thing, the which we can not doe, except we first learne the predicables, for they shewe the largenesse & the narrownesse of words, how farre they do extend, and how much they comprehend in them. As when I see one a farre of come vnto mee, first I knowe that he is a man, then when hee cometh nigher, I knowe whether he bee of mine acquaintance, or no. Likewise, when I goe about to declare what one is, and to open the nature of any thing, I vse the largest words, and so it must needes be, that I begin with the predicables, because they shewe how much euery word doth comprehend in it selfe, and how large, or narrowe it is. They be called predicables, because some one thing, is spoken of an other. And they are (as a man would say) markes or notes of wordes that are spoken of many, shewing how and by what maner the same wordes are attributed to other. And euen as the childe beginneth with his Crosse rote, and the

Scholer

The Arte of Logike.

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Scholer with his eight parts of speech, to the Logician first and foremost, professeth to knowe wordes, before he purposeth to knit sentences. Neither is there any one worde, which is not comprehended, vnder one of these five common wordes. And to this ende were those markes limited, that euery thing might bee knowne in his kind. For if euery singular substance, of herbes, of stones, and such like, should haue a seuerall name, neither the thing it selfe, nor yet the names could once be comprehended in our memories. Therefore, as euery thing is ioyned by nature, one with an other, so they all being of one affinitie, are comprehended vnder one of these five common wordes.

Genus.	The generall word.
Species.	The kind, or speciall.
Differentia.	The difference.
Proprium.	The propertie.
Accidens.	The thing chauncing or cleauing to the substance.



Genus is a generall worde, the which is spoken of many, that differ in their kinde: as when this question is asked, what it is. As *Animal*, a liuing creature, *Ars*, an Arte, *Virtus*, Vertue, *Gemma*, a precious stone. Or els thus: *Genus*, is a generall worde,

vnder the which, diuers kindes or sortes of things are comprehended, as vnder a liuing creature, are comprehended, men and beastes. Under Arte, are comprehended, Logike, Grammar, Rhetorike. &c. Euery generall worde hath diuers kindes, and is spoken euermore of them all. As *Lapis*, a stone, comprehended in it selfe, a Saphire, a Rubbie, a Christall, a Turkas: as thus, *Saphirus est lapis*. A Saphire is a stone, and so of other.

Euery generall worde, is two wayes considered, and commonly called the chiefe generall, in Latine, *Genus summum*, and the middle generall, in Latine, *Genus inter medium*.

The chiefe generall is so, that where as it is in the head of all and aboue all, it can neuer become inferiour, to be of any kind or sort in things. As the substance, the qualitie, the quantitie, are
euer

The Arte of Logike.

ever chiefe generall wordes, and can not be comprehender under any other. The middle generall is the same, that being comprehended betwixt the chiefe generall, and the lowest kind or sort in things, may be also some kinde or forme it selfe, as a bodie, a living creature, a precious stone, the which thre being compared with their inferiours, are generall wordes: being referred to their superiours, they are *Species*. That is to say, shapcs, kindes, or sortes of things.

THE KIND

Species seu forma, the kind, or sort of any thing (comprehended under a worde more vniuersall) is the same of whom the generall word is spoken, when the question is asked, what it is. And when I aske: What is Iustice? I aunswere a vertue. Therfore, in this Proposition (Iustice is a vertue) Iustice is the kinde, and vertue is the generall worde, which comprehendeth the sayd Iustice, and is spoken of the same.

Or thus, *Species* is a common worde, that is spoken of many, which differ onely in number, as man is spoken of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and of euery proper name belonging to any man. As Socrates is a man, Plato is a man, Aristotle is a man.

Euery *Species*, or kinde in things, is of two sortes. The one is called the lowest kind, which is alwaies spoken of euery proper name, and euery is the kinde, neither can it at any time be the generall worde, although sometime it beare the name of the generall worde. The other is called *Species inter media*, that is, the kinde placed betweene the highest and the lowest, which at diuers times, and by diuers considerations, may both be the generall worde and the kinde. For that which is under the generall word, that same may be called *Species*, or kind, that which comprehendeth other, may be called the generall worde.

A NOWNE
Proper.

A Nowne proper, is that whereof the kinde is rehearsed. As *Cato est homo*, Cato is a man: In this Proposition Cato is the Nowne proper, which belongeth to one man onely, and man, is the kinde, which is more large, and comprehendeth all men.

This

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THis Table sheweth the order of euery substance & kind, as they are appointed by Nature, what the chief generall wordes are, what the middle generall are, what the lowest kinds in euery kind are, & what the kinds betwixt both are.

			GOD.			
{ With body.	{ Substance.	{ Without body:	{ Angels.			
			{ Spirites.			
			{ The soule is of man.			
			{ The fower Elements.			
{ Composed of diuers Elements.	{ bodie	{ Without mixture.	{ Fire.			
			{ Arie.			
			{ Water.			
			{ Earth.			
			{ Heauen & all the Planets.			
{ Being a li- uing thing.	{ bodie liuing.	{ Without life:	{ Stones.			
			{ Mettalles.			
			{ Liquores.			
{ Having the sence of feeling	{ bodie liuing.	{ Without sence or feeling at al:	{ Tree.			
			{ Shrub.			
			{ In Herbs.			
{ Endued with reason.	{ liuing creature.	{ Without the gift of reason: as beaſts, bir- des, or Fiſh ſome liuing:	{ Upon the land.			
			{ In the water.			
			{ In Hayre, or in them both.			
						{ Scipio.
{ A man:	{ As	{	{ Socrates.			
			{ Alexander, & euery ſenerall man liuing.			



Difference is the same that is spoke of many, which differ in forme and kinde, when the question is asked, what maner of thing it is, as when wee say: *Quale quid est homo?* What maner of thing is man? Wee must answer: he is endued with reason. If the question be asked what man is: wee must answer by his Genus, or generall worde, he is a liuing creature. If the que-

The difference.

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tion

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tion be asked, what manner of thing a beast is: Wee may say: he is without the gift of reason. Every difference that is most proper to every thing, is naturally and substantially ioyned to the kinde which is comprehended vnder the generall worde.

The Propertie.

Propertie, is a natural pronenesse, and manner of doing, which agreeth to one kinde, and to the same onely, and that euermore. And also may be spoken of the same kinde, and by conuersion the same kinde may be spoken of him also. As to speake, and to haue power to laugh, both onely agree to man, and to none other creature earthly. And as I may say: Whosoever is a man, hath power giuen him of nature to speake: So may I also say by conuersion backward: whosoever hath power giuen him of Nature to speake, that same bodie is a man. To barke is proper to a dogge, and onely proper, and euermore proper. Ergo, whosoever hath power or rather an inclination giuen of Nature to barke, that same is a dogge: And againe: Whosoever creature is a dogge, that same hath power, or rather an inclination to barke: To goe vpright is proper to a man, and onely to a man, and to none other living creature. *Nota* standing, ye must marke one thing, that although many men goe trooked, and some also can not speake: yet both to goe vpright, and to speake, are proper to all men generally, and therefore this rule serueth to auoyde such objections. *Verba in definitionibus posita, non actum, sed potentiam significant.* Which is as much to say: that wordes vsed in definition, doe not signifie the very act in deed, but the power, the aptnesse, or the inclinations of Nature therunto: as when I say, it is proper for every man to speake: I meane to bee able or to bee apt by Nature to speake, is proper to every man.

Note further, that the Propertie is not alwaies taken after one sort, but it is fower waies considered.

First, the Propertie is that which agreeth to some kinde onely, although not to every person comprehended vnder the same kinde. As it is proper to a man onely to be a Poet, or to be a Philosopher, and yet not proper to every man.

Secondly, the Propertie is that which agreeth to every singular person, and yet not onely to man. As to haue two feet agreeth

agreeth to euery singular person, and yet not to man onely.

Thirdly, the Propertie is that which agreeth to euery man, and to man onely, and yet not alwaies, nor for euermore. As to haue hoare heires in the olde age agreeth to man onely, and yet not alwaies, but for the most part men haue hoare heires in their old age.

Fourthly, the Propertie is that which in decde is most aptly and chiefly called *Proprium*, when any thing doth agree to euery man, to man onely, and alwaies to man. As to be able to speake, to laugh, to goe by night, agreeth to euery man, to man onely, and alwaies to man.

This diuersitie many haue made betwixt the difference and the propertie, that the difference is one parte of mans substance, and is the parte that maketh vp man. As to haue the gift of reason doth signifie the minde, which is one parte of man, for man himselfe is compact of bodie and minde.

The difference betwixt the propertie and the difference.

A Propertie doth signifie a certaine thing, which is attributed to man when he is made, and as a man would say, doth come after, when man is wholly made, as to bee able to speake, to laugh, to goe by night.

An Accident (that is to say, a thing cleauing, or chauncing, or committing to a Substance) is that which doth not stand by himselfe, neither is the parte of a Substance, but rather is after such sort in the Substance, that it may both bee away and bee there, sometimes more, and sometimes lesse, without destruction, or losse of the subject, or substance, as mirth, sorrow, to runne, to sit, to bee well coloured, all these may bee away, and yet the men may bee on liue, in whom they were before. So that the lacke of them in their quantity, or greatnesse, is not the losse of the substance. And although no substance at any time doth altogether forsake his Accidences: yet this wee see, that one and the same Substance, doth sometimes alter his Accidences, forsaking some, and taking others. As water being set on the fire, altereth the coloures, and taketh heat, so that wee may iudge by this, that coloures in the water is not a Substance, but an Accident.

The Accident.

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The deuision of
Accident.

An accident is two waies considered, for either it may bee separated, or it may not, some may be separated from their subiect, as cold may be taken from water, and knowledge from þ mind. Other are inseparable, because they cannot be taken away altogether, as stature or broadnesse, cannot be taken from mā. Heate cannot bee taken from fire, nor moysture from water, the which notwithstanding they are not separate from their substance, yet the quantitie or greatnesse is chaungeable in euery one of them: for sometime it is more, and sometime it is lesse. And we see heate in other thinges to be separated from the subiect. Whereupon, we iudge that the heate is an other thing thē the very substance of fire. Therefore, this is worthis to be knowne, that the substance is one thing, and the accident an other thing, and meete it is to make a difference betwixt them, as thus: the soule is one thing, the feare of God is an other thing. Man may bee without the feare of God, (as many one is at this day, the more pittie) therefore the feare of God is an accident, the soule is a substance.

The vse of the Accident.

None man could be knowne from an other, neither yet any other thing, if it were not for the Accidents which happen vnto them. As when I would knowe an Pearbe, a Stone, a Beast, a Man, I must giue the proper Accidents, declaring the same to be of this or that colour, separating all such by description from all other, as well of that kinde, as of any other sorte els.

The vse and commoditie, which we haue by these
five commune wordes, called other-
wise Predicables.

The first vse.

There bee foure especiall commodities. First, they shew the largenesse, and the narrownesse of the most generall wordes, called otherwise Predicaments, which hereafter followe: so that hereby ye may perceiue how much euery worde comprehendeth in it selfe, and how farre it may be applied. The second profite is, that euery thing is defined by these five commune wordes,
for

The second vse.

for asmuch as all thinges, the more narrowe they be, are alwaies defined by wordes that are more large. As by the generall word, by the kinde, by the difference, and the propertie.

Thirdly, they are good to iudge the knitting of wordes, and to see what thing may truly bee ioynd to other, for there is no Proposition, or yet ioyning together of any sentence (according to the common order of Nature) but they alwaies agree to these aboue rehearsed Predicables: so that either the kinde is spoken of the singulare or proper name (which is euer some one person) as thus: Cicero est homo, Cicero is a man. Or els the generall worde, the difference, the propertie, or the Accident are all spoken either of the kinde, or of some one person. As thus: Homo, vel Cicero, est animal ratione præditum, loquendi facultatem habens, Album, longum, latum. A man or Cicero, is a liuing creature endued with reason, hauing aptnesse by nature to speake, being white, long, and broade. So that no proportion can be, but the partes of the same are comprehended within these five commune wordes. Fourthly, the generall worde, the kinde, the difference and propertie are ioynd together necessarily, to that when you name one, all the other followe. Therefore, when a Proposition is made from the kinde, to the generall, to his difference or propertie: it is euer more an vndoubted true proposition, as this: Homo est animal ratione præditum, loquendi facultatem habens. A man is a liuing creature endued with reason, hauing aptnesse by nature to speake. A man cannot be, except he bee a liuing creature endued with reason, and hauing aptnesse of nature to speake. The Accident notwithstanding is not necessarily spoken of the subiect, but is there casuall, and may bee chaunged, as thus: Homo est albus. Some man is white. This Proposition may be afterward false, for he may bee blacke, or alter his complexion some other way, so that the Accident is often altered, and an other succeedeth in his roome.

Therefore, it is good to be knowne, when you haue a Proposition, whether it be vndoubted true, for euer more, or els may be false at any time. And al Scholers ought as diligently to know these five commune wordes in all their doings, as those that

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learne to write, should diligently marke their letters. By this trade, order is best had, when euery cause is brought to these five commune wordes: the generall wordes first considered, next after, the kindes following vpon the same well obserued, and set as though they were in arate, after that the difference, the properties, yea, and the accidents also placed accordingly. As Tully in his Offices shewing what that thing is, which we call hom: first speaketh generally, next after he setteth forth the sortes and kinds of honestie, parting them into foure head vertues, wherevpon he declarcth the difference and the proprietie of euery one, and lastly, he toucheth things that belong vnto euery vertue, and sheweth thinges that happen in this life.

Of the Predicaments, called in English the most generall wordes.



Predicament is an order of single wordes, wherein thinges of one kinde are couched and comprehended vnder one worde, which is most generall.

A Predicament is nothing els in English, but a shewing or rehearsing what wordes may be truly ioyned together, or els a setting forth of the nature of euery thing, and also shewing what may be truly spoken, and what not. And for this cause Artes were inuented, that the truth might be knowne, and euery thing vttered with his proper wordes. For when I say, a man is a creature, I knowe this Proposition hath his proper wordes, and that like as man is a substance, so in the creature, which is the generall worde vnto him, which both are in the Predicament, and the order in this Proposition is obserued according to the Arte: for we must alwaies beginne at the lowest and goe vpwordes, which order agreeth also to Nature, when thinges lesse knowne are declared by thinges that are more knowne, as shall more plainly hereafter appeare.

The Predicaments are deuided into the substance and the Accident.

The first is both called the substance, and is a substance in deede. The other are Accidents, as not being of the substance, but

Division of Predicaments.

but declaring thereunto.

The commoditie of these Medicaments is greate. First, where as they be deuided into the substance and accident: it is a good lesson to knowe euer moze the substance, from the thing which is accidentall. And againe, of these most generall wordes ariseth this profite, that if you will define any thing, or shewe the nature thereof, you may knowe in which of all these store howles the worde resteth, which would expresse the nature of another.

Thirdly, if one will bestowe a little diligence herein, searching where euery worde is settled, and knowing to which of all these most generall wordes he may best referre it: he shall faithfully knowe the nature of all thinges, no man better, then the which, nothing is moze necessarie, and this difference is betwixt the five commune wordes, otherwise called Predicables, and these most generall wordes, called Medicaments, that the Predicables, set forth the largenesse of wordes, the Medicaments doe name the very nature of thinges, declaring (and that substantially) what they are in very deede.

Difference of
Predicables and
Medicaments.

A note of certaine thinges diligently to be obserued before the rehearsall of most generall wordes.



Considering ambiguitie breedeth error, most warrenesse ought to be vsed, that the doublenesse of no one word deceiue the hearer. The cause of all controuersie, is either the not well vnderstanding, or els the wylie vsing of wordes, that in sence haue dubble meaning. Aristotle chiefe Schoolemaster to al scholers, giueth good warning to all men, bee right ware in any wise to haue the right vnderstanding of euery seuerall worde.

There bee wordes that vnder one, and the same title, comprehend the nature of many thinges, as these wordes following.

A Crowne

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{ A Crowne.
A Noble.
Time.
Sage.

{ A Crowne signi-
fieth the Crowne
of a mans head, &
also signifieth a

Crowne of gold, such as is currant, or els such as Kings weare at the day of their Coronation. A shewde hope seeing of late daies a Priest, clarkely shauen in the Crowne, at what time French Crownes did beare an high price here in England, sayd to the Priest full unhappely in this wise: I pray you master Parson (quoth he) how goeth Crownes now with you, whereat the Priest was abashed, and would rather haue lost a Crowne in deede, then that his Crowne should haue bene so curstly and in such wise taunted.

Nobles signifie not onely the Peeres of a Realme, but also they are the good yealow Nobles in a mans purse: A Priest had a Noble for preaching a funerall Sermon, vpon the death of a worshipfull man, the Priest purposing to gratifie the dead, and wick due prasse to commend his liberalitie, saith: surely he was a good man, a vertuous man, yea, he was a noble Gentleman. I thinke if it had bene his hap to haue had a Royall, he had called him a royall Gentleman to. Time, noteth both the space of howe, day, and yeare, and also wee call an Hearbe by that name, which groweth in Gardens. Sage also betokeneth an Hearbe, and yet we call wise men, sage men: so þ every one of these wordes haue a dubble meaning, and ioynd only together by fellowship of name: by nature & in very deede, doe very much dissent. Therefore, this ought euermore to be marked that all wordes bee well noted according to their natures, that the rather we may escape errour. Those are onely to be receiued and used for the maintenance of all trueth, whose name, and nature is all one, or the which are euermore to be taken and vnderstanded after this sort. As homo a man, signifieth none other thing but a man. A Tree signifieth none other thing in all the world but a Tree only, and so of other. If any worde be used that hath a dubble meaning, restraine the largenesse thereof, and declare how you will haue it taken, by meanes whereof the fraude shall sooner be auoyded.

The

Words allowable.

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The predicaments are in number. x.

i.	<i>Substantia.</i>	The substance.
ii.	<i>Quantitas.</i>	The quantitie.
iii.	<i>Qualitas.</i>	The qualitie.
iiii.	<i>Relatina.</i>	The relation.
v.	<i>Actio.</i>	The maner of doing.
vi.	<i>Passio.</i>	The suffering.
vii.	<i>Quando.</i>	When.
viii.	<i>Vbi.</i>	Where.
ix.	<i>Situs.</i>	The seatling.
x.	<i>Habitus.</i>	The apparelling.



Substance, or being, which Cicero calleth Nature, is a thing, which standeth by it self, and needeth no helpe of an other, but hath his proper being and substance naturally. Or thus.

The substance is a thing, which hath his proper being of himself, & containeth accidents, which happen thereunto.

The deuision of the substance.



Substance is deuided into the first & second.

The first substance, is called euery singular person, or proper name, as Socrates, Plato, Virgil, Homere.

The second substance, comprehendeth both the generall word, and also the kinde of euery singular person. As thus. Tully, Caesar, Hanniball, with other. Likewise this word (a living creature) being a substance and generall word to euery proper name, containeth all things particularly, that haue life.

It is profitable to marke the order of substance, set forth in a Table a litle before: for wee may by the same, deuide seuerally euery substance, of all things in this worlde, the which, when we knowe, and remember in our mindes, we perceiue evidently, the difference, betweene God and his creatures, and seeing the thing created of GOD, and the properties therewithall, we rest vpon the same, and learne the vse and proper commoditie of ma-

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any things here in earth. Wee may define many things by the same Table, as we may define God, man, heauen, earth, beaste, stone: and any thing els, that is a substance.

The propertie of a substance.

1 The substance receiueth by alteration of it selfe, and at sundry times, diuers and contrarie accidents, and yet the substance is not contrarie of the owne nature.

2 No substance can be either greater or lesser; then it is by nature, although according to the bignesse, or largeness, it appeare to be other wise.

3 No substance can bee seene with our eyes, but onely the outward accidents, whereby we iudge and knowe, euery seuerall creature.

Of quantitie.

Quantitie, is the greatnesse of a thing, or the number, and proper it is to this most generall worde, to be diuided, as greatnesse is diuided into seuerall partes and numbers, into euery seuerall number.

Quantitie is two wayes considered.

The one is called *continua quantitas*, that is when the question is asked, how great or broad any thing is. And therefore, the length, the latitude, and the deepenesse of bodie artificiall, are herein obserued: the vse whereof, is most seene in Geometrie.

The other is called *discreta quantitas*, when the question is asked, how many things there be, and it is occupied altogether in numbering. The vse of this is perceiued in Arithmetike.

The propertie of quantitie.

1 The quantitie hath nothing to bee contrary vnto him, for great and little are not contraries, according to their quantitie, but they are relatives, compared the one with the other.

2 No quantitie doth receiue of the owne nature any thing, either greater or lesser, but it is alwaies one, and although it happeneth, that one life be longer then an other, yet according to the quantitie, a short life is as much a life, as a longer life is.

3 By quantitie also, one thing is counted either equall, or els vnequall vnto an other thing.

Quantitie hath
no contrarie.

Quantitie nei-
ther encreaseth,
nor diminisheth.

Of

Of Qualitie.



Qualitie is a forme, or shape of the bodie, or minde, whereof some name is deriued: As of Wisedome, men are called wise: of Iustice, men are called iustle.

There be three manner of qualities, whereof the first doth containe the habite, otherwise called the perfect hauing of any thing.

The habite in a thing.

The other is a forwardnesse in any thing, gotten by labour and trauaile, not geuen by Natures goodnesse, or els wee may call it, the halfe attaining of that, which wee goe about to haue, wanting perfection, for lacke of full time, and is called in Latine *dispositio*. As to haue meane knowledge, and not to be fully instructed in the practise of Iustice, is *dispositio*.

The forwardnesse in any thing.

Againe, to be fully learned, to haue accomplished all things due to righteousness, and Iustice, is called in Latine *Habitus*. As who should say, the absolute atteyning, and strong holde of the same. The pith of this worde *Habitus*, can hardly be uttered with one worde, in this our tongue, notwithstanding it may in mo wordes bee opened, for the better understanding of it. For, euen as ware chaufed with the handes, is made softer, euen so some partes of man, are made by vse, more apte to compasse any thing.

The full attayning of any thing.

He that vseth oft to speake French, shall by continuance obtaine perfection. He that vseth much to write, at length shall haue a readie hande, and this is called *Habitus*. So that no man hath knowledge, or perfect skill in any thing, except he get it by labour, and acquainte Nature with trauaile. Notwithstanding, I must needs confesse, that all natures be not like apt, to receiue knowledge. Some are giuen to one thing, and some to another. Therefore they, which by nature haue a promptnesse, shall sooner attaine perfection, then any other can doe, if by labour and earnest trauaile, they will stretch to attaine that, whereunto they are apt, and with good endenour, fillip Nature forwardes. God giueth some one man, a passing gift, to search the influences of

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the Starres, to an other he graunteth anaturall inclination to Musike, and all heauenly harmonies. So that if either of these two would seeke to folowe their naturall apenelle, it were most like they should excell. Other that doe not finde nature so fauorable, can neuer come to any such perfection.

The full attaining two wayes considered.

The full attaining of any thing by long time, is two wayes considered: for either it is of the body, or els of the minde.

Perfection gotten by helpe of the body, is, when men can by much vse, leape, waiste, or cast the barre, better then any other: or els doe excell in any handy craft, about the common sort.

The habite of the minde, that is to say, that constant hold of any thing, which is in the minde, either consisteth in knowledge, or els in practise. In knowledge are comprehended all Artes, as Grammer, Logike, Astronomie. &c. and all other learning whereunto wit can attaine. That habite of the minde, which is in practise, and by good aduisement is chosen, standeth in the will of man. As all vertue, and all vice doth. Of vertues these be in mans will, iust dealing euermore, manhoode in suffering all harmes stoutly for honesties sake, and temperance of life, in forbearing luste and filthie gluttonie. These vertues though their offspring be from God, yet time maketh them perfect in the eyes of man. Other vertues are giuen of God wholie and altogether, without mans labour to attaine them. As faith, hope, charitie, and all other like giftes of the holy ghost.

The second forme is called the power, strength, or promptnesse of nature, in Latine *Naturalis vis*. And the contrary hereunto is called the weakenesse of nature, when she hath denied her power to any thing, in Latine is called *Imbecillitas natura*.

The naturall strength.

Naturall strength, is apenelle of nature, giuen either to the body, or to the mind. To the mind, as aptnesse to learne, promptnes of memorie: to the body in man is aptnes by nature to waiste, for a Horse to be quicke and stirring, for a Birde to be apt to flie: for fish, to liue in the water, the which man can not doe: for an Asse to be slowe: for a stone to be hard, &c. Naturally weakenesse, is when Nature diminisheth her gift, as when she denieth aptnesse to learning, as we see many dulle wittes for learning,

and

and much unfit that way. Nature hath denied some men health of body, that they are neuer well at ease: some men are so sicke in their braine, that they are neuer wise: some are Capones by kinde, and so blunt by nature, that no arte at all can whet them. An Asse will neuer be swift, a Stone will neuer be soft of Nature. All qualities be instruments of Nature, whereby she worketh, as heate is the instrument of fire. Heate and cold in the sayce of hearbes, are instruments, whereby men either are healed, or els past healing for this worlde.

The thirde kinde comprehendeth the passions of man, called *Passions*. in Latine *Perturbationes*, and also those qualities, which tary a good while and moue man, either this way or that way.

A perturbation, or els affection, is a sodaine change of the minde, and also of the bodie.

There be fower stirrings principall, which are in al the minde, whereof all other haue their offspring.

{	<i>Libido seu cupiditas.</i>	{	Luste, or desire.
	<i>Lattia.</i>		Mirth.
	<i>Egritudo.</i>		Griefe.
	<i>Metus.</i>		Feare.

The which are stirred vp by some motion of the minde, either desiring any thing earnestly, or abhorring the same.

There be five qualities of the body, which moue the senses, and are called things offered to the Sences, as colours, either whitenesse, blacknesse, or any like, moue the eyes. All soundes & noises that be made, moue the hearing, as coughing, speaking, braying of a Dere, lowing of a Cowe, or neighing of a Horse. Sauours moue the smelling, as perfumes, sweete odors, the strong smell of ordure, or of such filth. Sauours moue the taste, as bitterness, tartnesse, sourenesse. Such qualities as are touched, moue the sense of touching, as hardness, softnes, roughnesse, plainesse.

Affections permanent, called *Patibiles qualitates*. The qualities that tary a good while, differ from sodaine passions, forasmuch as these tary not long, but sodainly come, and sodainly go as blushing in a mans face, sodaine feare, sodainly to change colour, and waxe pale. The other tary longer, as enuie, ambition,

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tion, loue, continuall feare, greedinesse, with such other.

The fowerth comprehendeth the figure, and foyme of any thing. The figure comprehendeth the shape of things that haue no life, as the fashion of the Element, of Trees, of floudes, of an house, a ship, a coate, and such like.

The foyme containeth the portrature of all liuing things, as the very liuely Image of Man, of an Pope, of a Lion, as we call a man well fauoured, or hard fauoured.

The proprietie or qualitie.

1 There is somewhat contrary vnto Qualitie, as Vertue, is contrary vnto vice, witte vnto folie, manhode vnto cowardise.

2 The thing containing, or receiuing any qualitie, may bee sayd to receiue either more, or lesse. As one man is thought to be wiser then an other, not that wisdom it self, is either greater or lesse, but that it may be in some man more, & in some man lesse.

3 By qualitie, things are compted either like, or unlike. Those are like, which are of like qualitie, and haue properties both accodingly.

The Table of Qualities.

{ Of the mynde. Gotten by studie.	{ The Qualitie. Of the mynde.	{ Of the bodie.
{ Tarying still with a man, and hardly go- ing away.	{ Tarying still with a man.	{ Given by Nature, as the naturall in- clination to any thing. Going longe away as the affections.
{ Is knowledge, which either consisteth by pra- ctised skill.	{ Or els by Practised skill.	{ Speculation, & by the only obseruatio- of things naturall.
{ Either of vertue.	{ Of vertue.	{ Or els of vice.
{ Is Iustice.	{ Temperance.	{ Fortitude.
{ Temperance, or iust dealing of euery Angular persone. Is Cato, Socrates, Plato,		

OF

Of Relatiues.

Relatiues are those, which are comprehended with other, of the which are named one with an other, and as a man would say, haue a mutuall respect one to another.

The other predicaments before rehearsed, were absolutely spoken, so that we may understand by one, and the same worde what it meaneth. As we may perceiue what a man is, although we ioyne nothing to him. We knowe what Justice is, although we compare him with none other thing. But these relatiues can not be so well understood, except we ioyne some thing to them. As when I say a father, I can not call him, except I understand a sonne that he hath. So that euery bodie is called a father, in respect that he hath a sonne, or els not. Againe, no bodie can be called a Scholemaster, except he haue Scholers. There is no husband, except he haue a wife.

Therefore we may see, that Relatiues are referred euermore to an other, neither can they be taken absolutely, without hauing respect to some other worde. There is no word but we may consider the same to be a Relatiue, if we referre it to some other thing, and therefore, we may goe throughout al the predicaments with this one place, and find relation of euery one of them.

Relation may
be in all words.

Those that are referred to some thing, are of two sortes. First they are properly so called, as the father and the Sonne, the master and his seruant, neither can they bee considered, except they be compared with some other: for when one is called father, hee is properly so called, because he hath a sonne, and therefore hath he his proper being. Againe, relatiues improperly so called, are those seuerall words, which are known, and haue their being, euen when they stande alone, and yet considered with other, they haue diuers respectes, as Loue is the loue of the thing loued: or thus. Loue beholdeth the thing loued. Faith beholdeth the thing whereunto it leaneth. And therefore whereas Paul saith, we being iustified by faith, haue peace before God, it is as much to say, that we are not receiued for the worthines of the qualitie, but for his sake, & is the sonne of God: for I pray you, whereunto leaneth faith, or what thing doeth it els behold? Sauiing only our Lord

Relatiues pro-
perly so called.

Relatiues vpro-
perly so called.

Jesus

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Iesus, that died freely once for all. Or els thus. Relatiues are so called (and yet vnproperly) which are not according to their proper being, but according as they are so named, whereof the sixe predicaments that folowe beare the name. As he that doeth any thing, is referred to a thing doen, wherein the two places that folowe are declared, which signifie to doe, and to suffer.

By the place *Vbi*: where, one neighbour is compared with his next neighbour.

By the place *Quando*: when, a childe of sixe yeres old, is compared with a childe of the same yeres.

By the place *Scilicet*: That is to be seate, or to lye any manner of way. He that lieth byright, is compared with him that lieth downe groueling. In all these the proper being, is not declared, for a childe may be sixe yeres of age, although he bee not compared with an other, and therefore it is called *Relatio secundum dici improprie*. But a man can neuer be a father, sauing onely in consideration of his sonne. And yet note this one thing, it is proper to all Relatiues alwaies to be true, euen by conuersion. As thus: whosoever is a father, the same hath a sonne, who soeuer is a sonne, the same hath a father. Whosoever hath faith, the same man leaueth to Christ onely. Whosoever leaueth to Christ onely, that same man hath faith. Here are two things to be marked in relation. The ground of euery thing, and the ende whereunto it hath respect, or consideration. As a father is the ground, in that he doeth beget, and hath respect to his sonne, in that he is begotten. The sonne is the ground in that he is begotten, and hath respect to his father, which did beget him.

And thus likewise in all other.

The propertie of Relatiues.

1 Relatiues receiue contraries, as vertue is contrarie to vice, not that is referred to vice, as yet they two are contrary.

2 Relatiues properly so called, according to their naturall being, are euer both at one and the same time: and also lose their names, both at one and the same time: as a man is so soone called a father, as he hath a sonne, but so soone as the childe dieth, he is no more called a father to that childe.

The

Relatiues are
alway true by
conuersion.

In relation two
things are to be
marked.

The Table of the Relatiues.

By nature.	{ Is by the cause and the effect, the Father, and the Sonne, are considered.	
By some manner or way vsed.	{ The Magistrate, and the mace, the King, and his sword carried before him, are compared together	
By degrees in calling.	{ The Lord and his seruaur, the Advocate and his Clients.	
{ Relatiues are compared one with an other.	By kindred.	{ The brother and sister.
	By marriage.	{ The sonne in lawe, the mother in lawe.
By couenaunt.	{ The graunter of a Lease, and the Tenaunt.	
By accidentall happening.	{ A Poete to be a spyer, a Whistler to be a manqueller, or a Lawyer to be a theefe.	
By naturall kinde.	{ A man, a woman.	
By yeares.	{ A yong man, an old man.	
By condition of life.	{ A poore man, a rich man, a free man, a bond man.	

The maner of doing, in Latine called *Actio*.



Gere seu facere, is when we are sayd, to be occupied in a matter, that is before vs, or when our labor is extended vpon a weaker or lesse thing: and in this place, are conteyned all Verbes actiues, as to write, to dispute, to banquet, to beget, to encrease, to diminish, or to change, & to speake at a worde, al those are conteyned in this place, which answer to this question, what doth he, or what doth it? Excepted alway, verbes pertaining to the senses, or affections, as to heare, to taste, to see, to smelle, all which haue the passive signification.

The maner of
doing.

Every action is either naturall, or voluntarie. That is called naturall, which is done by the might of Nature, as to beget, or to bring forth, to encrease, or decrease, to alter by qualitie, as to be moyst, drie, colde, or hot, to moue from place to place. That is called voluntarie, which doth betoken any thing done freely, as to teach, to write, to reade, to play the Marchaunt man,

Every action, ei-
ther naturall, or
voluntary.

The Arte of Logike.

or to doe any other action. And hereunto may bee referred euery mans dactielining.

¶ Perpassio, called in English, a suffering.

A suffering.

P*ati ferri, seu accipere*, to suffer to bee done, or to take, is the effect of the action, and to make it plaine, it is a verbe passive, euen the same, which the Grammariens vse, as to bee taught, to bee encreased, to bee diminitshed, all these are passiuess, and are referred to this predicament.

¶ Vbi. Where.

Where.

V*bi* is an order, or predicament, which comprehendeth the description of places, wherein same thing is reported, either to be done, to haue beene done, or els hereafter to bee done. As to bee at London, to be at Cambridge, to be at home, to bee in a Chamber, to bee aboue, beneath, on the right hande, left hande, before, or behinde, and whatsoeuer is answered to this question, when I aske where any thing is, or where any thing is done. This place serueth for coniectures, either in praysing, or disparaging.

¶ Quando. When.

This Predicament *quando*, concepneth the difference, and diuersitie of times, as *nunc*, now, *heri*, yesterday, *noctū*, in the night time, *inter diu*, in the day time. This place also giueth light to confirme causes. As to proue that one is painfull, I may say such a one studieth day and night, so much as nature can beare: therefore he is a painefull man.

¶ Sciam esse, to be settled.

S*ciam esse*, is then considered, when a mans bodie is in any stille places: as to lye asleepe, to stand byright, to sit, to leane, to lye grouelling, to lye wide open.

¶ Habitus, the araying or clothing.

Some call this Predicament, *habitus integumentum*, that is a couering or apparelling of any bodie, as to haue a coate, to weare a gowne, to be harnessed, to haue a Jacke, a sheart of Maile, a coate Armour. Also to goe gorgeously: as to weare Chaines of golde, to haue Bracelets, Ringes, Bowches, and Stones, to haue a Scepter, or Scepter in his hande. Thirdly, to possesse

posseſſe golde, ſiluer, lande, wife, and children, or to containe any thing, as the Doggeſheas doth holde Wine, the Barneholderſh Coyne. &c.

The vſe and commoditie of theſe Prodicaments.

If you will define any word, and knowe the proper nature of the ſame, ye muſt needes knowe theſe ten Prodicaments. As for an example, if ye will knowe what a man is, ye muſt haue recourſe to the place of *Subſtantia*, and there ye ſhall learne by the ſame place, that man is a liuing creature, endued with reaſon. If ye will knowe what vertue is, ye muſt goe to the Prodicament *Qualitas*, and there ye ſhall ſee, that vertue is a conſtaunt habite of the minde, making them paſſe worthe, in whom it is. If ye will define the nature of a father, ſeeke for *Relatiua*, and there ye ſhall learne, that he is a father, that hath a ſonne: he is a maſter, that hath a ſeruant, and ſo forth of the reſt. Therefore, ye muſt needes haue theſe Prodicaments readie, that whenſoever ye will define any word, or giue a natural name vnto it, ye may come to this ſtope houſe, and take ſtuffe at will.

Of a definition.



Here is nothing in all this whole arte of Logike, more neceſſarie for man to knowe, then to learne diligently the diſtinction, & diuiſion of euery matter, that by reaſon may bee comprehended. For, he that firſt well vnderſtanderh what he doth goe about (knowing fully the nature of euery cauſe propounded) ſhall leſſe erre in the whole diſcourſe following, and eaſie ſhall it bee for him, to auoyd faulſe arguments, if he can learne firſt, to ſee the very nature, and ſubſtanciall property of euery thing.

A definition is two waies conſidered, for either it is a definition of a word, or of a ſubſtance. A definition of a word, is any manner of declaration of a word, as a Reaſme is ſo called, becauſe it is by a King ruled, and merrily to ſay it. A woman hath her name ſo giuen her, becauſe ſhe bringerh wo vnto man.

A definition of the ſubſtance, is a ſpeech, which ſheweth the very nature of the thing, and every perfect definition, is made

A definition.

A definition of a worde.

A definition of a ſubſtance.

E.ii.

perfect

The Arte of Logike.

perfect by the general word, and his difference ioyned together: So that whatsoeuer is defined, it is alwaies the kinde or sorte of some one thing, as thus. Man is a liuing creature, endewed with reason: Man is the thing defined, and the other (that is, a liuing creature, endewed with reason) is the definition. There be fower rules to bee obserued, in euery perfect definition. First, that the definition containe no more then the thing defined, nor yet that the thing defined, containe any more then the definition doth. Again, wee must take heede, that the definition expresse the very nature, and substance, of the thing defined, or els it is no good definition. Thirdly, we must see that the definition be plaine and open, without ambiguitie, not hauing any obscure or farre fetched wordes.

When Plato had defined a man, to bee a liuing creature, hauing two feete, and without feathers. Diogenes that scoffing Dogge, which loued to take aduantage vpon small occasion, seeing Plato vpon a time, most earnest in teaching his scholars, suddenly chaunge into the Schoole, and setting a Cocke in the midst of them, which had all his feathers pluckt off: beholde (quoth he) here is Plato his man; whom he hath painted out so clerely vnto you. Because this definition was not plaine and open, Diogenes thus tealed, as ye haue heard. Notwithstanding Plato his saying was true enough, and good enough also, if it had pleased him so to vnderstand it. For, Plato his meaning, was of a creature, that by nature lacketh feathers: not of one that had his feathers pluckt off, and so the definition is without faulc.

Fourthly, whosoever purposeth, either to teach, or to learne, to perswade vehemently, or plainly to expound, it is for him right necessarie, alwaies to binde himselfe, to a certaine appointed order, and particularly to gather that thing, the which he minded at large to expresse. For so shall he see what he doth, & not swaue as some doe, but keepe his matter as he ought to doe. Whereby both he shall teach better, and other shall learne the sooner.

What a definition is.

A Definition.

A Definition is a denoting of that, which is more common, into those, which are less common. As a definition therefore doth declare

Rules to be observed in a definition.

Plato.

Diogenes Cock.

declare what a thing is, so the deuision sheweth how many thinges are contained in the same. A deuision, is either the deuiding of a worde, or of a thing. A deuision first of a worde is, when any worde that signifying diuers thinges, is deuided into euery seuerall signification that he hath: As I would deuide this worde, *Canis* into a Dogge, a fish of the Sea, and a starre in the Element: thus might I say, *Canis* is either a Dogge that lieth vpon the earth, or a fish, or els a starre in the Element.

A deuision of a worde.

A deuision of the thing is three waies considered, for either it is when the generall, is deuided into the kinde, the whole into his partes, or els when the substance, is deuided into the accidents. The generall is deuided into his kinde, thus, as an Element is deuided into the fire, the ayre, the water, and the earth. A Common-weale is deuided, into the state of the people, which beare rule, and also into that power, where the best and wisest haue their gouernance, and thirdly into ones hand, which alone beareth the stroke, and is chief Magistrate.

A deuision of a thing.

A Common-weale deuided three waies.

The whole is deuided into his partes, as thus. The bodie is deuided into the head, bellie, hands and feete. A man is deuided into bodie and soule, and this kinde of deuiding, is properly called a partition. And the very difference betweene a deuision, and a partition is, that in a deuision where the generall, and the kinde are, the generall worde is spoken of the kinde it self, as *Iusticia est virtus*, Iustice is a vertue, where as it can not be so, when the whole is deuided into his parts, that the whole should be spoken of his parte, as I cannot say, *caput est homo*, the head is the man. For the head is not man, nor yet the bellie neither, although they both be partes of man. Wee haue euermore neede of this partition in all matters. The Lawe of Moses is deuided into three partes, for either it is Morall, Iudiciall, or Ceremoniall, neither is this partition necessarie for Moses Common-weale only, but for all other Regiments that be. The Morall lawe standeth for euer, and is not altered at any time, but is receiued from time to time, euen as Moses receiued the same of God in stonie Tables. The Iudiciall law is next, the which although we be not bound to obserue, as the Israelites were, yet must there be Acts of Par-

A partition.

The Morall lawe.

The Iudiciall Lawe.

liament

F. III.

The Arte of Logike.

The Ceremoni-
all lawe.

liament made, for the reformation of thinges that bee awrie, and Magistrates appointed to punish, such as breake the ten Com-
maundements, called the Morall Lawe, and euen so may wee
judge of the Ceremoniall lawe, that although it appertaine ne-
thing to vs, to keepe such Ceremonies, as Moses and Aaron
haue enacted, yet it is needefull, that there bee an order in all our
doings, and that we resorte together to the Temple reuerently,
and that the Parents appoint their children a time, to learne at
Schoole, and for their seruants, a tyme to doe their true ser-
uice.

Substance de-
uided into his
accidents.

The substance is deuided into his accidents, as thus, of men,
some are free, some are bound.

Accidents deu-
ided into sub-
stance.

An other maner of deuiding there is, contrary to this, as when
the accidents, are deuided into their substances, as thus. Of
good thinges, some are of the minde, some of the bodie, and some
of fortune. Also there is a deuision, when accidents are deuided
into accidents, as of good thinges, some are honest, some profita-
ble, and some pleasant.

Accidents deu-
ided into acci-
dents.

It is an olde saying, and worthe remembraunce, being as
true, as it is auncient. *Qui bene distinguit, bene docet.* He that
doth deuide well, doth teach well. And Socrates in *Phedro Pla-*
tonis, praysing much the maner of deuiding, saith at length that
if he knewe a man, which could well deuide, and seuerally set e-
uery thing in his place, he would followe him, as though he
should followe God himselfe. In what miserable blindnes were
wee, if wee knewe not the difference, betwixt the Lawe, and the
Gospell, the which onely wee doe knowe, by the benefite of deu-
ision. There bee many fond people, which haue much disprayed
all temporall lawes, and ciuill lawes, thinking it meete, that all
Common-weales, should onely haue the Gospell, and none o-
ther lawe at all. This may seeme to some, a gay saying, where
as in deed, it is both foolish, and wicked. For there is a difference
betwene pollicicall lawes, and the Gospell: for the pollicicall
lawe, doth cause an outward discipline to be obserued, euen of the
wicked: so that they dare not offende outwardly, for feare of cor-
porall punishment. The Magistrate, which hath his charge, is
ordyned

The pollicicall
lawe.

ordained of God: and first his charge is, to set forth the ten Commandements, giuen to Moses, in stonie Tables, and to cause the same to be obserued vniuersally, punishing the offenders, for their euill deedes, corporally. After this, he must enact other particular lawes, as occasion shall serue, which doe not dissent from these ten, considering these Lawes are generall, and therefore, particular thinges may bee drawne out of them. As where it is sayd. Thou shalt doe no theft, the Magistrate seeing falshood in bargayning, & much deceit vled to fraude one an other, straight causeth it to be proclaimed, that all such as vle deceit in bargayning, commit theft, and shalbe attainted thereupon as feloness: the which man in so doing, hath fulfilled Gods Commandement. Now againe, as for preaching of the Gospell, it is an other maner of thing, for thereby sinners are forgiuen, the inheritance of life euerlasting graunted, and an euer liuing Church of mankind, gathered to be Gods chosen people, and also the true knowledge of God, perfect righteousness, and the life euerlasting, is kindled in the hearts of all the godly, through the power of Gods holy Ghost. But there be fewe, that will obeye willingly, and withall their hearts, the wordes of the Gospell in such wise. Neither can any lawe bee able, violently to force the inward thought of man. Therefore, the outward Magistrate, though he can not binde mens consciences, from the thing that is euill, yet may he labour to withdrawe them from doing euill, and in deede if lawes were not, men could not liue. Therefore, the polliciticall Regiment, and the Gospell, are two diuers thinges. This short distinction, giueth light to many weightie matters, the which thing, when men know not, they wander in great darknesse, and for lacke of light fall into errour.

The lawe of the
Gospell.

Rules necessary to be obserued
in euery deuision.



First, it must bee provided, that the deuision, asmuch as may be (for it cannot alwaies be so) ought to be made with two contrary differences, fully containing in them selues, the whole compasse or widenesse of the generall worde,

Rules needfull
for a deuision.

The Arte of Logike.

worde, or that which is deuided: for it is a faulte to forget any thing, or let slippe any parte.

Againe, the difference which deuide the generall word, being toynd boch together, must be equall to the sayd generall worde, and the partes coupled together, must be asinuch as the whole, or els the deuision is not good. A liuing creature is deuided into his two differences, as into a thing hauing reason, and a thing that hath no reason. Now, whatsoeuer is a liuing creature, the same is a thing, that either hath reason, or els that lacketh reason. And againe, euery thing that is indued with reason and without reason, that same is a liuing creature. So that in euery deuision, the members or partes that doe deuide by conuersion, are turned with the thing deuided, and euen likewise it is with partition, as I haue spoken before of deuision. Whereas Logike hath two partes, iudgement, and finding out of thinges, euen as I say, Logike is nothing els but iudgement, and finding out of thinges, so of the other side, iudgement, and finding out of thinges, is nothing els, but Logike it selfe. Whereby appeareth a plaine conuersion, that whatsoeuer the one is, the same is the other, which thing must diligently be obserued in euery deuision. For, if the members that doe deuide, be either more or lesse, then the thing deuided: straight way, the deuision is not good, for according to a precept that we haue in Latine, *Membra diuidentia semper cum diuisio conuerti debent*. The partes that doe deuide, must alway be equall with the thing deuided, and turned by conuersion with the same, or els the deuision is not lawfull.

Fault in deuision.

The maner of handling of a single question, and the readie way how to teach and set forth any thing plainly, and in order, as it should be, in Latine, *Methodus*.



In handling of any single question, the preceptes and rules, giuen before in the commune wordes, in the most generall wordes, in the definition and deuision, doe very good seruice, and helpe towards the ordering of euery such matter. The whole nature of such questiones, are throughly seene by

by vsing of this order. Every single question is eight waies examined, first to aske whether the thing be, or no, as thus: Is there any one man, that may be called wise? Is there any Lawe? Is there any frendship vpon earth? This question is often proued, either by experiences, or els by authoritie of the wise. Therefore, in questioning what the thing is, we must declare the verte nature, as if I shall speake of frendship, I will first be at a point, of what frendship I must speake. For frendship is of two sortes. The one is true and perfect frendship, which commeth from the hearte, for vertues sake, and is onely among good men: the other is feined fauour, when one for lucre, beareth a faire face outwardly, and feedeth inwardly a malicious stomache. And this is the common frendship; whereof the wicked onely are partakers. The second question, is to aske what a thing is. And this commeth from the definition, which is of two sortes, either of the substance of any thing, or els of the name. Of the name: as thus. A Realme is that countrey, which is ruled by a king. Of the substance thus. A realme is a gathering of people together, being able to liue, and withstand other, for preservation of them selves, abiding seuerall. The lawe is an ordinance, which commaundeth things in order, to be doon, and forbiddeth the contrarie. The third question is, when the partes, and euery seuerall kinde is considered, and for this question, the diuision and partition doe much good. As the lawe of the Gospell, and the politicall lawe. The fourth question is, to aske what are the causes, and especially, what is the efficient cause, and what is the final cause, or the ende, of any thing. The efficient cause of all good Lawes, is God and his minister. The final cause, or the ende, is to liue vprightly in the feare of God, and to walke all the dayes of our life, in the obseruation of his holy will. The fifth question is, when the effect, the office, or proper working is examined. As the effect of the Lawe is, to conferre the state of man, to continue peace vniuersally, to increase wealth, and to make loue betwixt all. The sixth question is, when things be asked that happen after, or the which haue create affinitie, or likelihood together. As if lawes bee kept and followed, we see our christyens children

How manifold
A thing where
ther it be or no.

What a thing is
and how it
may be called.

How manifold
the thing is di-
uided.

What be the
causes.

What are the
effects or pro-
per working.

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What happen
thereupon.

What are dis-
agreeing.

What examples.

ware to wrath. We see much neighbourhod, and good will to helpe the needy, and so forth. The seventh is to aske what are disagreeing. As from the Lawe, dissenteth rebellion, stubboynesse, pride, with other. The eight question is, to bring in witnesse, and to shew by whose authoritie, the Law taketh place. The Scripture teacheth, that God gaue the Lawe to Moses, and Paul with Peter also; and Christ himselfe commaunded euery man, to obey the higher power in all things, that are not directly repugnant from the will of God. Thus the question is eight wayes examined, and the matter taught thereby, to frame it in due order, so that he, which keepeth well this trade, can not faile in any cause, that he taketh in hand. And because they may the rather be remember, I will set them altogether.

As touching the
Lawe.

1. Whether it be or no.
2. What it is.
3. What the partes are.
4. What the causes are.
5. What are the effects or proper working.
6. What are next adioyning, what are like, what happen thereby.
7. What doe disagree, or what contrarie.
8. What example there is, or authoritie to proue it.

Order to be ob-
serued.

AND this lesson ought diligently to be learned of all, that euermore they begin from the generall, and come to euery seuerall part. As in declaring what vertue is, first to tell the nature of it generally, and after to handle euery vertue by it selfe. And this order both Tully hath followed in his Booke *De Officijs*, and also Aristotle in his *Ethikes* hath doen the like, to the great admiration of all those that be learned.

Of a Proposition.



When the verbe order of nature requireth, that first of all, wee should speake of seuerall words, and as a man would saye, teache one his letters, and shew him the maner of spelling, before we teache him to reade; and afterwarde to giue sentences to-
gether

gether and frame Propositions by knitting severall wordes in order, for it is the verie office of the minde, first to knowe, & then to knit, neither can any childe utter a sentence, befoze he learne to speak a worde. Again, when nature hath taught severall wordes, then the minde ioyned together, deuiderth, and afterwarde giueth a iudgement, whether they be well or no. For a manne were little better then a brute beast, if he coulde but onlie apprehende severall wordes, hauing no gift, or aptnesse to ioygne them in order, and so to iudge how things are ioyned together. But seeing God hath kindled his light in manne, that he can both ioygne, and iudge, we will nowe speake of the knitting together, and the ioyning of wordes in a Proposition.

What a Proposition is.



Proposition is, a perfecte Sentence spoken by the Indicative mode, signifying either a true thing, or a false, without al ambiguitie, or doubtfullnes, as thus. **Euery man is a lier.**

There be two partes in a Proposition, the one is called *Subiectum* (that is to saie, that wherof somwhat is spoken) the other is *Attributum*, commonlie called *Predicatum*, that is to saie, that which is spoken of any thing, as in the aboue rehearsed Proposition. **Euery mā is a liar**; man, is that wherof this saying (to be a lier) is spoken, and this same saying (to be a lier) is that which is spoken of man.

Euery Proposition is two waies deuided, either it is a single sentence, standing of one perfecte sentence, as **Iustice is vertue**, or els it is a double sentence, hauing two Propositions in it, as thus. **If Iustice be a vertue**, it is a good thing, praise worthe.

That Proposition is called false, the whiche either naturall reason proueth, either to be plain false, or the experience of man declareth to be untrue, as thus **A stone doeth feele**. The soule of manne is mortall. Experience sheweth, or at the least scripture affirmeth, the soule to bee immortall, and nature teacheth vs, that no stone hath the sence of feeling.

f. ii.

The

A proposition

Two partes in a proposition.

A proposition is two waies diuided, according to the substance.

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The second diuision of a Proposition, according to the quantitie.

A proposition diuided, according to the quantitie.



Affirmative, Propositions doe either affirme, or denie, as this Proposition: pleasure is a good thing, doth affirme that pleasure is good. Again, Pleasure is not a good thing, doth deny that pleasure is good. That Proposition doth affirme, when any thing is reported to be in any thing. That Proposition doth deny, when any thing is denied to be in any thing.

The third diuision of a Proposition, according to the quantitie.

A proposition diuided, according to the quantitie.



Thirde, all propositions are either generall, particular, indefinite, or singular. Those Propositions are called generall, or vniuersall, the which haue a generall signe, ioyned to the first part of the Proposition, as thus. Every couetous man is poore. No man both louth, and is wise, no not one. No man is euermore happie.

Proposition Vniuersall.

Generall signes.

Particular propositions.

Particular signes.

Proposition indefinite.

Generall signes are these: *Omnis*, *Nullus*, *Quilibet*, *Nemo*. Every body, No body, All the world, Not one in all the worlde. Particular propositions are these, where a particular signe is added to the former parte of the proposition, which doth not containe all, but part, or a fewe. As thus: some men feare God. Some men are to much desirous of glorie. The particular signes be these: *Quidam*, *Aliquis*, *Plerique*, *Plerunque*. A certaine man, Some body. All men for the most part, Often times.

The propositions are called Indefinite (that is to say, certaine) where the former parte of the proposition, is a generall word without a signe, as thus: The soule is immortall. Panshood is a vertue. Young men are riotous. Old men are couetous. And note this diligently, that those Indefinite Propositions (whose last rehearsed part is necessarie, and is so spoken of the former parte, that it doeth alway agree to the same, and to the whole nature of the same) doe import as much as a generall proposition, as in the aboue rehearsed proposition. The soule is immortall. This worde (to be immortall) which is spoken of the soule, agreeth not to one man or to certaine, but to euery man liuing.

When

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When the accidents are spoken of the former part, it implicth as much as a particular proposition doth. As: *Homo homini prestat ingenio, virtute, doctrina.* (Man is better one then an other in witte, learning, and vertue) is no more to say, then *Quidam homo homini prestat.* Some one man is better then an other. A singular proposition, is when a proper name of a man is contained in a proposition, and is the former part of the same, as Cicero is an Orator, Alexander is a warriour.

The vse of a proposition.



When men by occasion of talke, fall at variance, and can not agree vpon their matter, being both earnest to knowe the truth, it is good to bring the whole matter to some issue, and there resting vpon a point, to debate that part onely, before they go any further, the which is called of the Logicians a Proposition of the Rhetoricians, the state of the cause, which is as much to say, as the point whereupon they shall stand, or rest to trie their matter. Now, because euery Proposition is three waies diuided, according to the substance, the qualitie, and also the quantity, good reason it were to trie euerie cause, by these three partes also.

A thing most
necessary.

By the first we knowe, whether it be a single Proposition, or a double.

By the second we perceiue, whether it doe affirme or denie.

And by the third also we see, how largely it doth extende, the which three pointes, are right needfull to be marked.

The repugnancie of Propositions.

Repugnancie, is the diuersitie of two propositions, which haue both one *Subiectum* (called the former part) and one *attributum*, which is the rehearsed part, and in sence spoken of the former.

The repugnance
of propositions.

There be foure in number, called in Latine: *Contrarie, Subcontrarie, Contradictorie, Subalterne.*

Generall contrary Propositions, are those, whereof the one doth generally affirme, and the other doeth generally denie. As thus: *Oēs hoies gloria ducuntur.* All men are moued with glory. *Nulli homines gloria ducuntur.* No men are moued with glory.

F. iii. doth

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Particular contraries, are two particulars, whereof the one doth deny. *Aliqui homines gloria ducuntur.* Some men are moued with glorie. *Aliqui homines gloria non ducuntur.* Some men are not moued with glorie.

Contradictorie propositions, are when the one is vniuersall affirmatiue, and the other particulare negatiue, or els when the one is vniuersall negatiue, and the other particulare affirmatiue as thus: *Omnes homines gloria ducuntur.* All men are moued with glorie. *Aliqui homines gloria non ducuntur.* Some men are not moued with glorie, and likewise backward.

Subalterna, are those which bee either vniuersall affirmatiue, and particulare affirmatiue, or els vniuersall negatiue, and particulare negatiue.

The nature of a Proposition thre waies deuided.

True propositions.



Propositio Categoricalis (otherwise called a single proposition) is deuided into true & false Propositions.

They are true propositions, which agree to þ matter, & are either necessary, or els such as may be either true or false caled in latin *fortuita* or *contingentes*.

Necessary propositions what they be. And which they be.

Necessary Propositions, are assuredly true, and known to bee either by nature, or els by experience.

Of those that necessarilie be knit together are these. The proper name, the kinde, the generall worde, the difference, the propertie, the definition, the causes, the proper worke of causes and some accidents that euer tary. As thus: *Cicero est homo.* Cicero is a man. *Homo est animal rationale præditum, aptum ad risum.* A man is a liuing creature, endued with reason, apt to laugh. *Dies est necessario, quoniam Sol exoriscens est.* It must needs be daie, because the sunne is vp. *Ignis calidus est.* Fire is hotte.

Changeable propositions.

Those Propositions are changeable, which may be true, or chaunce to be for as fewe preachers are ambitious. Few kings heare the trueth. And whensoever the accident is spoken of that, which containeth him: enery such Proposition is called changeable, or that, which may be true, as: *Water is made hot:* here we see that it chaunceth to water (contrarie to her nature) to be warme, and therefore it is called changeable, as he which may change, or be chaunged.

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The Table of repugnant Propositions.

All men are
moued with
gloie.

Generall
contrary.

No manne is
moued with
gloie.

Contrary

Contrary

Generall and Particular
affirmative.

Generall and Particular
negative.

Contrary

Contrary

Some men
are moued
with gloie.

Particular
contrarie.

Some manne
are not moued
with gloie.



Erre we must be diligent, that in all such repugnauncie of Propositions, there bee no doubtfullnesse in any word, and that alwaies there be one maner of words that goe before, and also one maner of words that ende the sentence, plainly and without double vnderstanding. For, if I say thus: *Man doth*

No doubtfullnesse
in the speech.

sinne. Man doth not sinne. Herein is no repugnancie: for I name of God, whose synnes are redeemed through Chyestes death, by the vertue of his faith, the same man doth not synne, according to Saint Iohn. Hee that is of G O D, synneth not: but that man, which followeth the flesh, and hath giuen ouer himselfe, to the luste of this world, doeth synne deadly. Therefore, the part must

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must not alter the nature of either Proposition, the time also must be all one, the maner of doing of one sort, and the place likewise must be like.

The vse.

This diuersitie of Propositions, is verie necessarie to discern the truth, from that which is false, for when wee ioyne two Propositions that are dissonant, we shall easily trie the Chaffe from the Coine, the which when we haue doen, we may the better sticke to the truth, with full confidence, the contrarie being once disclosed and reiected.

De Conuersione, of the turning of Propositions.

Conuersion.

Conuersion is the chaunging, or altering of words in a proposition, when the former part (whereof any thing is rehearsed) and the hinder parte (which is rehearsed of the former) are chaunged, the one into the others place.

There be three maner of Conuersions, *Simplex, per Accidens, per Contrapositionem.*

Plaine conuersion.

A plaine Conuersion is, when both the Propositions are like in all things, both in signes, and also in affirmation, or negation, lauing onely that of the last rehearsed, is made the former part of the Sentence, and the former part, is made the last rehearsed part.

Such Conuersion is made, when both the Propositions be either vniuersall negatives, or els particulare affirmatiues, for the first thus: *Nemo timens Deum, contemnit se adulterio. Ergo nemo contemnens se adulterio timet Deum.* No man that feareth God, defileth himselfe with adulterie, therefore, no man that defileth himselfe with adulterie, feareth God. Here we may see the conuersion plaine, as the rule aboue rehearsed, teacheth. For, two particulare affirmatiues, this shalbe an example. *Quidam Aulici boni sunt. Ergo, quidam boni, Aulici sunt.* Some courtiers are honest. Ergo, some honest men are courtiers.

A conuersion by accident.

A Conuersion by accident is, when the former parte of the sentence, is made the last rehearsed parte: and the last rehearsed part, made for the former part, both the Propositions affirming

ming, or denping, sauing onely that the signes be chaunged, that is, the one being vniuersall, the second being particular. First, a conuersion is made of two affirmatiues, thus. *Omnis virtus est laudanda. Ergo laudandum aliquid, est virtus.* All vertue is to be praysed, therefore, some thing to bee praysed, is a vertue. A conuersion of two negatiues, thus. *Nemo malus felix igitur (sapiens enim sit) non est malus.* No euill man is absolutely happie. Therefore, an absolute happie man (seeing he is godly wise) cannot bee euill. This kinde of conuersion, is very profitable for him that will dispute. For, where as wee reason often from the generall worde, to the kinde, wee must needes vse this maner of conuersion, as thus. If all exercise be good, then this kinde of exercise is good, and so of other.

A conuersion by contraposition is, whē the former part of the sentence, is turned into the last rehearsed part, and the last rehearsed part, turned into the former part of the sentence, both the propositions being vniuersall, and affirmatiue, sauing that in the second proposition, there be certaine negatiues enterlaced. As thus.

Omnis homo auct aliquid videre, audire, scire.

Ergo quod non auct aliquid videre, audire, scire, non est homo.

Euery man desireth to see, to heare, or to knowe somewhat: therefore, whatsoeuer he is that desireth not to see, to heare, or to knowe somewhat, the same bodie is not a man: this conuersion is profitabl, and serueth well to reason by: Thus reasoneth Christ by his conuersion against the Iewes in the 8. Chapter of Iohn.

Reasoning by
the conuer-
sion.

Qui ex Deo est, verba Dei audit: vos igitur cum non auditis, ex Deo non estis. He that is of God, heareth the worde of God. You therefore, because you heare not, be not of God. This conuersion confuteth the Iewes plaine, and proueth that they are not of God. If we will reason from the generall worde to the kinde, or from the greater to the lesse, wee may vse this conuersion very well. *Omnis homo est animal. Ergo quodcunque non est animal, id nec Homo est.* Euery man is a liuing creature, therefore, whatsoeuer thing is not a liuing creature, that same is not a man. Take away the generall worde, and there can no kinde remaine at all. From the superiour vniuersal to the inferior, thus we may rea-

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From the v.
niuerfall su-
perior, to
the inferior.

son. All pure gold looketh pealow, therefore, whatsoeuer looketh not pelowe, that same is not pure gold. This conuersion serueth wel to make an argument in the second figure, as I will declare hereafter, the which ought diligently to be obserued.

A lesson to be obserued.

Of singular words, which are proper names of things, or els determinately doe betoken some one certaine thing, no conuersion is made, because no argument is made of particular wordes, or sentences, whereunto the whole nature of conuersion serueth onely, therefore, if one should say vnto mee, yonder is a Horsemill, the conuersion were amisse to say, yonder is a Mill-horse, for what sate knoweth not, except he had a horse head, that here y^e sence is altered, and that it is two things to say, a Horsemill, and a Mill-horse. So that of singular propositions, declaring the nature of one seuerall thing, no true conuersion can be made, both in worde and sentence.

The vse.



First, conuersion profiteth, for the euident opening of Propositions, as if I should say: there is nothing profitable, but the same is honest, and how then canst thou make a diuopment, betwixt honestie and profite, as though the one could be without the other. Again, it serueth well to make those arguments, as thus. No Christian is an Usurer: Ergo, no Usurer is a Christian. Some Bishops are good: Ergo, some good men are Bishops. Thirdly, it sheweth how to reduce the second and the third figure, being both vnperfect, to the Goodes of the first figure, as I will shewe moze at large hereafter.

Proposio Hypothesis. That is to say,

a dubble Proposition.

A dubble proposition.

P*roposio Hypothesis*, is a sentence with two single propositions, knit together alwaies, with some conjunction. As thus, *Si iustitia est virtus, est laudabilis.* If Iustice be a vertue, it is praise worthy.

There be three maner of dubble Propositions.

The parts of a dubble proposition.

A Dubble proposition standeth of three parts, whereof the one is a conditionall proposition, affirming a thyng to bee either true,

true, or false, with an (if) as thus : if faith be vpon the earth, some men feare God . If the worlde continueth still as it doth, wallowing in most abominable sinne , God will at length punish the offenders very sore . All which propositions are euer true, when the parts are so knit together : that the latter part must needes followe vpon that, which goeth before. The second part is, when a proposition hath a disunctiue , which knitteth the sentence vp, as thus . Either it is day, or else it is night . Such propositions are true, when both the parts are true, and the same also are false, when either of the parts are false . The third part is, when conjunctions that doe deny, are ioyned together, as thus . Battell being not lawfull, is not to be desired . By all which dubble propositions, wee may reason formally in diuers causes, as thus by the first. If faith bee vpon the earth, some men feare God, but no man feareth God, Therefore, faith is not vpon the earth. Againe, if wee feare God, wee are in charitie, but wee are not in charitie, therefore, we feare not God. By the second thus. Couctous men either be seruants of God or els of the deuill, but they are not the seruants of God: Ergo, they are seruants of the deuill. By the third thus . Battell being not lawfull, is not to be used, but battell is lawfull, therefore it is to be used.

The vse of all those things, that haue bene
spoken of a Proposition. .

I Will vse this Proposition for an example. All trueth purchaseth hatred. It is a single proposition by substance, an affirmative by qualitie, and an vniuersall by quantitie: the contradiction is, no trueth purchaseth hatred, the which is false. Therefore, this is true, some trueth purchaseth hatred: the conuersion by the accident. The trueth purchaseth hatred. Ergo, some thing that purchaseth hatred is trueth.

Of making an argument.

I haue rehearsed hitherto , all single wordes what the nature is of euery one , and in what generall worde , they may bee found. I haue set forth the nature of a definition, and a deuision . I haue taught also, to ioyne these seuerall wordes into a proposition

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proposition, and make the same a perfect sentence. Now thereby Gods grace, I will shew the matter, how to ioyne sentences together, and to proue a matter, by knitting Propositions handsomely in an argument, or by placing the Propositions accordingly. Therefore, there ought good diligence to be used in this behalfe, for as much, as it is the clarkliest part of all, and the hardest peece of worke, to frame an argument aptly, and to knowe the very reason, why thinges are so knit together.

What an argument is.

An argument is a way to proue, how one thing is gathered by an other: and to shewe that thing, which is doubtfull by that, which is not doubtfull.

To find out the reason that shall proue (in Latine) called *Medium*, in (English) the dubble reapeate.

The finding
out of an argu-
ment.



After this sorte wee may finde the reason, whereby to proue our matter: when wee haue a question or sentence, that we should either confirme, or confute, aske the cause of our selfe, why, and wherefore that thing, which is spoken of the former parte in any sentence, should be so applied to the same. And to make the matter more plaine, I will make this question. *Est ne avarus pauper?* Is a couetous man poore, or not? I may thus reason with me selfe, why should a couetous man bee called poore? What affinity is betwixt them two? Pary in this poynt they both agree, that like as the poore man, euer lacketh and desireth to haue: so the couetous man euer lacketh, wanting the vse of that which he hath, and desireth still to haue, being neuer content, though God giueth enough. Then seeing it is euen so, that both do lacke, and both do desire to haue, this same reason is the onely cause, whereby myne argument is made perfect. For thus I may frame myne argument aptly.

The framing
of an argu-
ment.

Whosoever lacketh, and desireth euermore to haue, that same man is poore.

A couetous man lacketh, and desireth euermore to haue: Therefore, a couetous man is poore.

Thus this argument is made perfect, by asking this question,

tion, wherefore, a couetous man is poore: As hereafter I will shewe it more at large, by an other example, to make the thing more plaine.

There be fower kindes of arguments.

- { A perfect argument.
- { An vnperfect argument.
- { An induction.
- { An example.

A Perfect argument, is an absolute gathering, or reasoning, whereby the last sentence, which we would proue, is confirmed by other propositions and sentences more vniuersall, and better knowne then the thing which is proued, conteyning in them selues the reason, why the last sentence is true, and why they are applyed to the same. This kinde of argument, is from the generall worde to the kinde, as thus. If I will proue theft worthy of punishment. I must first aske the question why? And that thing that cometh to my mind, more vniuersall then theft, comprehending the offence of theft in it, may serue to make the argument. As I may thus reason, that theft should be punished, because it is a vice, or a mischeuous deede, and then thus I knit vp myne argument.

- { Every vice, or mischeuous deede, is to be punished.
- { Theft is a vice, or a mischeuous deede.
- { Therefore, theft is to be punished.

Here we see the proposition, or sentence, whereof the first is called *Maior*, that is to say, the Proposition at large. The seconde is called *Minor*, that is to say, the lesse, or seuerall proposition. The third is called *Conclusio*, that is the lapping vp of all. And here we must note, that like as there be three Propositions, euen so there be three diuers endings, called in Latine *Termini*. Of the which, the one is called the terme at large, in the first Proposition onely, and afterward is referred, to the former parte of the conclusion, called *Subiectum conclusionis*. The second terme is called the lesse, or seuerall, which is in the second Proposition, and this is the worde, whereof the question

Three termes.
The first.

The second.

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The third.

Examp'es of
the ij. termes.

Dubble re-
peate.

Terme at
large, terme
seuerall.

is made, and is spoken of in the conclusion. The third is called the dubble repeate, which is twice rehearsed before the conclusion, and therefore it is twice rehearsed, because it is the knitting together of the two Propositions, and is the cause also, why the former part of the Proposition whereof a thing is sayd, and the last rehearsed part, being attributed to the part going before, are ioyned together in the conclusion. As to make the thing plaine by the former argument. I will proue this conclusion. Theft is to bee punished. Theft is called the former part whereof this worde (punished) is spoken, I and this worde (punished) therefore is called the last rehearsed part, because it is spoken of theft, which went before. Now, to make mine argument, and to proue this sentence true, must seeke a worde, which is more generall then that, which is proued. And that worde that commeth to my mind, and is pertainning to the cause, being more vniuersall: (for every thing that is proued, is proued by a thing more knowne) that same worde, or reason, is called the dubble repeate, whose proprietie is, twice to bee rehearsed in an argument, and that is the first and second Proposition, neuer entering into the conclusion. As this. Every vice is to be punished, vice is the dubble repeate, which must bee rehearsed in the second Proposition, for I sayd before, it must twice be rehearsed, because it may be euident, that the former part of the conclusion, is in very deepe comprehended vnder the former part of the first Proposition. And then the argument is made as followeth.

Every vice is to be punished.

Theft is a vice.

Ergo theft is to be punished.



Ere we see the dubble repeate, which proueth the matter is twice rehearsed, in the first and second Proposition, and entereth not into the conclusion. The terme is at large in the first Proposition, and the terme seuerall, is in the second Proposition, and enter both into the conclusion. So that wee may see that, which proueth the thing, doth not enter into the conclusion, but it is twice rehearsed in the two Propositions, and so the conclusion

tion followeth, by reason that these two wordes, vice and theft, agree in a third altogether, and whatsoever is sayd of the one, is sayd of the other, and nothing can bee comprehended vnder the generall: but all the kindes haue the same conceyued in them, which in this Proposition, are referred to the generall. (All vice is to be punished) vnto vice is referred this word punished. Therefoze, whatsoever is comprehended vnder this word vice, as theft, adulterie, wpong dealing, murder: this word punished, is rehearsed of them all: because it agreeth to the generall, and is rehearsed of the same, As I may reason thus.

All vice is to be punished.

Therefore } Adulterie.
 } Wrong dealing.
 } Murder. } Are to be punished.

FOR, if that which is generall, is to bee punished, then the Rule. Kindes and sorts in things, are to be punished, according to this saying. Whatsoever is truly and altogether rehearsed of the generall, that same is also rehearsed of the kind, which is included into the generall.

Seuen rules especially to be obserued, for the making of a perfect argument, called *Syllogismus*.

First, that in every perfect argument called *Syllogismus*, the first Proposition be vniuersall, I call that Proposition vniuersall, when there is *Omnis*, that is to say, all: or els *Nullus*, that is to say, none: in the Proposition. As for example. Every vice is to bee punished, this Proposition is vniuersall, because it hath *Omnis* in it, which signifieth all, or every one. Likewise, I call it particular when the Proposition hath *Quidam*, or *Aliquis*, that is to say, certaine or some bodie. *Quidam aulici sunt honesti*. Some Courtiers be honest.

Rules for an argument.

The second rule.

If one of the Propositions be particular, or negative, the conclusion is particular, or negative. I call that Proposition negative, when *Nullus*, or *Nemo*, that is to say, none, or no bodie, is in the Proposition. As *Nullus Christianus est fenerator*. No Christian is an Usurar.

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The third Rule.

In a perfect argument, both the Propositions, can bee neither negatives, nor yet particulars together, for euen as two negatives, there followeth nothing, so of two particulars, there followeth nothing. Therefore, when any such argument is made, wee may boldly say, it is not lawfull, because it is in no good, as it is very plaine to see, in making of this argument following.

Some Courtiers are rich.

Ponder fellowe will be a Courtier.

Therefore he shalbe rich.

Some Bishops are good.

Or thus. Such a one is a Bishop.

Therefore, he is a good Bishop.

This argument is not lawfull, first, because of my rule, I am taught that of pure particulars, nothing doth follow, as *Quidam* (some) is a particular. *Ego* I, is a singular worde, or signifying almost as a proper name, and againe it is in no figure, as hereafter I shall shewe. Thirdly, it is meete that the second Proposition should be included in the first part, of the second Proposition, whereof somewhat is rehearsed, or els it is no good argument, in the first figure.

Some Kings be righteous.

Nero is a King.

Therefore Nero is righteous.



This is no good argument, because *Nero*, which is the first word in the second proposition, of whom some thing is rehearsed, is not comprehended vnder the former parte of the Proposition, which is some Kinges, for this former parte, some Kinges doth not speake of Nero, nor comprehend such as he is, but honest, and goodly disposed gouernours. And yet in weightie causes such arguments haue beene vsed, euen of those that would haue drawne vs from the obedience of Gods holy word, and persuaded some that we were free, from the obseruation of any one thing, comprehended in Moses lawes. As thus.

The

The law of Moses is abolished from the Gentiles.
The law of the ten Commandements, is the law of Moses.

Ergo the lawe of the ten Commandements, is abolished from the Gentiles.

Whereas this first Proposition, comprehendeth not all the lawes of Moses, but the lawes Ceremoniall, which were as figures ordeyned, in declaration of Christes coming, and therefore the Scripture sayth until Iohn, the lawe was, and the Prophets, signifying that in Iohns time, he was come in whom the old Ceremoniall lawes, were fully verified and fulfilled, which at his coming, began to cease, seeing in him selfe, was the fulfilling of the lawe, not that wee should not obserue the Morall lawes of the heauenly precepts, commanded by God, for Christ him selfe, repeatech the obseruation of them, yea, he bindeth vs to a more straightnesse, that not onely wee should doe no euill, but that also we should consent to none euill: therefore this first proposition, is not generall, but particular, and so though the Ceremoniall lawe be gone, yet the Morall lawe remaineth still, according to Christes holy will.

Medius terminus, called the dubble repeate (which is a worde rehearsed in both Propositions) must not enter into the conclusion, because the other two parts, called *Termini*, bee proued by this, and brought to the conclusion, by reason they agree with this third, the which two, otherwise could not enter into the conclusion, if this dubble repeate, were not mentioned in both Propositions, and kept out it self from the conclusion, as is evidently to see by an argumentation.

The fifth rule.

In a perfect argument, called *Syllogismus*, there ought not to be more wordes in the conclusion, then was before rehearsed. For moe things to be in the conclusion, this epithyle shal serue, which *Antoni*us maketh, in the first Booke of *Tullii de oratore*.

Unprofitable things are not to be taught.

In Philosophie are unprofitable things.

Ergo Philosophie is not to be taught.

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This argument is to bee denied, because there is more in the conclusion, then was rehearsed in the two first propositions. For this should haue bene the conclusion. Some vnpoffible things which be in Philosophie, are not to be learned, not that Philosophie it self is to bee receiued, for els wee might make this argument like wise.

Dronkenesse is not to be allowed.

In drinkeing is oftentimes dronkenesse.

Therefore drinkeing at any time is not to be allowed.

Therefore we must frame our argument so, that nothing bee more in the conclusion, then was in the other propositions: as thus

Dronkenesse is not to be allowed.

In some drinkeing is often times dronkenesse.

Therefore some drinkeing is not to be allowed.

The sixt rule.

But three
termes in an
argument.

There ought not to be more termes in an argumentation, then three, for otherwise there is no good argument.

Euery pollicicall Magistrate ought to keepe vnder, disobedient persons, with corporall punishment.

Peter is an Apostle.

Therefore Peter should punish the disobedient.

In this argument is no ioyning together, of the first proposition, and the second: for the pollicicall Magistrate, and an Apostle, are two manner of things. Therefore it hangeth together as Germanes lippes, as we vse to say.

The seventh rule.

Why the
dubble re-
peate ought
to bee no
doubtfull
worde.
Anabaptistes
reason.

The dubble repeate, which is twise mentioned in both propositions, ought to be no doubtfull worde, for doubtfull wordes make sower severall termes, which should not be, as thus.

No bondman is free.

All that beleue the Gospell cruely, are free.

Erge none that beleue the Gospell cruely, are bondme.

Freedom two
waies taken.

This argument is false; and must bee denied at the first, because there be sower termes, for in the first proposition, freedom is taken for such a libertie, as men vse in Common-weales,

to

to make seruants, and apprentices free: in the second proposition, freedom is taken for deliuering the soule from the wrath of God, from sinne, and from death euermaking, as wee reade in the Scripture. Whom the Sonne hath made free, they are free in very deed, not that this freedom taketh away, all orders in the Common-weale, that no man shal haue an apprentice, or a bondman. For, although the father in heauen, through Iesus Christ hath made them free from sinne, and that once for ever, yet are they still apprentices, and bond by a politicall law, therefore we may see, that there be lower parts or termes, considering he speaketh of one libertie, in the first proposition, and of an other in the second. So that the argument is not good. A like argument there is, which one made to Diogenes.

A Sophistes
reason to
Diogenes.

{ That which I am, thou art not.

I am a man.

Ergo thou art none.

Here is an ambiguitie in this Verbe (I am) for if wee vnderstanded in the first proposition, that this word (I am) is not considered, according to the generall substance, but according to the qualitie, or rather proper being, speaking of the diuersitie of men, as when I liue, I haue myne owne body, my flesh, and mine owne bones, thou hast thine owne proper vnto thee, and not that I am thou, nor yet thou art I: Then it is well sayd, that which I am, thou art not. But if I vnderstand this worde (I am) in the first proposition, as a substance vniuersall, or rather generall copulative, to be rehearsed of the inferiours, then it is good. For as I may say, Diogenes is a man, Aristotle is a man, so I may say of all men, and therefore though this Verbe (I am) belong not to all, for their severall properties, or each mans being, yet it agreeth to the generall name, which is to be called a man, whereby wee may see here also lower partes, or termes, and therefore this argument must be denped at the first, giuing this reason, that I haue shewed before.

Notwithstanding, Diogenes answered this Sophist otherwise very pectily, and abashed him at the first. For whereas he

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propounds

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Diogenes
answered.

propounded the same vnto him, and thought thereby to haue giuen him a foile, Diogenes straight vpon rehearfall of this said argument told him thus: Thine argument is true enough fellowe, if I should rehearse it vnto thee my self, & neede then no solution at all: for thy maners being naught, makes thee to be no man.

Setling or placing of an Argument.

Setling or
placing of an
argument.



Now that I haue set forth the precepts, which are to bee obserued in an argument, I will declare how to settle and place an argument, that any body may giue a reason, why euery worde is set in an argument, in this, or that place. First, therefore we must consider, there be three figures, which serue for the making of an argument, and Moores also which teach the ordering of Propositions, whether they shal be vniuersall, particular, affirmatiue, or negatiue: I will define them both after this sorte.

A figure.

The first figure.

A figure is a lawfull placing of the dubble repeate, in the two Propositions, and euen as a dubble repeate is placed, so we may iudge with ease, in what figure the argument is. The first figure is such an order of propositions in an argument, that the dubble repeate must bee the former part, in the first proposition, and the last rehearsed part in the second proposition, whereupon the conclusion doth followe. And the reason that it must be so, is, because that whereas in this figure, the argument is euermore made from the generall, to the kinde vniuersally, (for the first proposition euermore in these two figures, must be vniuersall, either affirmatiue, or negatiue) and by reason of the generall, there is somewhat rehearsed of the kinde: one of the propositions must bee so placed, that it may euidently appeare, that the kinde is included in the generall. And therefore the generall is spoken in the second proposition of the kinde.

A moode.
Qualitie in a
proposition
& quantitie.
iij. Moores
to the first figure.

A Moode is a lawfull placing of propositions, in their diuers qualitie or quantitie. I call that in the proposition a qualitie, wher it doth affirme or denye. I call it a quantitie, when it is either vniuersall, or particular. Vnto the first figure belonge fouer Moores, which may be perceived by these fouer wordes.

Barbara.

{ *Barbara.*
Celarent.
Dery.
Ferio. }



These sower wordes signifie nothing, but seruing for notes onely and markes, whereby euery Proposition is knowne, either to be vniuersall, or particular, affirmatiue, or negatiue, must not bee forgotten, if we will make an argument truely in the first figure for euery argument, that is made in this figure, is in one of these sower Wordes, or els it is no argument of the first figure. If the dubble repeate be the former part in the first Proposition, and the last rehearsed part in the second Proposition, it is in the first figure, notwithstanding, except it bee in Woode also, it is no argument. Therefore, wee must learne to place an argument in Woode also. And for the better knowledge of this thing, note that in those Wordes, there be sower bowelles to bee considered, and marked, That is to say, A, E, I, &, O. And the rather to helpe memorie, I haue framed a rule for these sower bowelles, in these two verses.

A, doth affirme; E, doth denigh, which are both vniuersall;
 I, doth affirme; O, doth denigh, which we particular call.

For, where we see A, in *Barbara* thise, we must consider, that these A. A. A. in this one woode, declare vnto vs three vniuersall propositions affirmatiue. E, declareth a proposition negatiue vniuersall, as in *Celarent*, we see twise E, whereby we are taught that the argument, (if we make it in this Woode) must haue two vniuersall negatives, and one vniuersall affirmatiue, by reason of A, which is in the midst of *Celarent*. I, doth signifie a particular affirmatiue. O, doth signifie a particular negatiue, as in *Ferio*, the first must bee a negatiue vniuersall, the second an affirmatiue particular. Again, the consonantes, as first capitall letters, placed in the beginning of euery Woode. As B. C. D. F. and also the small consonant letters, which are included, and be within the words in euery Woode, both of the second and third figure, as C. M. P. S. euery one of these haue their proper meanings.

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As B. in any *Moode*, of the second and third figure, declareth that the argument of that *Moode*, being not plaine for vnderstanding, or not true in sence, or perhaps, not apt to proue a present cause, the same may bee reduced to the *Moode Barbara*, of the first figure, which shall make the argument appeare more plaine. C. sheweth the right path to *Celarent*. D. openeth the gate to *Dary*. F. maketh faire passage to *Ferio*. C. that is not in the beginning of any the *Moodes*, of the seconde and third figure, but placed within the wordes, declareth that the contradictorie of the conclusion, must be taken (if ye will reduce the argument to the first figure) ioyning thereunto, and vsing as a thing graunted one of the propositions, with the conclusion, altering the other proposition that remaineth, by contradiction also: and beside setting one of the two propositions in the other place.

¶ B. sheweth that the proposition must be altered, by conuersion of the accident. S. telleth that the proposition must be changed, by plaine conuersion.

¶ Q. What is a reduction.

What is a reduction.



Reduction is a right framing of an argument, and (as a man would say) a newe probation, by an other *Moode* and figure, of that thing, which was proued before, both by the second and third figure: as thus. To make a thing otherwise, then it was before, to reduce it, or to bring it to more plaine vnderstanding, in the shape and forme of the first figure, is called reduction.

¶ The deuision of a reduction.

The deuision of a reduction.



Reduction is of two sorts. The one is a demonstration, which sheweth the argument more plainly, than before was couched darkly, the other is a reduction to that, which is impossible, commonly so termed, because in any such alteration, the contradictorie is vied in the other argument, when any such reduction is made from the second or third figure, to the first figure. And this rule is for ever true: that two contradictories can neuer be both true. The first called a demonstratiue, or shewing reduction, is made by conuersion of the propositions, and by displacing of the same, setting one

Most true.

Demonstratiue reduction.

one in an others steade, sauing onely, the conclusion is alwaies one, and keepeth his place still. The other crooked way (called of the Logicians, *Reductio ad impossibile*) is a reduction to that, which is impossible, when the contradictorie of the propositions is used, and brought to the first figure. So that these two arguments after the reduction is made, can neuer be both true, considering the contradictorie. As for example, in the *Woode Baroco*, and the second figure,

Reduction to impossible.

Bar. All true christians refuse to get goods vngodly.
ro. Some Parchaunts refuse not to get goods vngodly.
co. Therefore some Parchaunts are no true Christians.

Here if myne aduersarie shall say, that the conclusion followeth not well, and that though the other be true, yet the consequent is false, I may force him by reduction, to graunt it to bee true. And therefore taking the contradictorie of the conclusion, and placing the same in the second proposition, and altring the second proposition, by contradiction also, making it the conclusion. I shall force him to graunt my first argument to bee true. As for example, I will take the contradictorie of the conclusion, which is: Every Parchaunt man is a true Christian, and likewise the contradictorie of the second proposition, putting the one in the others place, and thus I will reason. If my first argument be false, then this argument is true, because it is the contradiction of my first.

{ All true Christians refuse to get goods vngodly.
All Parchaunts are true Christians.
Therefore all Parchaunts refuse to get goods vngodly.

Every one seeth that this argument is false, being the contradiction of the other: Ergo, the first reason is true. And this is the vse of Reduction by a contradictorie, violently to force the graunt of our saying. For if this reason be false, the other must be true, but this is false: Ergo, the other is true.

That

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That these things may bee more euident to make an argument, both in the figure and Mood, and so to reduce the same, and bring it to the arguments of the first figure. I will first giue exāples for euery Mood of this first figure, that one may plainly see the whole matter, as though it were in a glasse, remembriſg alwaies, that these Moodes serue for this figure, which figure is knowne (as I sayd before) when the bubble repeatē is the former part of the first proposition, and the last rehearsed part of the second proposition. And whereas I sayd before, that certaine arguments were in no Mood, although they were in the first figure, and therfore not good, because they were not in one Mood, and figure, these shalbe to vnderstand, they were not in one mood, because the first proposition must bee vniuersall euer, or els it is not good. Now therfore, here followe exāples of the first figure, and of the Moodes thereof.

The first figure.

The first figure.
The first exāple is a perfect argument, being vniuersall, and also affirmatiue.

Bar. All honest things are to be embraced.
ba. All Christian lawes made by a Christian
Magistrate are honest.
ra. Therefore all Christian lawes made by a
Christian Magistrate are to be embraced.
A perfect argument vniuersall negatiue.

Ce. No contēner of p Magistrate is a Christian.
la. All Anabaptists are contēners of the Magistrate.
res. Therefore no Anabaptist is a Christian.

A perfect argument particular affirmatiue.

Da. Whatsoeuer apprehendeth the fauour and
grace of God, the same onely doth iustifie.
Apprehendeth the fauour of }
Faith onely apprehendeth the fauour and
grace of God.
ri.
j. Ergo faith onely doth iustifie.

A perfect

Example. A perfect argument, particular negative.
Proposition. Every Epicurique is goodly.
Exception. Some rich man is an Epicurique.
Conclusion. Ergo, some rich man is not goodly.

The first figure helpeth most of al, in teaching or setting forth things at large, which wee would haue knowne. All Arts haue their general precepts, and therefore, the vse of this is practised in this figure. The Philosopher saith, Every good thing the more common it is, the better it is. The Logician saith, All things are made for same end. Scripture teacheth, that every man is bound to loue his neighbour as himself. Every one of these general lessons, serue well for this figure, and may with ease be framed for prooffe of our matter. Also if wee mynd either to confute, or confirm any cause, it serueth very well. Neither can any cause be mentioned, but the same may in this figure be fashioned, considering every question hath here an apperance, be it either vniuersall, or particular, affirmatiue, or negative. The second figure is, where the double repeate is & last rehearsed part in both propositions, after this sort following; and there be foure moodes belonging to the same figure, as it shall appeare, which al they haue these foure vowels in them, A, E, I, O, so that they make the proposition to be vniuersall, or particular, affirmatiue, or negative, as it was before. Note that the conclusion is alwaies negative, forasmuch as the first, & the second, are alwaies repugnance, neither do they agree in a double repeate, called *Methodus*. And therefore the conclusion is negative, by contraposition, wherof I spake before, when I treated of the conuersion, or turning of propositions.

The second figure.

An argument vniuersall negative, reduced to the first figure, by plaine conuerion of the former proposition.

Proposition. No iust man before God hath an vniquiet conscience.
Conclusion. All they that trust to be iustified by their workes, have vniquiet consciences.
Conclusion. Therefore none trusting to his workes, is iust before God.

The second figure.

I. I.

An

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An argument vniuersal negative, reduced to the first figure, making the second proposition altered by plaine conuersion, to bee the former and first proposition, and the first proposition to be the second: and the conclusion also to be altered by plaine conuersion.

Ca. The Christian righteousness, is the purenesse of the minde.
me. To weare a Cippet, a Cowle, a hauen crowne, is not the purenesse of the minde.
stru. Therefore the outward attire is not the Christian righteousness.

A particular argument, reduced to the first figure, altering onely the first proposition by plaine conuersion.

Co. Some Diuines concerneth Philosophie.
fi. Some English preachers concern Philosophie.
no. Ergo, some English preachers are not true Diuines.

This argument is reduced to *Barbara*, only taking the contradictorie of the second proposition, & the conclusion and setting these two, the one in others place.

Ca. All Christians refuse to get goods vngodly.
me. Some Paraphs refuse not to get goods vngodly.
co. Therefore some Paraphs are no Christians.
 These of the second figure.

In debating matters, which stande in contrarietie, wee may get much helpe by this second figure, for euermore, when we dissent from other in opinion, this figure helpeth much for lapping by of our argument. As if one should say, All workes are allowed before God, that are done of a good intent, I might answer thus, no hypocrittall workes, no propheticall spassing, no meritorious praying, although they be done for a good intent, are yet to bee allowed before God. And so I might replye and fraime mine argument in this figure, against the aboue rehearsed sentence. The third figure is, where the dubble repeate is the

Framing of
the 2j. figure.

former

former part in both propositions. And there bee three modes of the same figure. Note also that the conclusion must needs bee particular in this figure, where the former part in both propositions, is the dubble replete, for like as we reason in the first figure from the generall worde, to the kinde that is from the vniuersall, so the particular, so in this figure we reason frō the kind (which is lesse) to the generall worde, which is more vniuersall, but so not withstanding, that the conclusion bee particular, and therefore this kinde of argument is very good. For the Species, or kinde, being once put, the generall must needs followe.

The third figure.

This argument is reduced to *Dari*, the second proposition being altered by conuersion of the accident.

Da- Every Common weale is Gods ordinance.
Pa- Every Common weale hath name of Lawes, and armour. The third figure.

ti. Therefore some Lawes and armour are Gods ordinance.

This argument is reduced to *Bar*, the second proposition being altered onely to conuersion of accident.

Fe- No vertue should be eschewed.
Pa- All vertue hath betwixt her.
con. Therefore some war should not bee eschewed.

This argument is reduced to *Dari*, the second proposition nothing altered, but onely set in the first place, and the first set in the second place being altered by plaine conuersion, & the conclusion in like maner.

Di- Mercie onely forgiveth sinnes.
Pa- All mercie is purchased by faith.
con. Therefore by faith onely forgiveness is obtained.

This argument is reduced to *Dari*, the second proposition, altered by plaine conuersion.

Da- All hypocrites compe wil workes high holiness.
Pa- Some hypocrites haue bene Bishops.
con. Therefore some Bishops haue compe wil workes high holiness.

I.ii.

This

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This argument following, is reduced to *Barbais*, the conclusion first being altered by contradiction, and made the first proposition, the second standing as it doth, and keeping their owne place still: the proposition at large, which was before the first, is now altered and made the conclusion, by contradiction.

Some battell is not to be eschewed.
 Every battell is full of much miserie.
 Ergo some miserie is not to be eschewed.

This argument following is reduced to *Feria*, the second proposition being altered only by plaine conversion.

Some malicious man is of God.
 Every malicious man is a preacher.
 Therefore some preacher is not of God.

The use of the third figure

This figure profiteth much, in proving particular things and gathering of consequences, in cases that are doubtful, when probability onely and no assured knowledge, sheweth out the trueeth of a matter. And because severall things come sonest to our senses, wee do such gathering most commonly, and by triall of particular causes, assest out truthe of the trueeth generally.

It is very necessary, that there should be three figures, as I have shewed already. For in every argument, that hath the shape of a *Syllogismus*, (for the induction and the example have it not, neither be they in mood and figure) evermore wee reason from the generall, to the kinde, or universall, making the conclusion universall: or els wee reason from the kinde, to the generall, making the conclusion particular: or els there is a repugnancie of the terme at large, and the severall, when they doe not agree with the double repeater: last of all wee sayne many causes, and many effects together, whereof is made an argument, called *Series*, or *Cogitatio*: that is to say, a heaping together of things.

First figure. Wee therefore make an argument, and proceed from the general worde, to the kinde, it is in the first figure: and even by our reason we

we learne this, that if the greater be not, the lesse cannot bee. As thus, if one be not a liuing creature, how can he be a man, if he be a liuing creature, he must either be a man, or a brute body.

Then wee proceede from the kinde, to the generall, making the conclusion particular, the argument is in the third figure. And this is for euer true, that when the kind is rehearsed, the generall must needes followe.

But when there is a repugnauncie in an argument of the terme at large, and the seuerall, so that they agree not with a third worde, it is euer in the second figure. And this is plaine to see, that such an argument must needes bee well concluded, when we goe about to confute any thing, seeing that two kindes, which are repugnaunt, must needes be disseured, and so the conclusion to be made vpon the same. And it is easie to see in the arguments of the second figure. Therefore it is good reason, that both there should be three figures, and also that the argument both well proceede being made in any of them.

Sometimes an argument is made, when wee couple many causes together, and the very effects of the same, as thus.

Quermuch gourmandise hindereth digestion in the stomacke.

By euill digestion in the stomacke, corrupt blood, is engendered in the liuer.

When euill blood is bred in the liuer, euill humours are spread throughout all the bodie.

Euill humours spread throughout the body, cause a distemperature in the body, & after that bring the dropisie.

Therefore quermuch gourmandise causeth dropisie.

Gourmandise causeth dropisie.

Of an vnperfect argument, called *Enthymemas*.

An vnperfect argument, is an argument wanting some part, the which is, when one proposition is rehearsed, and the conclusion strait brought in therevpon, as thus.

An vnperfect argument.

That is not good, which bringeth a man to mischance. Therefore money is not good. The Byble teacheth a man his dutie towards God, and his neighbor, Ergo it is necessary to be knowne and read of euery body. Pleasure bringeth endlesse paine after

I.iii.

it.

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it. *Ergo* pleasure is to be eschewed. These arguments be imperfect arguments, wanting one proposition euermore, the which if we add, a perfect argumentation foloweth thereupon, as thus.

{ Whatsoever bringeth endlesse paine after it, that same is to be eschewed.

{ Pleasure bringeth endlesse paine after it.

Ergo, pleasure is to be eschewed.

These imperfect arguments, called *Enthymemata*, consist partly of likelihoodes, and partly of infallible reasons.

Likelihoodes.

Likelihoodes are those, that often hit the truth, and yet are not alwaies so, as thus.

{ Such a yong man talketh often, and that alone also, with such a yong maike.

{ *Ergo* he is in loue with her.

This may bee true, and this may bee false, for although the coniecture haue some probabilitie with it, yet is it not for euer true. The other called infallible reasons, or rather necessary arguments, must by all reason be euermore true, as thus.

Infallible reasons.

{ Such a woman is brought in bed.

{ *Ergo*, she hath had the companie of man.

An other.

{ The Sunne is risen.

{ *Ergo*, it is day.

Therefore in all communication, good heerde ought to be take, that likelihoodes of things, be not used for necessary reasons.

Of an argument, called *Syllogismus expositorius*.

An argument made by a noun proper

This kinde of argument hath euermore a *Notione* proper, to be as the dubble repeate in both propositions: contrary to the maner of all other arguments, and it may be referred to the third figure.

{ Paule doth alledge godly sayings of the *Ethnikes*.

{ Paule was a *Preacher*.

{ *Ergo*, a *Preacher* may alledge godly sayings of the *Ethnikes*.

For, whatsoever is truly gathered of particular things, the same also is proper to the things generall, and whatsoever agreeth

greech to the kinde, agreech also to the difference, or propriety, of the sayd Name proper.

Inductio.

An Induction, is a kinde of argument, when wee gather sufficiently a number of proper names, and thereupon make the conclusion vniuersall, as thus.

Abraham was iustified by his faith. Likewise Isaac. Likewise Iacob. Likewise Gideon. Likewise David.

And all the holy men besides, without exception.

Ergo, all that be iustified before God, are iustified by their faith.

An other example.

Dathan for disobedience against the superiour power, ended his life wretchedly. Likewise Abiron.

Rebeller dye wretchedly.

Likewise Choran. Likewise Semei.

Neither is there any example to the contrary.

Therefore all Rebelles, and Traytours to their Prince and King, shall dye wretchedly.

An other example.

Nembroth, although he was a ioyful Hunter, yet he liued like a wretch in great miserie.

Laban also liued wretchedly.

Pharao was sore plagued.

Amalech, Madian, Abimalech.

Herode, with other were scourged greuously for their wickednesse: neither is there any example to the contrary.

The ende of the vngodly, is wicked.

Therefore the ende of wicked men is wretched.

This kinde of argument is called *Inductio*, because that bringing diuers proper names, it enduceth at length, and moueth the minde to make a generall conclusion. Therefore necessarie it is, that in such arguments all the examples, which are inducd be like, if any bee found contrary, the argument is of no force, as thus.

Athanasius liued unmarried.

Ambrosius liued unmarried.

Basilus had no wife, and a great many more.

Ergo, all Bishops heretofore were unmarried.

The

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Bishops married in the Primative Church.

The Apostles had wives.

Socrates induction.

Fewer godly in all ages.

The argument is not lawfull, forasmuch as diuers haue bene married in the Primative Church, as Spiridion, Hermes, Hilarius, Policrates, Tertulian, and diuers other. For it was the maner of the Primative Church, that honest married men, were chosen to be Bishops, and had the charge of Christs flock.

The Apostles also (as Egnacius witnesseth) had wives, as well as other men, and as I thinke vsed them, as other men doe their wives, or els asked their leave, and consent to forbeare them.

Socrates vsed a kind of induction, by asking many questions, the which all when they were graunted, he brought thereupon his confirmation, concerning the present controuersie, which kinde of argument, hath his name of Socrates himselfe, called by the learned, Socrates Induction, as if I might reason thus, lamenting the miserie of mankinde, wherein so fewe are good, and so many euill. Alas in what state be we most all men, seeing in all ages there hath none bene almost good. I pray you how many good folke were there, when all the worlde was drowned? Surely not past eight in all. How many were founde good in the Citie of Sodomit, when the whole was burnt for abominable sinne, with fire and Brimstone? Not ten, no not eight, no not sixe could be founde, as it appeareth plaine in the eighteenth and nineteene Chapter of Genesis. How many in the lande of Promise, when sixe hundred thousand fighting men went out of Egypt? Alas but two onely. How many did swarte from God euerliuing, and bowed to an Idoll in the time of Helias? Forsooth all the people, saving Helias, and seuen thousande. How many tribes of the Israelites followed God? Two onely, where as the other ten clerely forsooke him. How many did the Lorde coumpt to bee his in the lande of Syria? None at all, saving Naham the officer, and the widowe of Sarepta. How many feared God, when Tobias was persecuted? Tobias onely. How many found Christ, when he was here himself vpon earth? But twelue that he chose as faithfull, and yet one was a traytour afterward. Therefore, thus may I conclude, the godly people in all ages are small in number..

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The vse.



We profite much by this kinde of argument : for hereby we haue the assured knowledge of those grossids, which nature hath grafted in vs . As where nature telleth vs, that the whole is greater then the parts , wee cannot otherwise know it, but by shewing it to be true in this substance, and that substance, and so in all other, whereupon we conclude, that this generall saying is true. Aristotle sayth, this argument serueth well to perswade the multitude, when we gather many like thinges, and at last, after such heaping, conclude, that our argument is generally true. As I heard once a Doctor of Diuinitie, which was not so great in knowledge, as he was in title, a little before the banishment of the Masse, earnestly defending his cause, with examples of such and such worshipfull as dwelt there in the Countrie . Doth not such a man (¶ he) deuouclly heare Masse? Doth not such a Knight, such a Lord, such a Ladie, and such a Gentleman, full reuerently come to the blessed Masse? Then neighbours (¶ he) if all these doe so, and none but Heretiques followe the contrary, why should not you followe the best, and forsake the worst? With that, the people hearing such a patched reason, were wonderfully perswaded, to say as he sayd, and if neede had beene , readie to haue dyed (but not with him, for he would none of that himselfe, being come home sence gayly well) but alone, and together themselues, if such extremitie had beene offered . Again, this kinde of argumentation profiteth much, to dilate a matter at large, that thereby the truth may the rather be allowed, when it is found true in euery singular thing.

A Doctors
induction in
behoue of
the Masse.

De Exemplo.



Example, is a maner of argumentation, where one thing is proued by an other , for the likeness that is found to be in them both, as thus . If Marcus Attilius Regulus, had rather lose his life, then not keepe promise with his enemy . then should euery man being taken prisoner, keepe promise with his enemy. If Cities haue bene destroyed, for breaking of Treack, then Adulterers must needs

An argument
called an ex-
ample.
Marcus At-
tilius Regu-
gulus.

K.i.

be

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Alexander.

be punished. If Alexander dawning a weake Soldiour, when he was almost frozen for colde, and did set him in his owne Chaire against the fire: then should all Captaines, and men of warre, be teacher ouer their poore warriours, and bafe Soldiours.

Euermore take heede, that this kinde of argument, the causes bee like of both sides, or els the argument, proueth not. As thus.

{ Peter killed Ananias, taken with an open lye.
Therefore, spirituall ministers may punish open offenders, with temporall sworde.

How Peter
killed Ana-
nias.

The examples are not like. Peter did kill Ananias with the worde, and power of the holy Ghost: therefore, Preachers must not kill the bodie, but onely excommunicate men, accompting them unworthie to bee in the congregation. The sworde is lawfull for the temporall Magistrate onely, and for none other.

The vse.

H That hath store of examples, is well able to perswade the willing hearer, and shall much delight euen the discontented also, that must needs heare alwaies fine matters, and straunge examples to please his fantasie withall.

Sorites, an heaping argument.

An heaping
argument.

S *Orites, vel coarsuatio*, is a heaping together of causes, one vpon an other. A kinde of argument when the last rehearsed worde, of the first proposition, is repeated in the first part of the second proposition, necessarily agreeing therunto, and so going still forth in like maner, till at the length the last rehearsed worde be added vnto the first worde, or former part of the first proposition. And it is a kinde of argument much vsed when wee ascende byward from the lowest, to the highest. Or els when we goe from the causes to the next thinges done. Which thinges done, are the occasion of other thinges besides, as thus.

{ A man is a liuing creature.
A liuing creature is a liuely bodie.
A liuely bodie is a substance.
Ergo, a man is a substance.

Where

Where the Lawe is, there is transgression.
 Where there is transgression, there is feare.
 Where there is feare, there is remoyse of conscience.
 Therefore, where the lawe is, there is remoyse of conscience.

An other.

Iustification is not without faith.
 Faith is not without a repentant heart.
 Therefore, Iustification is not without a repentant heart.
 No arguments be made negatiue, by this kinde of argumen-
 tation. As thus.

The Gospell is not the Lawe.
 The Lawe teacheth vs the feare of God.
 Therefore, the Gospell doth not,
 Or thus.

Christ the Sonne, is not in person God the father.
 God the father is euer liuing.
 Therefore, Christ is not euer liuing.
 But these, and such like, be as wise as this that followeth.
 Fish is no flesh.
 Flesh is meate.
 Therefore, fish is none.

And the reason is: no arguments be made negatiuely, by this
 kind of reasoning. Neither is the consequent good, when wordes
 that agree not necessarily, are ioyned together.

Of euill maners are made good Lawes.
 Good Lawes are thinges worthy to be praised.
 Thinges worthy praise, are to be desired.
 Therefore, euill maners are to be desired.

This knitting is not lawfull, for euill maners of themselves,
 are not the occasion of good lawes, but the goodly minde of good
 Magistrates, is the very chief cause. As the disease is not the
 cause of healing, but rather the Physicion and his medicines, and
 mans nature, which resisteth the popson of sicknesse, is the very
 cause. Again, in euery heaping vp of arguments, after such sort,
 learne and marke, how they procede, and you shall easily see
 false packing.

K.ii.

Thus

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Thus meric fellowes reason when they are at ale.

He that drinkes well, sleepest well.
He that sleepest well, sinnes not.
He that sinnes not, shalbe saued.
Therefore, let vs all drinke well and we shalbe saued.

Marke the proceeding, and ye shall easely auoyde the errour, for although in sleepe wee sinne not, yet by drinking wee cause sinne, and although wee sleepe soundly after, yet no one man at one time, both drinketh and sleepest, therefore, though in sleeping he offendeth not, yet in drinking he passeth measure, and therefore, the knitting is nothing worth.

An horned argument.

Dilemma, otherwise complexio, vel cornutus Syllogismus, called a horned argument, is when the reason consisteth of repugnaunt members, so that whatsoeuer you graunt, you fall into the snare, and take the foyle. As if I should aske, whether it were better to marie a faire woman, or a foule. If you say a faire. Then answer I, that is not good, for they commonly say, she will bee common, and then I may say, ye are touched with the horned argument, if that saying bee true. If you say, it were good to marie a hard fauoured woman, then I answer, she will bee lothsome, and so ye fall into an inconuenience both waies. Notwithstanding, if either of the parts may bee turned, into the aduersaries neck againe, or both of the, it is a faultie argument. And you may confute the same by inuersion, that is to say, turning his tale cleane contrary, as thus. If I shall marie a faire womā, I shal haue great pleasure & comfort in her: if I marie a honye woman, she shal not be comon to other, for few men will seeke after her. Therefore, I shall haue comfort both waies.

Christes answer, being
stroken on
the cheek.

Christ himself, as Iohn witnesseth in the xviij. Chapter, vnder the same kinde of argument against the ministers, which stroode by, and smote him on the face, saying: answerest thou the high Priest so? Iesus answered him. If I haue euill spoken, beare witnesse of the euill: if I haue well spoken why smitest thou me?

De consequentijs.



It profiteth not a little, after the rehearfall of such arguments, briefly to shew the knitting of propositions, and to declare the maner of a short argument, uttered by two propositions; which are sayd to stand upon the antecedent, & the consequent, as the Logicians vse to terme the.

Of briefe arguments.

The first rule.

From the vniuersall gathering to the particular, the argument goeth well, as thus.

{ All officers doe their duetie.
 { Ergo, this officer doth his duetie.
 But not contrary.
 { This officer doth his duetie.
 { Ergo, all officers doe their duetie.

The second rule.

From that which by nature is in any thing, to that which happeneth casually, or commeth by some mille euill, the reason is not good. As thus.

{ Sober diet is good.
 { A Feuer causeth sober diet.
 { Ergo, a Feuer is good.

An other argument used by the Romish Bishop.

{ Sinne doth not beget man.
 { The worke of lust begetteth man.
 { Therefore lust, otherwise called *Concupiscentia*, is no sinne.

The second Proposition is not true, for wicked concupiscentence, came in by mans folly, and hath much defaced that, which nature first ordeined. Therefore, nature it selfe through God, giueth encrease, which is much contrary to the wicked lust of concupiscentence.

Nature throwe God, giueth encrease.

The third rule.

Things disagreeing, are not considered both one way, and with one respect.

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The Gospell wilteach vs to make no difference of meates. The Philisitions appoint vs a diet, and forbid vs this and that. Ergo, the Gospell, and the Philisitions, teach things contrary.

These doe not disagree, considering their endes are diuers. The Scripture forbiddeth superstition, in the obseruation of dayes. The Philisition hath respect, to the state of mans bodie.

The fourth rule.

The argument is good, when substances are set, according to their proper differences. But when they are set the one against the other, according to their accidents, which are agreeing to both, the argument is not good, as thus.

It is lawfull for you, not to drinke wine.

Ergo, to drinke wine is unlawfull.

Whereas this whyle (lawfull) is common to both, as well to drinke, as not to drinke. The argument, which the Sophist made to Diogenes, may by this rule be confuted.

The fifth rule.

Every thing, the more that other thinges are through it, the same is alwaies the more it selfe. As thus.

Water is hot through fire.

Ergo, fire is more hot.

An other.

Some loue to marie for goodes.

Therefore, they loue goodes best of all.

Where it hath place, and where not.

Some arguments made, according to this rule, are nothing true, and therefore it is good, to giue warning of them.

It is well said, and truely, this rule holdeth in causes, that are next adjoining, and the which wholly compasse a matter not in those causes, that are fetched farre of, and being but half causes, partly and by the way, giue onely the occasion. As thus.

Onid came to be a Poet by his masters.

Therefore, his master is the greater Poet.

The

The argument is not good in these causes, that are but halfe causes, for Ouid is not a Poet, only because he learned precepts of his master, but also because he had a great aptnesse by nature, and a wonderfull wit, to doe better then another.

Some holde fast vpon a saying of Saint Augustine, and build wonders vpon that text, I would not beleue the Gospel, saith Augustine, except the Catholike Church did perswade me. And here vpon say they,

Saint Augustine saying vpon the Church.

{ The Gospel is beleueed for the Churches sake.
Ergo, the Church is of more authoritie.

And here they heape a number of mischiues. Therefore (say they) the Church may make Lawes, and appoint traditions, whatsoeuer they be. But I answer thus, the antecedent is false. For, I chiefly beleue the Gospel, considering God is the author: and seeing the wonders that he hath done. I give credite to it for his sake. I graunt, wee doe beleene the Gospel, for the Churches sake, but yet principally, for that God is the chiefe author, that perswadeth vs to receiue his worde; and after the Church (as the second cause) telleth vs that the Gospel is the truth of God. Therefore, if they will make this such an argument, as they seeme to say it is, then this that followeth, is of as good force, for in all thinges it is like.

How should I knowe the Church, or which were of the Church had not the Gospel afore instructed me

{ This child is a good hope, Gremencie rod.

{ Ergo, the rod is better then the hope.

The chiefe cause of the boyes goodnesse, is God himselfe, which sendeth his grace vnto him: the second cause is, his good freendes, which chasten him for his offence: and lastly, the

rod, as an instrument, where by the feate is done,

helpeth forward to bring the hope to

some goodnesse.

¶ of

The Arte of Logike.

Of the second parte of Logike, called

Inuentio, that is to say, the finding
out of an argument.



hitherto wee haue treated of the former part of Logike, called in Latine *Iudicium*, that is to say, Judgement, by skil to declare the nature of euery word seuerally, to set the same words in a perfect sentence, and to knit them by in an argument, so that hereby we might with ease espie & right frame in matters, how they agree, being

lapped by in order. Now therefore, the other part shall bee set forth, which is called *Inuention*, whereby wee may finde arguments, and reasons, meete to proue euery matter, whereupon question may rise. This part is the store house of places, wherein arguments rest, vnto the which, if wee conferre the matter, which wee entende to proue, there will appeare diuers arguments to confirme the cause. Like as they therefore that digge for golde in ground, doe search narrowly the vaines of the earth, and by diligent marking the nature thereof, at length finde out the Mine, which once being founde, they straight bring it to light, for the only behouse of man. So he that will reason wisely, as well for the common profite of other, as for his owne priuate gaine, must be a very diligent labourer, and considering matters are put to the prooffe, wherein often resteth doubt, his part must bee euermore to marke the nature of his cause, and to seeke confirmation thereof in euery part. First, by the definition, the cause the effect and proper office. Again, to see what is contrary, what is like, and what thinges bee incident thereunto, the which all when he hath done, he shal see at length that some one argument aboue all other, serueth best to confirme his cause, the which whē with trauaile, he hath founde out, he may bring to light, and vse according to his will.

Inuention.

A similitude.

¶ That

What a diuision is.



Place is, the resting corner of an argument, or els a place, a marke, which giueth warning to our memorie, what wee may speake probably, either in the one part or the other, vpon all causes that fall in question. Those that be good Placefinders, will sone find the hare by her forme. For, when they see the ground beated flat round about, and faire to the sight: they haue a narrowe gesse by all likelihood, that the Hare was there a litle before. Likewise the huntelman, in hunting the Fore, will sone espie when he seeth a hole, whether it be the Fore borough, or not. So he that will take profite in this part of Logike, must bee like a hunter, and learne by labour, to knowe the boroughes. For, these places bee nothing els, but couerts or boroughes, wherein if any one search diligently, he may find game at pleasure. And although perhaps one place faile him, yet shall he find a dosen other places, to accomplish his purpose. Therefore, if any one will doe good in this kind, he must go from place to place, and by searching euery borough, hee shall haue his purpose vndoubtedly, in most part of them, if not in all. We see that euery proposition, doth either affirme a thing to be true, or els denieth that it is true. Therefore, when any thing is constantly said, it needeth somewhat euermore to confirme it. As for example. The Sacraments are necessarie in the Church of God. I may prooue this saying true, by reasoning from place, which is called the end of euery thing, as thus.

A similitude or parable of hunting.

In all arguments either we affirme or deny.

To giue testimonie of our faith, and to nouell our selfe in the practise thereof, is verie necessarie. The Sacraments giue testimonie of our faith, &c. Ergo, the Sacraments are verie necessarie.

Argument vpon respect of the end.

When any proposition doth deny, it is needfull to haue a third worde, which may agree with one part of the proposition. As if one should thus say. Man is not iustified by his workes. The place of repugnant wordes, that both altogether disagree, giueth iust matter. And therefore I may say: Man is not iustified by his workes, because he is iustified by his faith onely. For, if merite come by grace, and that freely, then workes can not saue vs.

Sacraments necessarie,

L. i.

Paule

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Paul proueth the first, therefore the second is for ever true.

The diuision of the places, which are xxiiii. in number.

	{ Particuarlie in the very substance. As	{ The definition. The generall worde The kinde. The propertie. The whole. The partes. The poked worde.
{ Some are inward places, called Loci interni, and they are	{ And partly incident to the substance. As	{ Words adioined. The manner of doing. The thing contained.
	{ Some are causes. As	{ The effici- ent cause. The ende.
{ Some are outward places, called Exter- ni, that is not in the substance, or nature of the thinge, but without it, and these are.	{ Either knit with any ac- cidents, cal- led cognata, of the which Either applied to the thing, not being the cause therof, but only giuing a name ther- to, called Applicata. as	{ The effeate. The thinge appointed for some end
		{ The place. The time. Things annexed
	{ Or els they bee acciden- tes, whereof there be 3.	{ Things chauncing Sentences of a sage The name of a thig Things compared. Things like.
	{ Or els they are repug- nances. As	{ Discordances. Things differing.
	{ Of the definition.	

¶ Of the definition.

There be seven places, which are in the
substance or nature of the thing.

The definitio

A Definition is a perfect sentence, whereby the verie na-
ture of the thing it selfe, is set forth, and expounded. You
may reason from this place, both affirmatiuely, and ne-
gatiuely, as thus: Fortitude is a vertue, that fighteth in the
quarrell

quarrell of right, I may reason thus from the definition, to the thing defined, if I will proue fortitude praise worthe.

From the definition to the defined.

- Da- Whatsoeuer is vertue, fighting in the quarrell of right, the same is praise worthe.
- ri- Fortitude is vertue, fighting in y^e quarrell of right.
- i- Therefore, fortitude is praise worthe.

If I will define a good thing, and proue that money is not good, I may reason thus.

- Ce- No such thing is good, as is desired for respect of any other ende.
- sa- All money is desired, for respect of an other ende.
- re- Therefore, no money is good.

The generall rule.

To whom the definition doth agree, to the same also doth the thing defined belong. And contrariwise, both affirmatiuely and negatiuely.

The maner of reasoning.

If Socrates be a liuing creature, endued with reason, then is he a man, if he be a man, he is a liuing creature endued with reason. If he be not a liuing creature, &c. Thē he is not a man. If he be not a man, then he is no liuing creature, endued with reason.

The vse.

The nature of euery thing, is knowne by the definition, and therefore, this place aboue all other, is most necessarie.

Of the Generall word.

The generall word, is spoken of many, that differ either in kinde, or els differ in number, when the question is asked, what it is, we may reason negatiuely, from this place, thus.

The generall worde.

- Ce- No vertue may be called wastfulness.
- la- Liberalitie is a vertue.
- rent. Therefore, liberalitie may not be called wastfulness.

The generall rule.

If the generall worde bee taken away, the kinde tarieth not. If the generall worde doe remaine, it shall not straight followe that the kinde shal ensue. For, it is no good argument, if I see a

The Arte of Logike.

tree a good way from me, to say thus: it is a tree, therefore, it is an apple tree. But I may say thus well negatively, it is no tree; therefore, it is neither apple tree, nor yet any other tree.

The maner of reasoning.

If euery creature by nature loue it selfe, then man doth loue himselfe. If euery vertue be praise worthy, then in the administration of Justice, to giue euery man his owne it is prayse worthy.

The vse.

The generall worde declareth the largenes of any thing, so that, where the generall taketh no place, the other that be inferiour can not bee. As if there be no liuing creature in some one house, then there must needes be no maner of man, in the same house.

Of the kind.

The kinde being reckened among the places, is taken to be any one thing, that is lesse generall then an other, and by this sort, euery proper Name or names of things, shal serue for the kind, and go in steede thereof. Therefore, as we reason from the kinde to the generall, so may wee reason from Names proper, to their kinds. From the kind to the generall, an argument is made onely affirmatiue, as thus: If Justice be to be desired, then vertue is to be desired. Such a man is a flaunderer: Ergo he is a naughty man.

The generall rule.

To whom the kinde doth agree, to the same also, the generall doth agree.

The maner of reasoning.

If sobrietie be praise worthy, then vertue is praise worthy. If drunkennesse be deuelish, then surfeiting is deuelish.

The vse.

The necessa-
riness of this
place.

The kind is generall to euery proper name, and therefore, in describing the nature of euery Name proper we haue much neede of this place, to know vnder what kind euery seuerall thing is comprehended. Again, whatsoeuer is defined, the same is of kind of some one thing,

so that hereby we learne, how farre this worde stretcheth, being ordeined to set forth the nature of euery proper name.

Of the difference and propertie.

From the propertie, and difference, arguments are deriued, both affirmatiue and negatiue. We can reason a matter artificially, therefore he is a good Logicien. Clope could not better his minde at large, but bid stammer, and stay much in his speech, therefore he was an Orator. By the propertie yee may reason thus: Such a man feareth God, putteth his whole trust in God, and loueth his neighbour as himselfe. *Ergo*, he is a right Christian. And like wise yee may reason by conuersion. Such a one is a Christian. *Ergo*, he feareth God.

The difference and propertie

The generall rule.

When the propertie, or difference is graunted, then the kinde straight followeth, take away the same, and there remaineth no kinde at all.

Declarers of natures working.

The maner of reasoning.

Whosoever is endued with reason, the same is a man.

The vse.

The difference and the propertie, declare natures working in all things liuing, and therefore they helpe well to shew what euery thing is, by his proper gift. We speake before of a Methode, or direct order to be vsed in all our doing: and herein we may well see the vse thereof. For, hether to wee handled those places, which do nothing els but comprehend the nature of a perfect definition. Now, whereas the place followeth of the whole, and his partes, it is nothing els, but the right maner of a perfect diuision. The places that followe after, declare the causes, the effects, what be incident, what be disagreeing from the matter, shewing example, and testimonies of the auuncient.

The whole and the parts
The whole two waies taken.

Of the whole, and the partes.



The whole is that same, which consisteth of his partes, and is diuided two maner of wayes. First, there is the whole in substance, which standeth of such partes, that if one be taken away, the whole becometh straight, neither can it after ward keepe

L.iii.

his

The Arte of Logike.

his name, as it did before. For an example. A man is divided into a body, & soule. Take away the body, who compereth the soule to be the man, which before had his bodie ioyned thereunto: We say the soule liueth, when the body is dead, but no man sayth the soule is the verie man, euen as we called him before, when hee was compart of both.

Againe, there is the whole absolute with his partes, which scructh to make the whole perfect, adding such things, that although they bee away, yet the whole notwithstanding remaineth, and hath his name still, as when a man is made of body, and soule (which are the partes of his substance, and can not be a waie) yet hath he other partes, which although they bee awaie, the whole notwithstanding keepeth his name still. As if a man lose his hand, his arme, or one of his feete, yet he is called a man, and these bee called *partes integrales*, that is to say, the partes, which finish the whole, and make it perfect, after that it hath those partes, which make the substance.

The generall rule.

If the whole bee, the partes of the substance must needes be, As if a man be a liue, the body and soule, both are aliue.

The maner of reasoning.

If Philosophie be good, then it is good, to knowe the nature of things, the waie of ordering mans life, and the skill how to reason probable, for Philosophie it selfe, is diuided into these three partes.

The vse.

Hereby wee learne to examine the whole, by the partes, that if we can not obtaine our purpose, to haue the whole graunted, to examine it by the partes, and force our aduersarie to assent to some member.

The integrale partes, which make perfect the whole, and cause the bignesse thereof, are diuided into parts like, or not like.

Partes like, are those, which are alwaies like, and diuided euermore into like. As the flesh, bones, sinnowes, fire, water, gold, Iron, wine, wood, stone. Every part of all these, is called asmuch as the whole, as a piece of flesh, is called flesh, a piece of

wood

Partes integrales.
Parts like.

wood, is called wood, a drop of water, is called water aswell as a gallon of water, is called water. They be called in Latine *Similares partes*, because they are named like unto the whole, for a piece of flesh is aswell called flesh, and as much hath it the name of flesh, as a whole Dre hath. The partes, which haue not like names to the whole, are partly principall, and partly not principall. The principall partes are they, which in no wise may be away, without the losse of the whole it selfe: as the parts of mans body, which containe life, can not be away, without losse of y^e man. As the head, the bealy, the heart, and the entrailes. Yet notwithstanding, the partes of these can not be called like to the whole, for no man saith that a piece of the heart, is the heart, or a piece of the bed, is the bed, and so in the other. Those which are not principall partes may be away: and the whole notwithstanding remaine still, as the hands, the feete, the legges, and the armes.

Partes not like

The generall rule.

When the chiefe partes are taken away, the whole needes decaye: the chiefe partes beeing brought altogether, the whole must needes followe.

The maner of reasoning both negatively, and also affirmatiuely.

Such a man hath learned small Philosophie, Naturall, and Logike, therefore he is a Philosopher. Some priestes can neither write well, speake well, nor yet recite authors, accordingly. Therefore, they are no Grammarians. This mā is no Rhetoricien, because he cannot place his thinges in good order. For, whereas five things bee required in an Oratour, first to inuent, after to place thinges inuented, thirdly, to set forth the matter in good wordes, fourthly, to remember all these, and laste of all, to utter the same distinctly, and with a cleare voyce: If one lacke any of these five, he can not bee called an Oratour. Therefore, I may saye: Such a one hath an euill memorie: Ergo, he is no Oratour. Or such a one hath no utteraunce: Ergo, he may not bee called an Oratour. In the negative parte, it is enough to take one parte awaie, for the disallowing of any thing. But if

Five things
required in
an Oratol.

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A generall
partition of
an Orator.

if I will affirme any thing by the partes, I must take all the partes, and not one, or two partes. For, he is not an Orator, that can inuent only, or place things in good order only, except he can doe the whole, as it is required. Again, he is no good Orator, that can teache onely, or belite, but he is absolute, that can both teach, delite, and also perswade.

The maner of reasoning.

WE reason from the parte, to the whole, affirmatiuely, and negatiuely, thus: Such a one can neither iudge the knitting of words together, nor frame them in order, according to the arte, nor auoyde any subtilties: Ergo, hee is no Logicien.

The vse.

The partes set forth the whole, and are a greates beautifying of the same: being seuerally handled, and in their natures set forth at large.

Of wordes yoked together.

Wordes yoked.

YOked wordes, which being deriued of one, are chaunged in speaking. As of *Sapientia*: *sapientia*, *sapienter*. A wise man, wise dome, wisely. Here we see that of a wise man, is deriued wise dome, I may reason from this place, both affirmatiuely, and negatiuely. If one be not wise, he hath no wise dome, if one be wise, he hath wise dome. If one doe circumspectly, he is called a circumspect man. If it be no miserie to die, then death is not miserable. Such a one is a Philosopher, therefore hee hath studied Philosophy. Arguments deriued from hence, haue great force, if the onely yoked wordes be ioyned together, without addition of an other, or els they are not strong. As thus. Preachers be cuill liuers: Ergo, Preaching is euill. This argument is not good, because of the addition. For, preachers and preaching, are onely the yoked wordes, and therefore, thus I should say. There are Preachers: Ergo, there is preaching.

The generall rule.

When one of the yoked wordes is added, or put away the other also is added, or put away.

The

The Arte of Logike.

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The maner of reasoning both affirmatiuely and negatiuely.

Such a one is a Priestly Minister. Ergo he is a Priest. Such a man hath serued the King nobly. Ergo he is a noble man. The preacher handled his matter learnedly. Ergo the preacher hath learning. How call ye him wittie, that hath no wit at all? Is there no honestie in such a man? I maruell then, why they call him honest.

The vse.

VVe may learne by this place, to knowe, what things are, being considered in other. For, if I would knowe, whether it bee good, or no, to bee a man of honour, and to haue rule in the Common-weale: I may learne by them that doe rule, what it is to bee a ruler, or a man of honour, and how daungerous a calling they haue, that are placed in high estate. If I would knowe what wisdom is, best it were for me to marke their doings, that are wise men.

Of wordes adioyned to the substances, and yet not of the substance.

VVordes adioyned, are called those accidents, whereby the singular worde, or proper name, hath an other name then of the very substance, as vnto Cato (which of his substance is a man) wisdom doth happen, whereby he is called wise. Vnto Cicero also (which by his substance is a man) there happeneth eloquence, whereby he is called eloquent. So that he hath an other name, then his substance gieth, which is to be eloquent, and this is the word adioyned. All quantities, qualities, and those that are comprehended, in the predicament of relation, are referred to this place, when they are considered to bee comprehended in a substance. Vertue referred to the minde, which containeth it, is a worde adioyned: compared with vice, it is a contrarie referred to Justice, it is a generall worde. Wordes adioyned are perceived, either by the senses (as those, which are subiect to the senses) or els by understanding. As swiftnesse may bee considered to bee in a man, although we see him lye a long. And so wee say, such a Lacquey runneth well, although wee doe not then pre-

Wordes adioyned.

Vertue diuersly considered, diuersly placed. Wordes adioyned, perceived either by sense or els by understanding.

Ap. 1.

sently

The Arte of Logike.

ſently ſee him runne, but we remember that he hath runne, ſaying now, as we haue ſeene beſore in deede. Again, ſome wordes adioyned, are by nature in the thing, which concerne them, as heate is naturally in fire. And becauſe we ſee that the ſame heat, although it neuer goe awy, yet at all times, it is not of like ſtrength: but at ſometime leſſe hot, then at an other: we iudge the ſame heate to bee an accident. Some wordes adioyned, are not naturally cleauing, but by ſome other way, are ioyned to the thing conſequentially them, as heate in water ſet vpon the fire.

The generall rule.

IF one of the wordes adioyned, be in the ſubiect, or thing conſequentially, the other alſo is like to bee there, which followeth vpon the firſt. As thus. Cato is a man worthe praiſe, becauſe he is ware, ſober, full of experience: Praiſe followeth vertue, as the ſhadowe doth the bodie. Therefore, whoſoeuer hath moderate, and great knowledge of things, the ſame man of neceſſitie winneth praiſe, and fame, that cannot dye. Again, if the wordes adioyned be, the ſubiect that conſequentially them, muſt needs be alſo, as thus. If God be of all goodneſſe, then there is a God.

The maner of reaſoning.

Chrift came into this world, being gentle and milde. Ergo Chriſt came not to deſtroy the loſt ſheepe, but to ſaue the. Scholars be godly, vertuous, and occupied in learning. Ergo, it is a gracious deede, to helpe ſuch of them as haue neede.

The uſe.

WE may by this place, either praiſe, or diſpraiſe, ſetting forth the nature of men, and iudging them by their workes.

The maner of doing or ſuffering, called *Actus*.

The maner
of doing or
ſuffering.

The maner of doing, or ſuffering is, when we are ſuppoſed to be occupied, or affected any maner of way, either in doing, or in ſuffering. There be as many maner of beings, as there bee adiacents or wordes adioyned. And of theſe adiacents, feare, ſorrowe, trauaile, heate, colde, are deriued theſe: to feare, to be ſorie, to trauaile, to reſt, to bee hot, to be colde. And generally of thoſe wordes, that are referred vnto the two predicaments, called the maner of doing, and the ſuffering, are compaſſed within
this

this place, if the same wordes bee considered as accidents, which cleaue to the substance, and may both be present, and also be away without losse of substance. For if things done be weighed, according to their proper maner of doing, they are referred to the two places aboue, called the difference and the proprietie. For where as we say. Such a one speaketh: *Ergo*, he is a man (for nothing els can speake naturally, but man onely) although in this case (to speake) be a maner of doing, yet it is not referred to this, but rather to the proprietie, because it belongeth to man alone, and alwaies to man.

The generall rule.

If the maner of doing, or suffering be, the thing conteyning is also, and the wordes adioyned also (whereof doing and suffering, haue their offsprings) followe vpon the same.

The maner of reasoning from the place.

If one breath, the same man hath life in him. If Iulius Cesar came into England, then there was such a man called Iulius Cesar. If Richard the third played the Tyrant here in England, then there was such a man in England.

The vse.

This place much helpeth, either for praise or dispraise. Some Officers bibe the poore, robbe their master, and waste their owne: *Ergo*, such are worthy death.

Of the thing conteyning.

The subject, or the thing conteyning, is a substance, being the storehouse of accidents, and the very proppe to hold vpon deedes done: for neither wise dome, strength, health, nor pollicie, can be at al, except they be cōteyned within some one body.

The generall rule.

Take away the thing conteyning, and there remaine neither adiacent, nor yet deede done.

The maner of reasoning.

There is fire: *Ergo*, it is hot. Christ was a very mā: *Ergo* Christ dyed, and suffered the panges, at his departing.

An other.

Why dost thou say, that I owe thee a Crowne, who I know
D.ii. was

The Arte of Logike.

was neuer yet worth a groat? Melanchthon liueth and readeeth,
Therefore there is a great learning to be had, where he is.

The vse.

By naming of a worthie person, his praise is sufficiently set forth, euen when his name is once uttered. For what learned man, hearing the name of Cicero, doth not remember thereby, the full practise and the absolute skill of all eloquence? These places therefore helpe aswell, for the amplifying of matters, either in praise, or in dispraise, as they do for the steadfast prouing of any cause.

Of outward places being not in the substance, but only touching the substance and without the nature of it.

The causes
of things.



THE first are called, the causes of things, and the things comming of causes, which onely are ioyned to the thing necessarie, whereas the other places following, are not coupled necessarily, but are onely ioyned together, by certaine aliaunce to the present matter.

The deuision of causes.

Some causes, are called the very causes of things, euen by their owne nature: Other causes are happening causes, the which may perhaps bring forth the effect: lastly there bee causes without the which, things cannot bee done, and yet are they not any cause to force the effect.

The very
cause of
things.

The very cause of things, is such a one, as if it bee practised in very deede, and set forth with other naturall causes, the effect must needs followe. And againe, if it be not put in practise, although the other be put, yet the effect shal not followe. As for example, although one haue cloth, yet can he not haue the vse of it, except the Tayler cut it out. And although the Miller grinde, yet wee are like to dine without bread, except the Baker doe his part also in the batch.

The happen-
ing cause.
The cause
without the
which things
cannot be
done.

The happening cause, is such a one as although it bee put in practise in very deede, yet it shal not straight way so be, that the effect must needs followe. As an Ague may bee the happening cause, that some one man keepeth good diet, and yet not any forcing cause: for then all sick folke might be corrupted for sober men.

The

The cause without the which thinges can not bee done, as thus. The Surgiſon cannot heale a wound, except the dead fleſh be cut out. The wayfairer ſhall not (or very hardly) come to his iourneies ende, except he haue ſome money in his purſe. In time of warre, it is euill trauiſling, without a poſſepoſt: & this is called in Latine, *cauſa ſine qua non*, that is to ſay, the cauſe without the which we cannot, and yet it is not the cauſe of our iourneying.

The definition of the very cauſe.

A cauſe in very deepe, is a meane, by whole force, ſome thing both followe.

There be fower ſuch cauſes.

The efficient cauſe.
The ende.
The matter.
The ſhape.



The efficient cauſe, is the working cauſe, by whole meanes, thinges are brought to paſſe.

The efficient cauſe.
Efficient working cauſes, two waies conſidered.

Of thoſe that are working cauſes, ſome by nature bring thinges to paſſe, ſome by aduilement, and by a force purpoſed choyle. Things worke by nature (and that neceſſarily) which lacke knowledge to choſe this, or that, and haue no iudgement, to diſcerne thinges. As the Sunne, the fire, hearbes, precious ſtones. The Sunne, euen by nature, giuech light to the day, and cannot otherwiſe doe: The fire burneth naturally. Hearbs keepe their vertue of neceſſitie. The Adamant draweth Iron, euen by nature. And ſo the Bloodſtone, ſtoppeth blood. Some of theſe cauſes, work by the force and violence of nature, ſome by an outward power, being ſtreigned thereunto. They work by the force and violence of nature, whoſe beginning is within themſelues: being ayded by none other outward thing. As fire burneth, euen by the naturall force of heate, which is the ſubſtance thereof. They worke by an outward power, which are ſtreigned to work by an other meane. As water ſet vpon the fire waxeth hot, and yet is it not hot by her owne nature, but is made hot by the nature, and might of fire, of whom the water taketh heate. In like maner bullets of lead, ſhot out of a gun, an arrow out of a bowe,

Cauſes working by the force of nature.

Cauſes working by an outward power.

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a stone out of a sling, al these flye not into the ayre, by their stene power or might, but by force & violence of him that casteth them.

The generall rule.

From the naturall working cause, the effect must needes follow, as thus, If the Sunne shine, the day must needes be, which is the effect, or workmanship of the Sunne. Such a man hath eaten Henilock: *Ergo*, he is poisoned, & in daunger of death. Fire is in the Chimnie, or in the toppre of the house, therefore it must needes burne. Take away the cause, & the effect cannot be at all: for if there be no fire, there can be no flame, nor burning neither.

The second working cause is, when thinges are done by aduiscment, by choyse, not by any necessitie at all, for thinges may aswell not be done, as be done. As if there be a Shomaker, there may be Shoen made, and contrary, if there be no Shomaker, there can be no Shoen at all.

The generall rule.

Vhen the voluntarie cause is put, the workmanship, or the thing done, may followe. As if there bee a Carpenter, a house may bee made. If one reade good authours, and hearken to the reading of learned men, he may come to good learning.

The maner of reasoning.

Such a one hath dyonke popson, *Ergo*, he will dye shortly. Christ hath reconciled mankind to his father, by suffering death vpon the Crosse: *Ergo*, such as beleue in this sauing health, shall liue for euer.

An other deuision of causes efficient.

Commaund-
ing causes.

Some efficient causes are commaunding causes. As the King is the commaunding cause to his Subiect, to doe this or that. The master of workes, is the commaunding cause, to all the labourers. The other efficient causes, are obedient causes, when the seruauit worketh at his masters commaundement.

Obedient
causes.

An other deuision of causes efficient.

Of such efficient causes as do obey, some doe their worke, as the Mason worketh vpon the stone, the Carpenter vpon wood. Other efficient causes that are obedient, are but instruments of doing: As Hatchets, Hammers, Pikeaxes, with

with other. In battaile, the Captaine is the efficient commaun-
der: the Soldiour, the efficient obeier: Gunnes, Darts, Bowes,
and Billes, the instruments of doing. Good heede ought to bee
had, that in al causes we make a difference, not confounding one
with an other, that the nigh causes, and the farther causes, be not
taken all for one. A cause farre fetched is this. Such a one fell
out with his neighbor: Ergo, he killed him. Falling out byingeth
chydng, chydng byingeth hatred, hatred causeth fighting, fight-
ing giueth blowes, blowes soone dispatch, soone dispatching, is
readie death. Therefore, I might more probable and nigher to
the purpose reason thus. Such a one gaue his neighbour a dead-
ly wound: Ergo, he hath killed him. And thus the argument is
made from the nighest cause.

Examples of
causes.

An other deuision.

Some causes are principall causes, as the holy Ghost way-
king all godly motions, and stirring our nature, euermore
to the best. Other causes, are the inclinations in man, that
are either good or euill. Thirdly, there are helping causes, which
are meanes the rather, to further vs in all vertue. As learning,
practising of honest behauiour, acquainting our nature euermore
with the best. The principall cause, that Ioseph forbore to
company with an other mans wife: was the holy Ghost, that stir-
red his minde with the feare of God. The second cause, was his
owne minde, that remembred the worde of God, and the punish-
ment due for sinne. The third cause was, that he accustomed him
selfe euer to liue vprightly, and not onely to auoyde sinne, but al-
so to auoyde the occasion of sinne. There be other deuisions, but
I leaue to rehearse them, for feare I should be ouer long.

Causes being
the inclina-
tion in man.
Helping cau-
ses.

Ioseph.

The holy
Ghost is prin-
cipall cause.

The ende called *Finis*.

The Ende is, for whose cause any thing is done, and is two
waies considered. For there is an absolute ende, whereunto
all other are referred, being called the perfection and chiefe pro-
pertie, in any thing: as the chiefe end in any man, is to be per-
fectly endued with reason; and to attaine euermlasting felicitie.
The chiefe end in a horse, is to be of a very good courage,
and to want no stomacke: the chiefe end in fire, is to be
very

The ende.

The ende ab-
solute.

The chiefe end
in man.

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very hot, and very drye. There is an other ende, called a helping end, which serueth to an higher end, and is only ordeined for this purpose, that we might attaine thereby, the perfect end of al. As meate, drinke, apparell, and other necessarie thinges, are helping ends for man, to attaine the chieffest end. For without these ends, man could not liue. To liue honestly in this life, to be vpright in dealing with all persons, is an helping end (as the Philosophers take it) & a testimonie to the word of our faith (as the Christians take it) for man to liue, without end. To marie a wife, is a helping end, for man to auoyde fornication. The poore man labourerth, and wherefore? To get his liuing. Wherefore getteth he his liuing? That he may the better be able to serue God. The Soldiour fighteth at his Princes commaundement, chiefly because God commaundeth him, next after for loue of the king and his countrie, thirdly and last of all, that he might liue the rather, in quiet at home with his wife & children. So that of one and the same thing, there may be many endes being orderly considered.

The maner
of reasoning.
A Swoord,

The maner
of reasoning.
A Swoord,

V Vhole end is good, or euil, the same thing is good, or euil. A swoord is good, because it is good for a man, to defend himself. Faith in Christ Iesu is good, for by faith we are saued. To vndoe my neighbour, with tending for gaine, is most vngodly: therfore to be an Usurer, is most vngodly. To desire an other mans wife, is vngodly, because adulterie is vngodly. Battaille is good, because it bringeth peace. For all men should fight, for this ende, that we might liue in quiet, with our neighbours. If thou wilt bee esteemed for a godly person, accompany thy selfe with folke of honest fame, and thou shalt bee well reposed, especially of the honest. It is good to learne, because learning it selfe, encreaseth good knowledge, which is the ende of our studie.

The matter
of substance.
Every forme
is either na-
tural or arti-
ficiall.

Of the matter or substance, called *Materia*.
The substance called *materia*, is readie to be framed of the workman, as him liketh, by the which substance either thinges naturall, or thinges artificiall are made. As first a man which is a naturall thing, is made of body and soule. An Image, which is an artificiall thing, is made by the handie worke

woyke of man, and is grauen out of a stone, or molten in golde, or in brasse. From this place are made arguments, that both doe affirme, and also deny. As thus, if a man haue cloth, he may haue a garment made, if it like him. But if a man haue no cloth at all, nor yet any such like stuffe, that serueth for apparell, how can he haue a gowne, or a coate? If the Baker lacke meale, how can he make bread? The matters considered two waies. First, it is a substance that tarieth still, as when a House is made of stone, wood, and Plaster, or an Image of gold, brasse, or siluer: here the substance tarieth still, although the forme be altered. Like-wise when a house is taken downe, the stone and timber remaine still, and keepe their substance, and serue as they did before, either for erection of the same house againe, or els other wise as it shall please him that is the owner. Againe, the substance is that, which chaunceth into an other nature, and can not be the same, that it was before: as of meale and water. Bakers make their bread: now they can not resolve the same bread againe, into meale and water, which was the former substance.

The generall rule. **W**hen the substance is at hand, the workmanship may follow, and the effect may appeare: but when the substance is taken away, there can bee nothing made at all. As if a man lacke siluer, howe can he make an Image of siluer? There is no stone, wood, or plaster. Ergo there is no house. But if I reason thus by the substance, that chaungeth into an other nature, and can not be the same, that it was before: I reason then amisse, as thus. There is no meale or flower, Ergo, there is no bread: but I should say rather, there was no meale nor flower, Ergo, there is no bread.

The manner of reasoning.

The Shoemaker hath no Leather, how can he then make a Shoe? The Printer hath no Paper at all, Ergo, he can not se his men to worke, to print any thing.

The shape, called forme.

The shape, or fashion of any thing, is a cause whereby the thing that is made hath his name, as a leather, when it is made, or fashioned

The shape.

The Arte of Logike.

fashioned for thee foote, is called a shoue. Such a man weareth a luerie coate guarded with Veluet, and al the peomen seruants haue but plaine coates, *Ergo* hee is one of the gentlemen. He hath a siluer pot gilt, and wrought with Goldsmithes worke, *ergo* he is better then a pot wrought with plaine Siluer, beeing of the same quantitie or bignesse.

The generall rule.

When the shape or forme is made: the effect, or thing doen may follow, take away the shape, and the vse also is taken away. A Cuppe is made, *ergo* a man may drinke in it: breake the cup, and how shal you drinke of the same cup. The Element goeth compasse wise, because it is rounde. Reason is called the shape of man. Therefore I may say, such a one lacketh the gift of reason, *ergo* he is a foole.

Things coming after the causes called *Euenta*.

The effects of causes.

Those which come of causes, are two waies considered, for either they are called things, that in due time follow the cause that went before, or els things ordeined to some certaine ende.

Those things which come after the cause, and are made of the same, are called *effects*, that is to say, things doen. And euery argument, is either deriued from the effect of the matter, or the forme, or of the efficient cause.

From the effect of the matter or substance called *Materia*, thus we may reason: I knowe

He hath a shoue made of Iron, *ergo* he hath Iron. There is a house. *Ergo* here is stone, and wood.

From the effect of the forme. I knowe

A boule being tourned, rolleth, *ergo* it is rounde.

From the effect of the efficient cause.

It is bright day, *Ergo* the Sunne is up.

The generall rule.

When the effect is come forth, it must needs be, that either his proper cause is then, or els that it hath bene before.

The maner of reasoning.

If slaughter be not to be borne in a common weale, then these

quarel

quarrel pickers, these roysters, and fighters, are not to be suffered to goe unpunished.

The thing appointed for some end.

That which is appointed for some certaine end and vse is called *destinatum*, as a house is builded to dwell in. Armour is prouided for man to defend him selfe. Medicines are meanes appointed for mā to recouer health. I shewed before that there was an end, which was an helping ende, and a meane to come to the perfect and moste absolute ende, for, without this appointed meane and prouision of God, man could neuer liue, which lesse could he come to any perfection in this life, as touching the actions, and worthie feates required in man. Thus we may reason from this place. Seing it is lawfull for man, to defend himselfe, it is lawfull for man, to weare a weapon. If warre bee lawfull, then money is necessarie, without which, no man can goe forward, or set forth an armie.

The thing appointed for some end.

The generall rule.

Those things that agree to that, which is appointed to the ende, agree also to the end it selfe.

The maner of reasoning.

If a man may lawfully buy the greates Bible in English, hee may the also, enen without asking leaue, reade it at his pleasure.

The vse of all the causes.

The comoditie of these causes is so great, that in setting forth the vse of them, a man might sooner lacke wordes, then want matter. First, we knowe that nothing is done without a cause. & therefore, seing this world framed as it is euery thing proportioned in his due order: we may truely gather, & there is one aboue al, & rulerth al, who the christians call God. In passing or disputing, how can a man better proceed, then by rehearsing the end of euery thing. Again, in examining & searching out the profite, or disprofite, by the end we knowe what is gainfull: by the efficient cause we knowe what may be doen. For whatsoeuer is profitable, the same is profitable for some end, & whatsoeuer we would haue doen, we may some perceiue by & efficient, if it may be doen. Yea, in causes of iudgemēt, we may iudge, what will some one mā had to

The knowledge of causes right needfull.

The Arte of Logike.

do this or that, when we consider to what end he did this, or that. Last of all, we knowe hereby, that God hath ordeined nothing in vaine, and that euery thing is ordeined for some ende. The ende of Christes death, was to merite mans redemption. The ende of mans life is, to trust wholly in Christes Passon, and to liue thereby for euer.

Of things outwardly applied, called *Applicata*.

They are called things outwardly applied to a matter, which are not the cause of the same matter, and yet giue a certaine denomination to it. There be three of this sort.

{ The time.
 { The place.
 { Things annexed, or knit together.

And these three are nothing els, then the three medicaments, or most generall places, which I rehearsed before.

{ *Vbi.* { *Ubi.*
 { *Quando.* { *Uhen.*
 { *Habius.* { The araying.

The maner of doing.

The place.

The time.

A patronesse
of baudrie.

The nature,
the place and
time.

If one list to reason from the place, called in Latine *Locus*, he may thus say: such a one is in the countrey, *Ergo* he is not in the Citie. If I will proue that a man being accused of murder vnjustly, did not offend: I may reason both from the time and the place. The man was killed in the fields, about three of the clocke in the after none, all which time, this other man came not abroad. No, he looked not out of his house all that day. *Ergo*, this man did not kill him. Clodius, was accused at Rome, that he had made a spoyle of the reliques in the temple of *Bona Dea*, whereas he at the same time, when this deede was thought to be doon, was at *Interamnus*, a village in the countrey beside Rome. Quintilian saith thus. Thou hast killed an adulterer, which the lawe doth permie: but because thou hast killed the same man, in a brothers house, thou art worthy to die thy selfe, yea, the nature of the place and time, maketh much for increase of faultes committed. As when one is not afrayd euen in ths Church, and that

at

at seruice time, to thrust his enimie through, likewise to kill a man priuely by the high way, is thought worthy greater punishment, then if he should kill him mainly in the open streete, and that in the sight of other. Also to murder one in the darke night, is counted more heinous, then to kill him in the bright day. Notwithstanding these two places are rather vsed of the Rhetoriciens, then among the Logiciens: for, when a man is taken of suspicion, we go about to proue him faultie by diuers cōiectures. As if he were about the same place at the selfe same time, when a man was slaine, and also had his sword about him: we coniecture that he might haue killed him. Againe, if we perceiue one to be a riotous felowe, readie to fight with euery body, accompanying with naughtie parkes, and euer more at one ende of all feates, waxing pale when he is apprehended, shriking for feare, or running away, when he should be takē: we suspect such a one, that he is not altogether clere. Therefore, Oratours doe vse, to marke things that goe before the fact, as whether he hated the man or no, or what gaine he might haue by his death, and also obserue things toynd with the fault, and chaunging of hewe, when he is apprehended, or his sword to be bloody, or any part of his apparell, and thirdly, they note what foloweth. That is, if he ran away, if he could not tell his tale plainly, and so they conclude, as they are led by suspicion. Some arguments are necessary, some probable, as thus, from the consequent. Such a woman is brought in bed with a child, *ergo*, she hath had the company of a man. Such a man had a bloody sword in his hande, straight after the death of his neighbour, euen in the same fieldes, where his neighbour was slaine, *ergo* it is like this man hath slaine him. All which arguments are deriued from the place called *Contingentia*, as I will shewe it hereafter.

Coniectures.

Arguments
necessarie.Arguments
probable.

Of wordes annexed, or knit to the substance, called *Comexa*.

AS touching wordes knit, ye may vnderstand, that they are ioyned outwardly to the subiect, and giue a name vnto him, according as they are. As riches are ioyned to a rich man. For, where as Crassus, is called a man by his owne substance.

Words annexed.

R.iii.

stance

The Arte of Logike.

Diuision of a
knit word.

staunce, yet notwithstanding by his richesse, he is called a rich man. So he that hath a wife, is called a housband. He that hath a master, is called a seruant. He that hath a father, is called a sonne. Words knit, are deuided diuersly, for some are called such as are nigh, and touching the substance. As to be full of fish, is agreeing to the water, to be full of grasse, is annexed or agreeing to the earth, to be cloudie is annexed or agreeing to the ayre. Againe words knit, are called those things that a man weareth, as to weare a coate, a Jacke, a harneis, to haue shoen, to be merrie, to be dustie, and all such as are casuall to man. Some are called annexed, or agreeing, which are knit to man, and yet not things woꝛne vpon his backe, but farther of, and rather perceiued by vnderstanding, then knowen by eye sight. As nobilitie, power, fame authoritie. To be an Officer, a Maior, a Sheriefe, Loꝛde Chauncelour, Comptroller, or any other officer in the common weale; all these are annexed to their inferiour, ouer whome they haue authoritie. In this point differ wordes knit, called annexed, from wordes adioyned, called *adiacentia*, that all adiacents, or wordes adioyned, can not bee without the subject, as heate: colde, whitenesse, or any other like can not be, except they bee comprehended within some subject. For, it is proper to euery accident, to be in some one thing, conteyning him. If there be nothing conteyning, then the accident can not be. Notwithstanding, wordes knit are so placed, & one is without the other, and may be, either of them seuerally, if the one happen to perish: as a housband is without the substance of his wife, and although his wife dye, yet the housband may be on liue still, sauing that he loseth his name to be called housband, but if a wise man dye, wisdom must decaie also, because it must needes bee in some one subject, or els it can not be.

Of accidents.

VV hose are here called accidents, which both them selues, and the thing also, may be together, the one with an other, and also may be away, the one from the other.

There

There be v. of this sort. { Things chauncing.
The name of a thing.
Sentences of the sage.
The likenesse.
Things compared together.

Things chauncing, called *Contingentia*.



Those accidents are called things chauncing, which chaunce about a thing, so that whether these things chaunce, or no, the thing it selfe may be, or though the thing be not, these may so chaunce to be. As for example, palenesse may chaunce before sicknesse, and the same also may chaunce, though a man be not sicke, and a man may be also sicke, and yet nothing pale at all. Likewise loue and feare. A man may loue, although he feare not, a man may againe feare, although he loue not.

The diuersitie of three diuers places.

VWords adioyned, wordes knit to an other, and wordes chauncing to a thing differ thus, that in wordes adioyned, called *Adiacentia*, the cause why things are so framed, is euer in the subiect, neither can the wordes adioyned continue, except they be comprehended within some one substance. Words knit, are of such sort, that by meaning one, the other is straight known. As when I name a Schoolemaster, I signifie Scholers also, although I doe not expressely name them. But in things chauncing, called *Contingentia*, we must at the least compare two together, that wee may better knowe them to bee of this place. Therefore, if I name this worde (craftie) by it selfe, without any further consideration, then it is an *Adiacent*, or a word adioyned. If I name this word (seruant) craftie is referred to the place, called words annered or knit, considering craft is mentioned in respect of the seruant. If I say thus (a craftie seruant) then these two are considered to be in this place called *Contingentia*, which is a place of words chauncing to a thing, so that whether they chaunce or no, the thing it selfe may be, notwithstanding. As a seruant may be, and yet not craftie. Again, one may be craftie, and yet not a seruant.

The nature of words adioyned, Words knit.

Words chauncing.

The

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The diuision of things chauncing.

Some goe before the thing, some are ioyned with the thing
some folowe after the thing.

Things chauncing before. As thus. The skie was red
this morning : *Ergo* we are like to haue raine, ere night.

Things ioyned with the matter, at the very instant. As thus.
Angre is, in old men. Of fetching of wind, declares a sicknesse
of the Lungs. If the bequether or maker of any will be on line,
the will taketh no place, and may be boyde. Such a one goeth
gaie in his apparell, spendeth with the best, and yet hath nothing
to maintaine his charges. *Ergo*, it is like, that he commeth by his
goods naughtely.

Things happening after. Such a one is well learned. *Ergo*,
he hath gone well to his booke heretofore.

The name of a thing or the interpretation of a word.

Name of a
thing.
The interpre-
tation of a
word.

The interpretation or name of a thing, is a word made by the
agreement of men, to signifie this, or that. As Philosphus
is that man, whatsoeuer he be, that hath a desire and a loue, to
the knowledge of wisdome. Therefore if ye will expound, what
a Philosopher is, you may reason thus : from the interpretation
of the word. Whosoever he be that hath an earnest loue to Philo-
sophie, & seeketh knowledge thereof, that man is a Philosopher.

Cato hath an earnest loue to Philosophie, and seeketh knowledge thereof.

Ergo, Cato is a Philosopher.

Many witty men take occasion, to reason pleasantly upon
the interpretation of a worde. As I remember a witty
man, and a worthy man also did, who enueiling at
a time against Cardinal Poole, and being vehement in the
cause of his countrey, sayde thus in the midst of his heare, O
Poole, O hurle Poole, as though his name declared his euill
nature. The telling of this, makes me to remember an other. I
knew one whose name was called Pope, and being occasioned
to follow the Law, concerning a matter of lande, at the first sup-
pression of the Popes whole power, at that time in deed, straight
commaundement was giuen, not to call him by that name: this
man

man being of the same name, and partly of kindred, also concerning opinion (as the deuill would haue it) durst not once for his life, shewe his head, for feare his name should betraie his whole nature, and in deede hauing a more fearfull heart, then neede was, thought that it might iustly bee counted offence great enough in him, that it was his euill hap, to haue such an odious and euill name, the which all men as then did, euery where almost, with outward looke vtterly detest. And in deede (the Proverbe sayth) he is halfe hanged, that hath an euill name. The which sentence, this man I thinke, not well vnderstanding, remembered it ouer well: and was rather content to lose all, then that this his peeuish name should lose him, and cast his bodie quite away for euer.

Again, the interpretation of a thing, is then thought to bee, when a metaphoze or translation is used, and the meaning thereof taken. As when this worde *Ignis* (fire) betokeneth loue. *Whence* borowed speech or metaphoze. as of the owne nature it signifieth fire, as we read in Ouid, thus,

Quis enim celauerit ignem:

Lumine qui semper proditur ipse suo.

Who can keepe close the fire, or hide the burning heate,
That doth betray it self alway with light of flame so great.
Wherein is nothing els signified but loue, which is so hot of it selfe, that it must needes breake out into flames, and shewe it selfe, at one time, or other.

The generall rule.

To whom the interpretation of a *Proverbe* doth agree, to the same also the *Proverbe* it self agreeth.

The maner of reasoning.

Such a childe is called Dawson, and he may well be so called, for his father is but a Dawe.

Of the places called authoritie, otherwise named, sentences of the Sage.

Such testimonies may bee called, sentences of the sage, which are brought to confirme any thing, either taken out of olde Authours, or els such as haue bene used in this common life. As the sentences of Noble men, the Lawes in any

D. i.

Realme,

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Testimonies
two waies
vsed.

Aristotles
mynd, as tou-
ching the
world.

Sentences
grafted in
man by na-
ture.

Realme, quicke sayinges, Proverbes, that either haue been vsed heretofore, or bee now vsed. Histories of wise Philosophers, the iudgements of learned men, the common opinion of the multitude, olde custome, auncient fashions, or any such like. Testimonies are two waies considered. For either they are such as pertaine to God, or els to man. Those auctorities, which come from God, and are spoken by the holy Ghost, are vndoubtedly true, neither can they be false: therefore, we ought most reuerently to receiue the worde of God, and agree to such textes, as are written and spoken, euen as though we heard God himselfe speake, with liuely voyce vnto vs. Mans auctoritie hath no such great force, although Noble men, learned Philosophers, and stoute Captaines, haue pronounced many things most wisely. For, although Aristotle sayth, that the world neither had beginning, nor yet at any time shall haue ending: I may reiect this saying (if any man bring me it for his confirmation) although this great Philosopher did pronounce the same. For, except I bee perswaded by reason, it is in my choyse either to admit, or refuse such auctorities. Notwithstanding, we should not forsake wise mens wordes rashly, but with a modest answer, desire the aduersarie, not so much to sticke to his auctoritie, as to proue the same by good reason. In prophane thinges, ye may reason affirmatiuely very well, as thus. The best thinges are first to be learned, for so doth Quintilian teach, *Nusquam tuta fides*. It is hard trusting any body. For so sayth Virgill. But I cannot reason negatiuely, when I bring myne auctoritie out of prophane Authours. For I reason amisse if I say. There is no such disease, called the French Pockes, because Gallen the chiefe of Physitions, neuer maketh mention in all his Bookes, of any such disease. For, this euill hath crept in since his tyme, through the naughtinesse of men. And although it were the, yet may it be that he neuer heard of it. Whereunto might be added all such sentences, as by the law of Nature are grafted in man. As these following. Doe as thou wouldest be done vnto. Be thankfull to him that doth thee a pleasure. Honour thy father and thy mother. Knowe there is a God. He that hath not these opinions, naturally fastened in his heare,

he

he may lustily bee thought rather a beast, then man endued with reason. In matters of Scripture, I may reason both affirmatiuely, and negatiuely. Christ sayth to his Disciples, *Reges Gentium dominantur, vos autem non sic.* Kings beare rule ouer countries, but you must not doe so. Therefore, no Ministers should haue any Temporal power, because Christ sayth so. We may reason negatiuely thus, wee reade not in all the Scripture, from Genesis, to the Reuelation of Sainct Iohn, that euer there was Frier, Monke, Nunne, or Chanon: Ergo, let them goe from whence they came. We read not in the Scripture, that worshiping of Images, was euer allowed to bee Lay mens Bookes: therefore, take downe such Idols, and let them serue for other vses.

No Friars, no any other such mentioned in Scripture. Images.

The generall rule for prophane authorities: That which is allowed of all wise men, or at the least by the better part: no man ought rashly to gaine say it, or thus. Every cunning man must be beleued in his owne art.

The maner of reasoning.

A Ristotle thought best, that Monks should haue double punishment: Therefore, they deserue it. By texes of the Scripture, we may reason the matter, as thus. Cursed be he that doth the worke of the Lord guilefully, sayth the Prophet. Ergo, euill Bishops, loytering Pastours, are accursed of God.

Of the similitude or likenesse.

A Similitude is, when two thinges or more, are so compared together, that euen as in the first, there is one propertie: So in the other there is a like propertie, according to both their natures seuerally obserued. For, like as water by continuance, weareth a Stone, so there is nothing so hard, but by time it may be compassed, or brought to passe. As Spiders make their owne Cobwebs without any other helpe: so some good fellows can bring vp newes, and tell straunge tales, without any hearing, when there is not one worde true. As the Palme tree being overlaped with weights, riseth higher, and budeth upward more freshly: So a noble stomacke vexed with much aduersitie, is euer more the flouster. And this ought diligently to be

A similitude.

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observed, that the thing, which is brought to make the similitude, be like unto that, which is proued.

The maner of finding out a similitude.

The maner
of finding
out a simili-
tude.

In every cause, that we do purpose to handle at large, we must obserue diligently, what thinges are spoken by translations, that is, from the proper signification, to a meaning that is not proper. As speaking in the praise of a thing, and calling him the bright Sunne of the earth. I may gather a similitude by this worde (Sunne) and make it thus. Euen as the Sunne only giueth sight to all the whole earth: so there ought to be in a Common weale, one King that should be ruler ouer all.

The generall rule.

Of similitudes there is like iudgement, that is, euen as wee thinke of the one, so may we thinke of the other.

The maner of reasoning.

As a Dog standing at the table side, eateth that by by and by which his master hath cast to him, and euer looketh for more and more: so some when they haue receiued a living, for which they hoped before, by and by they are readie, to take another, and although they be full, yet still they are hungrie.

Of things compared.

Things com-
pared.

Things are compared together in one third worde, whereunto they both doe agree, as thus. If theft bee worthie death, then murder is worthie no lesse. Here ye see, that theft and murder are compared together, in one third worde, which is death. Comparations are deuised two maner of wayes, for either they bee equall, or not equall. They are equall in this wise: if the father haue auctoritie ouer his sonne, he hath also auctoritie ouer his daughter.

Comparations
two waies di-
uided.

The generall rule.

Vhere thinges are equall, there must needs bee equall iudgement. Comparations are unequal, when I reason either from the greater to the lesse, or els from the lesse, to the greater. From the greater to the lesse, ye may reason thus. If a Captaine with his whole companie, be not able to sack a towne, much lesse one base Soldiour, can be able to do it. The Scholer

master

maſter cannot vnderſtand the Greeke, or the Hebrewe tongue, much leſſe can the ſcholler, which neuer learned either of them.

From the leſſe to the greater, ye may reaſon affirmatiuely, as thus. Childzen can ſuffer much colde, and cannot yong men beare a froſt: Cuſtome beareth ſwing, and ſhall reaſon take no place: Women haue dyed for their Countrey, therefore, may not men be aſhamed to feare death: Noble men are deſirous to haue a good Horſkeeper, that can keepe their horſes wel, & they ſpare not, to giue great ſtipends to ſuch: and ſhall they not much more bee deſirous, to haue a good Schoolemaſter, that might godly bring vp their childzen, in vertue and wiſedome? If a horſe be not well broken, the owner will ſee that he may be made gentle, and ſhall not a man, ſeeing his naturall child euill brought vp, take paines, and ſee him brought to ſome good order: Wee can ſee a Syruian, a Syrent, a Ring-bone, or ſuch other diſeaſe in a horſe, and ſhall we not be as readie to looke, that there bee no faultes in our childzen, or in the teacher, to whom we giue the charge, to bring them vp in learning, and good maners?

Horſes faultes are ſoone ſeene, but childrens maners are neuer marked.

The generall rule.

If that which ſeemeth to be greater, be not added, neither ſhall that be added, which is the leſſe. Again, if that which is leſſe be added, that which is greater ſhall be added alſo.

The maner of reaſoning.

The ſcholler vnderſtandeth Latine: Ergo, his Schoolemaſter alſo hath knowledge in the ſame tongue. Negatiuely thus. A vowe.
If God will not allowe a vowe, made by the daughter, without the knowledge of the father, although the vowe bee but for one day: how much leſſe, ſhall that Marriage take place, when yong folke make priuie contraires, without the good will, either obteyned, or yet onco ſought for, of their parents.

An obſeruation for things compared.

This one thing would be learned: when things are compared together: to knowe whether they bee in that point, either equal, or vnequall. As for example. Such a Lord is not learned, no, nor wiſe neither: therefore, none of his men are either learned or wiſe. In this point there ſhould bee made no comparing, be-

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A rule for
things com-
pared.

twixt the Lord and his seruant. For, al wittie men be not there-
fore Lordes, no, nor yet all Lordes, be therefore wittie men. No,
no, euen the greatest lacke sometimes, as wel as other poore men
doe. Some by inheritaunce are honozable, some by faithfull ser-
uice towarde the King, and their Countrie, are highly promo-
ted: Some againe, by bolde enhabling themselves, and soine by
thrusting on, choppe in at a windowe, when the doore is shut vp.
Therefore, thus I might reason better. Such a Lord hath smal
landes, and little substance, therefore, his men being moze in
number, then his landes can well maintaine, and hanging onely
on his fleue, liuing without any other trade, but only their bare
wages, are better able to borrowe, then to lend, and must needes
bee very needie, and yet perhaps may bee more learned, yea, and
wittier also then is their Lord and master.

An other argument.

Poore subiects get hopes, and shall not mightie Kings, bee
able to get children: Herein is no comparing at all, such as
is required. For, a King is not therefore so called, because he
can get children, but because he is a man of power, and ordeyned
of God to rule, for the punishment of vice, and maintenaunce of
vertue. Therefore, thus I may reason right well. The King ruli-
eth: Ergo, the subiects must obeye.

The vse.

This place helpeth much to exhort, especially when we rea-
son from the lesse, to the greater, or contrary. Neither can
any one that teacheth, want the vse hereof, if they purpose
their sayings shall take place.

Of repugnancie.

Repugnancie



Repugnancie is such a disagreeing state of things,
that no one thing can bee the same, that the other is,
by one nature or substance, as thus. Man, and ver-
tue, the one cannot be the same, that the other is.

The deuision.

Repugnan-
cies, two wa-
yes dauided.

Things repugnant, are deuised into discordantes, and into
woydes differing one from an other, by any maner of meanes.

Of

Of discordances, called *opposita*.

Discordants are, when only one word or sentence, is contrary to an other, so that the one cannot be the same, that the other is, nor yet both at one tyme, and in one place, and in one respect can be in one, and the same subiect, as hot and cold, the father and the sonne, sight and blindnesse, light and darknesse, cannot be at one and the same tyme, in one and the same place, of any one substance. For though one be blind of one eye, and see with the other, yet we cannot say, that things discordaunt, are in one and the same substance. For, the subiect or substance of sight or blindnesse, is not properly the man, but the very place selfe, where the sight or blindnesse is. So that blindnesse and sight, are not both in one place, & therefore, not both in one substance together. For the breast, the bellie, the legges or armes, are not the substance of the eye, but the place only, wher þe eye hath his natural being.

Discordants.

There be fower of this sort.

Contraries.

Relatiues.

Privation.

Contradiction.

Contraries, are such discordaunts, as cannot bee, at one and the same tyme, in one substance: notwithstanding, they may both seuerally bee, in two subiects, or substances, at one, and the same time. As whitenesse, blacknesse, vertue, and vice, wisdom, and foolishnesse. Contraries, are two waies considered: for, some be such, that if the one be not, the other must needs followe, and they are called in Latine, *Contraria inmersa*, that is to say, contraries, where nothing cometh betwene: as thus, A wise man, a foole. Vertue, Vice, Faith, vnbeliefe. All these are such, that if the one be not in a man, the other must needs bee. As thus. Such a one is wise: Ergo, he is no foole. If a man be not wise, it must needs be, that he is foolish. Wee are saved by faith: Ergo, we are condemned by vnbeliefe.

Contraries.

Contraries
two waies
taken.

Againe, other contraries be so, that though the one be away, yet the other followeth not therefore of necessitie. For black and white, bee contrary, and yet they bee not so contrary, that if the

white

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white colour be not, the other must needs be. For, a man may be high coloured, or fallow coloured, and yet not blacke. Therefore in such contraries, where some thing may bee put betweene the extremes, it is no good reason to say, that if the one be not, the other must needs be, and the reason is, that vnto euery singular and seuerall contraries of such sort, there be diuers other contrary vnto them, as the which come betwixt in the absence of other. As if a cloth be not white, it is no reason to call it blacke. For, it may bee blew, greene, red, russet, tawnie, yealow, or any other colour els, as it shall best please the Dyer. Note further, that all discordaunts are not contrary, according to their generall word, or common accidents, but according to their proper difference. For, if we reason thus.

{ Fire is an Element.

{ Ergo, Water is none.

The argument is not good, for fire and water are not contrary, according to their generall word, which agreeth to them both, but according to their proper differences, as in that fire is hot and drie, it is contrary to water, which is colde and moyst. Thus some that maintained countereffect chastitie, were wont to reason against marriage, taking an occasion vpon that place of S. Paul, where he sayth: it is not good to touch a woman, where he meant nothing els, but considering the Gospel then required spiedie Preachers, and that it were a clogge to be married, and somewhat an hinderaunce to those that should trauaile, he thought it expedient to forbear. Not that he condemned marriage, or yet thought women to be deuilles.

{ Virginitie is good say they:

{ Therefore marriage is not good.

Where as Virginitie and Marriage, are not contrary according to their generall worde, which is (good) but according to their proper difference: As thus.

{ Virginitie is a single life, without knowledge of carnall act.

{ Therefore, Marriage is not so.

Therefore, this word (good) in the aboue rehearsed argument,
doth

doth signifie a thing granted of God; and allowed by his will, which doth aswell comprise the Marriage, as it doth Virginitie, therefore this argument is of no more force, then if I should say,

Enjo, temperance is not good.

And yet there is no man, but will say; that both these two ver-
ses are good. Or thus;

Ergo, poore men haue none.

Whereas God hath giuen, both high and low, rich and poore,
the spirite that shal liue euer. But this I speake, to set forth more

အသံကား
- ဂုဏ်ထူး

[illegible]

between, called *immediata contraria*, and the other must needs followe, which is not true in these contraries, where

Relatives are those, which are connected by affinity or consanguinity.

and also referred to some other. And a father, a sonne. A master, a
servant. A King, a subject.

The general rule.

be not, the other cannot be neither.

Thou art my seruante, why doest thou not know me, to be thy

Water: Cold art a Quaker, and must take in hand to
 ale.

which by nature, might have been there.

The habit, is the haunting of that thing, in the moment, which nature hath granted to be there.

The generall rule.
Clergyman, is the destruction of that, which by Nature

The P.I.

The Arte of Logike.

The manner of reasoning, which is a science, is divided into two parts: the one is of the nature of the things themselves, and the other is of the manner of the words used to express them. The first is called *Logica*, and the second is called *Physica*. *Ergo*, he cannot feel, because he is blind.

Blindnesse, is called privation, because it is the absence of that thing, which by nature was, or might have been in the subject. Neither, yet blame man, for being blind, because nature hath utterly denyed, the gift of seeing to all stones.

Sinne.

Sinne is called privation, because it is the destruction, of that great goodnesse, which God poured into man. And therefore God justly punisheth both, due to the fault, and due to the privation.

Sentences
gain saying.

Sentences gain saying, are two propositions, the one denying that, which the other affirmeth, as this. Christ is in the Sacrament really: Christ is not in the Sacrament really. It can not be, but one of these two propositions must needs be false.

The general rule, is, that if one of the two propositions be granted to be true, the other must needs be granted to be false. Neither can it be, by any means possible, that both of them should either be true, or false, at one and the same tyme. Alwaies provided, that there bee no doubtfullnesse in the words: for if one worde signifie diversly, then may both propositions be either true, or false, at one and the same tyme. As thus.

Christes flesh.

The flesh of Christ mozteth greatly.

The flesh of Christ mozteth nothing at all.

In these two propositions, there is no contradiction, or gain saying, but that they both may be true, at one and the same time, considering they are both diversly taken. Christes flesh eaten and chewed with our teeth, mozteth nothing. Christes flesh come upon the Crosse, mozteth much, as the which yet chalet to all believers, life for ever.

The manner of reasoning.

If we be iustified freely, through the onely merites of Iesus Christ: then this is false, we are not iustified, onely through the merites of Iesus Christ: but the other is true: *Ergo*, this is false.

The

Of priuation, contradiction, & of contraries that immediately follow, conditional arguments are made, with the addition of some one conuersion, of the which, whiche one is true, the other must needs be false, as thus. Either the soule is immortall, or els it is not immortall, but y^e first is true: Ergo the second is false

Of wordes differing

When haue we the use of this place, when we reason, and proue that one thing is not the same, that the other is, as King Lud is not the same, that Iulius, Caesar, or Brutus was: King Lud builded London, of whom the Citie had his name, being called Luds towne, and after ward, by alteration of letters, called London. Ergo, neither Caesar nor Brutus, builded the same. Discordaunts, called *opposita* are not the same, that wordes differing are, called *differencia*. For as much as where discordaunts bee, one thing onely, is set against an other one. As for example. Nothing can bee set against brightnesse, as discordant, but onely darknesse, nothing can bee set against heat, but onely colde, and so in other. But in this place there are many thinges differ, from some one thing, and what for is not the same, that an other is, may be called a worde differing, in Latine *differens*, or *disparatum*. Socrates is a man: Ergo, he is not an Ore, a Stone, a Horse, or any other thing els.

Things differ fower waies, either by numbering. As euery singular man, differeth one from an other: James is one, and John is an other. Other differ in their kind, when they are comprehended vnder diuers kindes, as Beavis of Hampton, and Arundell his horse: Or els Alexander, and Bucephalus. For Beavis with Alexander, are comprehended vnder man, as their kind and speciall, but Arundell and Bucephalus, are comprehended vnder this word horse, which is kind, or spectall both them both. Other differ by the generall word, when they are comprehended vnder diuers generall wordes: as this word Baptisme, and Magistrate, the one comprehending vnder a Sacrament of God, the other vnder a certaine ordinance of God. Lastly, wordes differ by their most generallnes, when they are placed in diuers predicaments.

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caments. A King, and manhood, the one is placed among the
Relatives, the second is in quality.

The generall rule.

It cannot make things, that doe much differ, to bee of one
nature.

The manner of reasoning.

The reason from wordes differing negatively altogether.

From such as differ in number, we reason thus.

Such a one is called Thomas, therefore he is not the same,
that John is, Peter is not Paule, nor yet Paule is Peter. Faith
is not workes, nor yet workes are faith.

From such as differ in kinde, thus, I am a man, therefore I
shoud not be used like a brute beast.

From such as differ by the generall worde.

I haue boughte plaine cloth of thee, and why dost thou require
railed felues of me?

From such as differ in predicament.

Vertue is a qualitie of the min, therefore it is no substance.

After knowledge attained, after it is most necessary,
And happie shall be hee, that with skill addeeth prac-
tise, for then learning is best confirmed, when know-
ledge is put in use.

Use maketh
maisteries.



Therefore, considering I haue set forth the places, I thinke it
necessarie after knowledge of the same, to describe matters by e-
uery one of them, as they lye in order: that other may likewise,
when any question commeth in controuersie, go through the pla-
ces themselves with it, and examine euery worde, by euery seue-
rall place.

And to make this thing more plaine, I will goe through the
places, with one certaine worde, and looke what helpe I shall
finde there, for knowledge of the same. The worde shall bee (a
King) or (a Magistrate.)

The definition.

A king declar-
ed by the pla-
ces of Logike. The definition of a Magistrate. Every King, or Magistrate,
is the minister of God, for a good ende, to the punishing of naugh-
tie persons, and to the comforting of godly men.

The

The generall rule.

The minister of God,

The kinde.

Either a Tyrant, or a godly King, the one ruleth according to his lust, the other according to right and Justice.

Wordes yoked.

The Officer, the Office, to beare an Office, if the Office can not be spared, the Officer cannot be spared.

Adiacents necessarily ioyned.

Wisdom, earnest labour, cunning in sciences, skillfull both of warre and peace, these all must needes be in every Magistrate.

Adiacents adioyned casuall.

To be liberall, to be frugall, to be of a temperate life, all these happen to be in good Magistrates.

Deedes necessary.

To defende Religion, to enact godly Lawes, to punish offenders, to defend the oppressed: all these are necessarie in a King, and are neuer found in a Tyrant.

The thing conteyning.

Moses, David, Salomon, Ezechias, Iohas, Charles the Emperour, Edward the first of that name King of England.

The efficient cause.

God himselfe, or els the ordinaunce of God.

The second efficient cause.

Unquiet subiects, rebelles, disobedient people, are the cause why Magistrates are ordeined, that the rather they may be ruled, and kept in good order.

The ende of a Magistrate.

This ende he must needes obserue, that alwaies the people liue in quietnesse, & in honest conuersation passe their whole life.

The effect, or els the things done by a Magistrate.

Peace is made, the Realme enriched, all thinges plenteous, but where a Tyrant ruleth, all thinges are contrary.

The authoritie.

The iiii. to the Romaines, let every soule bee subiect to the powers. i. Peter. ii. Be subiect to the King.

P. iii.

Things

The Arte of Logike.

Things incident.

THE Scepter is a token of Iustice, euen as a sword is a signe of reuengement, of wrath, paying of Subsidies, Taxes, Tributes, Rent, or any such like, Deomen of the Garde, and al other waiters, Soldiours in warre, the obedience of the subiects, the honour giuen vnto him, triumphes made, running at the Tilt, fighting at the Barriers, fighting at the Tourney. All these are *contingentia* to a King, that is, although these thinges bee not in a Common wealth, yet may there be a King, yea, and although there be no king, in some Common weale, yet these thinges may be euery ech one of them, as it was in Athens, where the people had the rule of the Common weale, and al was referred to their iudgement.

Similitudes.

Gouernance.

That which the Sheepeheard is to the Sheepe, the same is the Magistrate to his Subiects. That which the master of the Shippe, is to the Shippe, or the master of an household, to his house, or the head to the whole body: the same is the Magistrate to his Subiects.

Things comparing.

Obedience.

Seruaunts must bee obedient, and subiect to their Masters with all reuerence, as we read in the Scripture: how much more then should the Subiects be obedient to their king and soueraigne Lord, which by the ordinaunce of God, is appointed to rule, and to haue gouernance ouer them.

Gathering of arguments.

We may see by this one example, that the searching of places, ministereth arguments plentifully. For, if ye will proue a Magistrate necessarie, ye may reason from the definition, from the causes, from the authoritie, from the thing conceyning, from the adiacents, from the similitude; and make good reasons for the purpose. Notwithstanding, I thinke it not necessary, that ye search at the places at euery time, and for euery matter: but that ye search most part of them. And although wee can not finde a good argument in euery one of them, yet it is well, if wee may gather burthens of fower good arguments. As when wee goe into a garden, wee shall not finde all herbes growing there, although

though we search euery corner: so when wee looke in all the places of inuention, for the prooofe of our matter, wee shall not finde in euery place, a good argument for our purpose. Notwithstanding, it is most necessarie, either when wee will proue a matter our selfe, or elstrie an others labour, which is set forth at large most eloquently: to bring the whole somme of his long tale, to these places, and make an argument in three lines of that, which he dilateth into three sheetes.

And for our selfe, if we will reason a matter earnestly, it shall bee profitable to set our owne arguments before hande, deriued out of the places, the which shall make vs more bolde to speake, when we shall euidently perceiue our owne reasons surely grounded. And the better able we shall be, to confirme our owne cause, and to auoyde all obiections, when we knowe surely by this art, whereunto we may leane. For although other shall impeach our doings, and wrest our wordes, yet wee shall be able euermore to keepe our owne, when wee plainly perceiue, whereof our argument hath his ground. Many speake wisely, which neuer read Logike, but to speake wisely with a iudgement, and to know the very fountaine of thinges: that can none doe, except they haue some skill in this art.

The vse of
Logike.

Therefore, what diuersitie there is betwixt a blind man, and him that seeth, the same difference is betwixt a wiseman vnlearned, and a wiseman learned. We haue seene the commoditie of this art, by this one worde (Magistrate) which I did applye to euery place, that might giue any light, for the making of an argument. Now ye shall haue a question set forth, and both the partes of a proposition, referred to the places of inuention, that thereby ye may knowe, wherein the places doe agree, and wherein they doe not. For whereas the places agree (that is to say, all things are referred to the one, that are referred to the other) there the proposition is good, and the latter part of the proposition, is truly spoken of the first. But where the places doe not agree (that is to say, some things are referred to the one worde, that are not referred to the other) there the things them selues cannot agree. It will be this question for an example, whether it be lawfull for

The Arte of Logike.

The Marriage
of Priestes,
proued by
Logike.

a Priest to marry a wife, or no. And first of all, I will examine a Priest, and applye him to all the places. Next after that, we will referre a wife to all the places, and see when we haue done, whether in these two doe agree, and wherein they doe not agree.

From the definition.

A Preacher is a Clerke or Sheepeheard, which will giue his life for his Sheepe, instructed to set forth the kingdome of God, and desirous to liue vertuously: a faithfull and a wise Steward, whom the Lord both set ouer his house, that he may giue the household seruants meate, in due time.

From the generall worde.

A Minister, a seruant of God, a holy man, a Gospeller, the minister of God, should bee vpright in his liuing, faithfully bestowing the wordes of truth.

From the kinde.

Peter, Paule, Iohn Baptist, Esay, Eldras, and Stephen Ambrose being a temporall man, was after that a minister of the Church. Chrysostome became of a Lawyer, an earnest Preacher of Gods worde. Dea, Peter and Andrew, both were Fishers, therefore temporall men may bee called, if they bee worthy, and desire this spirituall function.

From the propertie.

To be meete to teach, to be godly wise, to doe, and to teach all thinges, that they are commaunded by Gods booke. Saine Hierome in his Epistle to Nepotianus, as touching the life of Preachers, sayth thus, I will not haue thee pleade causes, and to be a babling iangler without all reason, but I will haue thee to bee a faithfull minister of the Sacraments, and very skilfull in the Lawes of the Lord.

The whole.

To be brought vp in the Scriptures, euen from his pouch, to be godly in conuersation, and wholly to be instructed with all thinges, necessarie for a Preacher: whosoer is thus armed, is worthy to be a minister in the Church of God. This argument is deriued from the whole.

The

The partes.

To inuent matter out of the Scripture, according to the aptnesse of his hearers, to deck his doings handsomely, to place his sentences in order, to remember what he speaketh, and to utter his wordes distinctly, plainly, and with loude voyce.

Things yoked together.

A Preaching, a Preacher, to doe the worke of a Preacher.

Timoth. iiii. He that by his Preaching edifieth, the same man is a Preacher.

Things cleauing or adioyned to the substance.

Labour, diligence, wit, knowledge, sobrietie, gentlenesse, veritie, Parlage, an earnest desire to bring vp his Children well with other such. A Bishop must be without fault, the houlebande of one wife, watchfull, sober, modest, herberous, apt to teach, no great drinker of wine, no fighter, not giuen to filthy lucre, but bright, voyde from bawling, from couetousnesse, &c. i. Tim. iii.

The maner of doing.

To feede Christs flocke, to put his life in daunger for the flocke committed to his charge, to bring vp his flocke, and family in the feare of God, in the knowledge of his word, and in due obseruation of the same.

The thing conteyning.

Hierome in the first booke of the commentaries, which hee made vpon the Galathians. i. Let vs not thinke, that the Gospel relecth in wordes of Scripture, but in the sence, not in the outward rinde, but in the verie heart, not in the leaues, but in the verie roote of reason. Let the wordes of Christ dwell plenteously in you, with all wisdom, Col. 3.

The matter.

The word of God, the old Testament, and the newe. Iero. i. Behold, I haue geuen my wordes into thy mouth.

The shape or forme.

The shape may be taken of the conuersation, speech, spirit, & the maner of Preachers living.

The efficient cause.

D. i.

God

i. Corin. ii.

God himselfe, the Scripture, good Preachers, Euangelistes, the Lorde will giue his worde, to those that preach plentifully. Psalme. lxxvii. I haue planted, Apollo hath watered, but God giueth the increase.

The ende.

The ende of Preaching is, that the wicked might be conuerted to repentance, and the iust man kept in his right living.

Ezec. xlii.

Things doen by vertue of the cause.

Actes. iiii.

To winne men to Christ, to make mens consciences quiete, to moue them to prayer. When Peter made a Sermon out of hinde, there was aboute three thousand conuerted, to the faith of the Gospell, that telle same date.

What is appointed to him, and on what is proper to this reasoning.

To studie earnestly, and search the Scriptures, that he maie be a true minister of God, to liue a good life, and seek to kepe a householde, that he maie be herberous.

The place.

Iohn. xviii.

The church, the pulpit, the bestiarie, the chauncell. I spake openly in the Synagoge, saith Christ, and in the Church to all the Jewes that came thither, and I spake nothing in corners.

The time.

A yong man, an elderly man, an olde man, to preach earlie and late. Timothy. iiii. Let no man contemne thy yout.

Things annexed.

To haue some stipende for his Preaching. Moyle is the labourer, to haue his wages. Math. x.

The other places following, because they are not absolutely considered, but referred to some oether, and euer haue respect to the next worde, which is rehearsed in the question of that, which went before, they can not severally be handled in one worde: and therefore, ye must marke the whole question, and in one argument comprehend as well the wife, as the minister. Now therefore, ye shall haue this worde *wife* (a wife) described throughout the places.

The

The definition.

A wife, is a woman that is lawfully receiued into the fellowship of life, for the increase, or getting of children, and to auoide fornication.

A wife.

The generall worde.

A wife, is a woman.

The kinde.

A chaste wife, a married wife, a manerly wife, &c. let vs maie vse the proper names of women, for the kinde it selfe. As, Lucretia, Cornelia, Portia, Hippocratea, &c.

The propertie.

To bring forth children.

The whole.

The whole woman her selfe altogether.

The partes.

The head, the brest, the armes, the backe, the thigh, the harte, the vaines, blood, flesh.

Wordes yoked.

A housewife, like to doe the worke of a wife. She doeth the duty of a good wife: Ergo she is a wife. She hangeth her things about wisely: Ergo she is a good housewife.

Wordes adioined.

The loue in marriage, care ouer the familie, keeping of her selfe to one housebando, to be obedient vnto him, loue of her children, loue of her children.

The maner of doing.

To be obedient, to be thymshaken, to be knauesh, to bring up her children well, to liue in marriage with her housebando, both at bed, and at bozde, according to the will of God.

The thing containing.

The woman her selfe.

The matter and forme.

The body, and soule, of the woman, and the man, are the matter of marriage, the coniunction it selfe, is the foyme of it.

The efficient cause.

God

God

The Arte of Logike.

i. Timo. iiii.
Genes. i.

God himselfe, the Scripture, let a man bee the houseband of one wife: They shall be two in one flesh. The cause that one woman is married to a fewer all persons, and liketh him before all other, and the man her in likewise: is God himselfe first, that kindeleth such affections; next after, their consent, and full agreement, both make by all the matter.

The end.

To bring forth Children, and to keepe them safe, and to a-
void the same.

The effect.

Children godly instructed, the house well ordered.

Things appointed for some end.

To please her houseband, to live a good life, to provide things
necessarie, for the furniture of her household.

The place.

The house, the chamber of wedlocke, the hall, or parlour.

The time.

A yong woman, or an old, Aristotle saith, it is meete for men
to marrie at xxiii. for maidens to marrie at eightene, but then
was then, and now is now, all things in this world, are ripe be-
fore their time. I meane, not that honestie it selfe is so, for I ne-
uer knewe it ripe as yet, but ever rawe. But thus ye see the time
of marriage, was not so hastily looked for, as it is now. In this
world a childe shall scant be out of the shell, but he shall be sure to
die, or other, & which I doubt, whether it may be called a mar-
riage, or no: for, those that be of ripe yeres, no man doubteth, but
if they can agree both, and haue their friendes good will (for,
that ought to be sought for, and also obtained) the marriage is at-
tained before God.

Words annexed or knit together.

Marriage is referred to this place, for a wife is so called, be-
cause she hath a houseband, neither can any woman be called a
wife, except she haue a houseband, therefore, she is placed among
the words annexed, that is, where one thing is knit to an other, so
that the one can not be, except the other be also.

Nowe, that wee haue drawn these wordes, the Preacher,
and

Aristotles
mind, what
time men &
maidens
should mar-
ry.

Boyes beget
boyes.

and the wife, after this sort, throughout the places, so farre as we could: wee should compare them together, and see wherein they doe agree, and wherein they varie. Let vs compare the definitions together, and we shall finde somewhat euen there, where these wordes bee (desiring to liue vertuously) which shall geue light for an argument, as thus.

Whosoever desireth to liue vertuously, must
marrie a wife.

Euery true Preacher of Gods worde, desireth to liue vertuously.

Ergo, euery true Preacher must marrie a wife.

Now, if myne aduersarie will deny the proposition at large, called the *Maior*, then can I doe no good with it, except I find somewhat in the definition of a wife, which is agreeing to this aboue rehearsed proposition. I finde in this word (wife) that she is married for the increase of Children, & to auoyde fornication. Then I reason thus, for the confirmation of my purpose by the argument, called *Sorites*.

Whosoever desireth to liue vertuously, desireth to auoyde fornication.

Whosoever desireth to auoyde fornication, and can not obtaine it by prayer, or otherwise (as to all men it is not giuen) the same persone desireth marriage.

Ergo, whosoever desireth to liue vertuously, desireth marriage.

Again, the generall word of both these definitions, giueth light for an argument. Euery wife is a woman, euery Preacher is a man, and nature hath ordeined, that man and woman may liue in marriage (if they be so disposed) of what degree, condition, or state, so euer they be, nothing in all the Scriptures to the contrary. Therefore, I may reason thus,

What so euer is man, that same may marry a woman by Gods ordinance.

Euery Preacher is a man.

Ergo, euery Preacher may marry a woman by Gods ordinance.

From the definition.

The Arte of Logike.

Incommodities of marriage mitigated.

Even as I have doen, in these places, comparing one to another, so ye may doe in the residue, and where ye see any thing serueth for your purpose, that they agree together on both parties, ye may use the same: if they doe not agree in some places, ye may refuse them, or els so mollifie the thing, that such repugnances, may not harme your cause at all. As where it is in the wordes aduised, that a woman is often times ouerthwarted, froward, disobedient, carelesse ouer her children, for as much as these be no causes of marriage, they shall not hinder marriage, for a goodly man will beare all aduersity, and suffer such euill hap, and not therefore eschue marriage, because these incommodities chaunce in marriage. Now, I will enter into the other places, which doe not seuerally handle one worde, but haue respect more to an other, and so by knitting together of such things, of setting the one against the other, the truth of our purpose is espied, and the cause confirmed.

Similitude of marriage.

From the similitude. As he is not to be counted a good Gardiner, or a good orchard keeper, that is content with such fruit as he hath already, onely cherishing his olde trees, and hath no care, neither to cut doun the olde, nor yet to set newe grasses: so that man is to be counted no diligent member in the common weale, which being content with the present company of men, hath no minde to increase the number of people.

God the author of marriage.

From auctoritie. If the great worke man of thinges, God almighty himselfe, after the flood, being reconciled to man, made this law (as we reade in the scriptures) that men should not liue single, but increase and multiplie, that the earth might be filled: and seeing also that Christ himselfe since that time, hath allowed marriage by a miracle, by chaunging of water into wine, which miracle was the first that he did vpon the earth: and seeing Paule also biddeth euery man that can not liue chaste, to marry, and that it is better to marry, then to burne in filthy desires, and besides this, willet a Bishop should be the houseband of one wife: it must needs be, if Priests may lawfully marry, as well as any other.

other temporall men.

From comparison of the lesse, to the greater.

It is asham to see brute beastes, obey the Lawe of Nature, and man, especially a learned man, and a preacher, like a stoute Giant to strue with nature, and to do contrary to her bidding.

From the greater to the lesse.

If the daughters of Lot doubted nothing at the matter, to lie with their owne father, when he was dronke, thinking it better to prouide for encrease by filthie lust, then that mankinde should decay: shall not then a preacher, which should haue regarde for the encrease of mankinde, and also a desire to auoide fornication, marry, if he be disposed, or otherwise cannot liue chaste?

Of discordantes.

We may reason from the contrarie, thus: If virginity be a thing geuen to Angelles, and almost aboue mans reach, then mariage is at hing proper to man.

From the priuation.

If the lack of children, be a thing hatefull to man, then the hauing of children, is a thing soisfull to man.

From the relation.

If a Bishop be allowed by the scriptures, to be a housebando, then is he allowed to haue a wife, & by the Scriptures we reade, that he is allowed to be a houseband, for Paule saith: Let a Bishop be the houseband of one wife, Ergo he is allowed to haue a wife.

From wordes differing.

That word is called a differing word, whatsoeuer it is, which is not the same, that an other is. As thus: A Preacher is a man. Ergo he is no God. Priestes be men, as other men be, an that some married men ere nowe, haue well knowen. Therefore, he may marry a woman, if he can not liue chaste, considering there is nothing in all the scriptures, to the contrarie.

As I haue doen for the office of a Priester, and the mariage of a Priest, so may I also goe throughout the places, with any other matter, that is nowe in controuersie.

As I saith, works, Penance, the Sacrifice of the masse, Baptisme

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Baptisme, the Lawe, the Gospell, Synne, flounder, rule, Preaching, and every other thing, that man is bound to knowe.

Faith defined **What is faith?** Faith is a trust and full perswasion, whereby onely we doe assure vs, that our sinnes be forgiven vs, and we accepted as iust before God, through the merites of Christ.

Or thus.

Paule in the Epistle to the Hebrewes. Faith is a sure confidence of things, which are hoped for, and a certaintie of things, which are not seen.

The generall word.

A sure confidence, and a certaintie of things.

The kinde.

A faith which is occupied about things, both corporall, and also spirituall, beleeuing that Christ was both God and man, by whome saluation is attained.

The difference.

Things, which are hoped for, and the which are seen.

The propertie.

To beleue assuredly, and trust the promises of God.

The partes of faith.

The true faith hath no parts. Albeit faith is diuersly taken in the Scripture, for, there is an Historiicall faith. As I doe beleue that William Conquerour was a king of England.

Faith diuersly
taken in
Scripture.

There is also a iustifying faith, whereby I looke assuredly to be saued. There is a faith, when one man faithfully promisseth another, to do this or that, and will stand to his worde. There is also a faith of miracles, whereby the Apostles did cast out devils, and helped the diseased persons.

Things adioyning to faith, and also things annexed to faith.

Hope, Charitie, to be good to the poore, to forbear from wicked attemptes, to speake well of all, and to eschue excess.

The thing containing.

The mind of man, or the soule of man.

The efficient cause.

The worde of GOD, or the holy ghost, stirring the heart of man,

man, and comfortyng him in the merites of Christes passion.

The end of faith.

Life euerlasting, which is giuen freely to euery beleuer, that confesseth in his heart, Iesus to be Christ, and assuredly trusteth to be saued, by the onely merites of his passion.

Contraries.

Unbeleefe, Desperation, whereby man falleth from God, to his vtter damnation for euer.

Thus we see how large the vse is of these places, for not on- ly shall any one bee able to speake right aptly, and very well to the purpose, whensoever he shal seeke out the trueth of any cause by diligent search, and raunging in these corners, but also hee shall largely set out his matter, with much delite, and orderly tel his tale, with singular profite, and passing gaine. And therefore I would wish, that Logike were alwaies the square to rule our talke, and made the very touch stone to trie our reasons, such as in weightie matters, ful oft are alledged, and then I would not doubt, but that folly should the sooner bee espied, and wise mens sayings the better esteemed.

Of disputation, or reasoning, what it is.



What is called a disputatio, or reasoning of mat- ters, when certaine persons debate a cause to- gether, and one taketh part contrary vnto an o- ther, the one answering, and denying, and the other still apposing, and confirming the cause so earnestly, as he can, whereupon after harde holde, and long debating, the trueth either appeareth, or els they rest both vpon one point, leauing the matter to bee adiudged of the hearers, vpon the knowledge of both their mindes fully had, and perceiued. In all which matching, and tugging together, this would bee obserued, that euery of them keepe their owne standing, that is to say, the answerer must still vse flat denying, and shake of such light reasons as are alledged, by the helpe of iudgement, which is the first part of Logike, wherein are diuers rules and lessons set forth, especially for that purpose: the appo-

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ser must fight with weapon of his wit, and still builde by that, which the answerer doth ouerthrowe, neuer leauing to follow, and confirme his cause, till he haue brought the other to some such point, as he shall not well be able to auoyde. And the rather to excell in this behalfe, he must vse the second part of Logike, which is called Inuention, where he may haue arguments at will, if he search the places, which are none other thing, but the Roze house of reason, and the fountaine of all wisdomē.

The office and duetie of the apposer.



In al debating of causes, warines is euer thought great wisdomē. And therefore, he that wil shew wit and learning, must vse good aduiseмент, and take great deliberation with him, and euer more haue some cheefe ground in his head, wherunto he mindeth to leauell all his reasons before hand, that vpon the graunt of them, a weightier matter may euer more be obteyned. And whereas the answerer perhaps shall smell where aboutes he goeth, and therefore will seeke starting holes to escape, and flee such daunger: The disputer must alwaies keepe him in, and suffer him at no hand to slippe away, but force him still, to answer the propounded argument directly, that either he graunt the argument to be true, or denigh it to be good, or els shewe wherein the fault is, by either opening the doubtfulnesse of some wordes, or declaring plainely, the wrong knitting and lapping by of the whole reason. And because where many wordes are spoken, great aduantage may be taken, the apposer shall in as fewe wordes as he can possible, comprehend his whole reason, and framing it in good order, shall force the aduersary, to make answer vnto the parts, plainely, and without eloke, or doubtfull dealing in any wise, that vpon his open and manifest answer, a fresh reason may out of hand be framed, and so one vpon an other, gathering reasons from place to place, so long, and so often, till at length he bee brought to some one thing, which he shall not bee able by reason to denigh. And this would alwaies bee knowne, that the same reason which proueth, should alwaies be either more large then

then is that thing, which is proued, or els of like weight & largenesse with it. And so wee reason from the generall to that, which is inferiour to it: and also from the effects of thinges, to the causes: from the definition, to the thing that is defined, and likewise from all other places of inuention, after the same sort.

The office or duetie of the aunswerer.



HE aunswerer also must be as ware, and as wilie, as the apposer is, seeking by al subtile meanes, to escape such crappes and ginnes, as the craftinesse of the apposer hath layed out for him. And therefore, vpon rehearsall of the argument, it is needefull and expedient for him, to repeate it vnto himself, in the self same order, as it is set forth and spoken by the apposer, and after a little pause, to make such an aunswere, that the apposer may take little aduantage thereby, and at no hand to graunt any such thing, that may afterwards turne to his owne harme, the which full oft doth happen, when wee graunt that, as a trueth, which is plaine falshood, or denye that to be true, which is most true, or allowe things absurd, to be coumpred as lawfull. And yet where as things in outward apparaunce may seeme true, which are nothing so, but haue onely the outward shape and colour of certaintie: the aunswerer must earnestly take heede, that then he bee not deceiued. For if one inconuenience be graunted, a thousand mishaps doe followe vpon the same, and a wide gappe is made open to enter into al errors. Therefore, the aunswerer must at the first hearing of his argument, marke whether it be made according to rules of Logike, or otherwise. For the matter and euery part of the argument, may be true in sence, when the framing of it together is full bad. And therefore in such cases, the argument must be refused, because it is not well proportioned, neither yet shaped in order, according as the rules of making arguments, done euermore require. But if the argument haue his due forme and shape, then must the aunswerer marke the trueth of his argument, and if the allegations beene either doubefull, or vntue in sence or vnderstanding: the same must be refused out of hand as vnlawfull, and of no force, to

R.ii.

confirme

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confirm the cause. And for the better auoyding of euill arguments, the one of these two waies must alwaies be vsed, that either we deniigh some part of the argument, if the matter be altogether false and untrue: Or els that wee open the doubtfulnesse, or euill knitting of some worde or sentence, by making a distinction (as the Logiciens terme it) and seuerally sorting such things, as then were thought, to be euill set together. And thus the answerer being ware in his doinges, may giue his iudgement, without great daunger, and force the apposer, to giue ouer his tackling, without any aduantage gotten. But for this whole matter of answering to an argument, I doe shew my minde at large, next and immediately befoze the rehearsall, of false conclusions, or deceitfull arguments, which doe followe in the next page, where I spake of confusion, and therefore I surcease to talke any further in this matter, least that with dubble inculcation of one thing, I may bring tediousnesse vnto all men,

The



The places of false conclusions, or
deceiptfull reasons.



What I haue declared, what an argument is, what the places of inuention bee, how they serue for the confirmation of any matter, how euery thing is made, in his due mood & figure, and also shewed the obseruation of many things, whereby any one, shall both be assured, that his argument is true (if it be made according to the rules) and

also may know that it is false, if it be not made according to the same rules: I will from henceforth set out the manner of deceitfull arguments, called in Latine, *Reprehensiones*, or *fallaces conclusionum*, euen as Aristotle hath set them forth. Albeit, there is no argument so deceitfull, but they may easely be auoyded, if the rules bee marked, that are rehearsed before, concerning the true making of an argument. For according to the old saying, *Contrarium eadem est doctrina*. That is to say, of contraries, there is one manner of doctrine, for he, which can handsomely set forth a Lyon in his shape and portraiture, may iudge with reason a Lyon euill fauoured painted, & can with little difficultie, shewe the faultes in euery place: So in like manner, if one can make an argument, according to the rules about rehearsed, in his due forme and mood, he can tell also, when an argument is otherwise made then the rules can beare. To some men, these places of craft that followe, may seeme straunge, and yet euen in weightie matters, the wicked haue deriued their subtile defences from these deceitfull corners. Therefore, because such places, may the rather be auoyded, and better knowne, I will both set forth at large, and also teach, as well as I am able, how to confute them. And first to confute, is nothing els but to iudge false packing, and to vnclose by reason, things knit together by craft. Therefore the Logician, if he will doe his part, must not onely fence himselfe, for confirmation of his owne cause, but must therewithal ouerthrow the assertion of other, and also by reason moue their sayings to

Deceiptfull
arguments,
or false con-
clusions.

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be false, which by deceit would enueigle the weak.

The maner of confutation, two waies considered.

Confutation
two waies v-
fed.

An aunswere
maile to satisfie
the person
three waies.

FOR the first, either we purpose by disputation, to aunswere fully to the matter, or els secondly (if power want to compasse that) we seeke some other meanes, to satisfie the man, and that thre maner of waies, either by making the objection seeme lesse then it is, or by bringing some other example against it, or els by seeking some meanes, to goe from the matter.

We make the argument appeare slender, when we receiue it laughingly, and declare by wordes, euen at the first, that it is nothing to the purpose, and so abash the cpyonent.

Again, we turne an other argument in our aduersaries neck, when we bring an other example against him. Or els when we charge him, with a like fault, and lay some greater matter in his dish. Lastly, wee shift away from the violence of our aduersarie, by making some digression, or giuing occasion of some other talke, where by the aduersarie, either is driuen to forget his argument, or els being blinded with too much matter, is forced either to goe no further, or els to thinke himself content. In all which maner of confutation, when we purpose to put a man to silence, I would wish great moderation to be vsed, and as little aduantage taken by such meanes, as may bee possible. For although it be a poore helpe (as in deede it is none other) yet many a man loseth his estimation, by much vsing of such fashions. It is a world to see the subtiltie braue, of many bragging bodies, which with bold countenance, beare an outward shadowe of wisdom, hauing onely the Masking visage, and lacking the naturall face. They will stand stoutly in mainteinaunce of an vntrueth, and with countenance seeme to shewe it; yea, and by their bold bearing it out, almost perswade the hearers, that they onely haue the true part, and that other are altogether decciued. They will say, that no wiseman would once thinke that for shame, which the aduersarie uttereth without all shame: yea, they will say, he speaketh to to blabshly, and so dash him out of countenance, that he shall not well knowe what to say, and last of all, they will crisse and toy merely, and so with impudent laughing, make the other pass

past speaking. I wil not put any in this *memento*, as though they were guiltie: but their owne doings, shall put in themselves, on Gods name, for me. Notwithstanding, I would gladly wish (as I sayd before) that there were a measure, y^eld, and then such doings, might beter be borne.

Wee aunswere to the matter, two waies, either generally, or particularly. A generall aunswere is made three waies. First when the fault is in the matter, that is to say, in the wordes of either proposition, when they signifie diuers things, or be diuersly applied to shewe it plainly: and either denigh it as foolish, or els dissolue it, as doubtfull. As thus, the Libertines reason.

Aunswere made to the matter two waies.
A generall aunswere, iij. waies.

{ Whatsoeuer is naturall, that same is not euill.
{ To sinne is a thing naturall.
{ Ergo, to sinne is not euill.

Libertines
errour.

The seuerall or second proposition, is not true. And therefore the argument is false in the matter it selfe. For God did create the nature of man, pure and cleane, and sayd, that all was good, which he made, at the first creation. Neither was it Gods will, that man should alter his commaundement, and swarue from the path of his appointed Lawes, but rather the suggestion of the deuil, and the weakenesse of our flesh, brought man to hell, death, and damnation.

Againe, when the fault appeareth in the forme, and maner of making an argument, wee must declare that it is not framed according to the rules, which require that euery argument, should both be in moode and figure, as I haue before sufficiently declared. As thus,

The fault in the forme, or making of an argument.

{ All Magistrates doe reuenge.
{ Euery bold hardie man doth reuenge.
{ Ergo, euery bold hardie man, is a Magistrate.

This argument being made in the second figure, is of no force, considering it is no moode of the same figure. For in this figure all the propositions, doe not affirme altogether, but one of them euery doth denigh, as it appeareth plainly, to him that list to see.

Thirdly, when the fault is both in the matter, and in the maner of making, wee must refuse the arguments, and shewe the

Fault both in the matter & forme also.

faultes

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faultes plainly. As thus.

Every slaughter, is sinne.
 Every adulterie, is sinne.
 Ergo, every adulterie is slaughter.

First, the fault is, that slaughter is not well defined. For in warre time, it is lawfull to kill, and euery man may stand in his owne defence, against violent robbers, and rather kill, then bee killed. Thirdly, the argument is in no moode, although it bee in the second figure. The particular auoyding of an argument, is five waies vfed, either by declaring, in what deceitfull subtiltie it is contained. Or from which of the places, it is wrongfully deriued. Or to shewe the wrong framing in euery moode and figure. Or to make an argument, with a like reason, and so to auoyde the cause. Or last of all, to vse the straunge deceitful places, which shall be last rehearsed.

And now will I tell particularly euery deceitful argument, that when such a subtile argument shalbe vfed, either in disputation, or priuate talke: any one may espie the fault out of hand, and shewe in which of these capcious reasons, the subtiltie resteth.

And first a false conclusion, is a deceit vfed in an argument, whereby one vnder the colour of trueth, goeth about to enueigle the hearer, or thus, a false conclusion is an argument appearing to the ignorant, as though it were true, and yet is nothing true at all. Aristotle doth deuide them into two parts. Some bee called deceitfull arguments, when a doubtfull word is vfed, or the kinde of speech is straunge, and may bee taken two waies, and that the fault is rather in the kinde, and maner of speaking, then in the matter or very thing it selfe. Therefore, those that be good Grammarians, and knowe the properties of wordes, and are skilfull in the tongues, can gaylie well solute such errorrs as be made by the mistaking of wordes, or by false vnderstanding of phrases, whereof in very deepe many heresies, and much false doctrine haue had their first beginning. There bee againe some craftie subtilties, which are not in the worde, but rather spring either of the euill knitting together of the propositions, or els of the confusion of the thinges, that is to say, when one thing is falsly

A particular
 answering
 five waies.

i.
 ii.
 iii.
 v.

A false con-
 clusion.

False conclus-
 sions, two
 waies deu-
 ided,

Phrases not
 knowne, haue
 caused errors

fallie appointed for an other, as in this proposition a man may easily espie false packing, which is in the second proposition.

Fe. No sinne doth beget a man.
Sti. Concupiscence doth beget a man.
Na. Ergo, concupiscence is no sinne.

The second proposition, although it may deceive a man that is not ware, yet it is altogether false, because nature, which is a thing ordeined of God, doth beget man, not the wicked impotencie, or rather the deficiation of nature, which after ward followed. Here it is plaine, that mingle-mangle is made of thinges, when generation, which should bee attributed to nature, is referred to concupiscence, because it is in nature, & next adioyning vnto it.

Now, for the number and deuiding of these deceitfull arguments, it is to vnderstand, that there be 13. whereof 6. are called subtilities, in the word or maner of speaking, and the other 7. are called subtilities without the worde, when thinges are confounded, when the knitting is altered, and one taken for an other.

The number of false conclusions, or the deuision of deceitfull arguments.

Deceitfull arguments.

In the worde are these following.

- i. The double subiect of wordes.
- ii. The double meaning of a sentence.
- iii. The ioyning of wordes that should be parted.
- iiii. The parting of wordes that should be ioyned.
- v. The maner of speech.
- vi. The accent.

All these names be comprehended vnder this one worde (doubtfull) notwithstanding Aristotle setteth forth diuers waies, that he may shewe the difference of these doubtfull thinges. For, some arguments haue the doubt in a worde, signifying diuersly, some in the proprietie of the phrase, some in the ioyning together of wordes, and some other in the deuiding, and displacing of the same, as it shall appeare more plainely, in the handling of these places severally.

Diuersitie of subtilities.

The doubtfullnesse of a worde.

Homonymia, which may be called in English, the doubtfullnesse of one worde, when it signifyeth diuersly, is a maner of a sub-

The doubtfullnesse of a worde.

Di. i.

tilite

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either, when the defect is in a word, that hath more significations
then one. And the reason is, that such arguments are not good,
because there are two termes in the two propositions, for, the
dubble repeats, significeth one thing in the first proposition, and
an other in the second proposition. Therefore, nothing is proved
in the conclusion; when such doubtful words are placed in a
proposition. And therefore, when such a subtiltie is espied, a man
may denie the consequent, giving this reason, that it is a subtil-
tie, drawn from this place of doubtfulnesse.

Anne of dub-
ble vnder-
standing.

De. Every arme is a substance made of flesh, blood,
bones, sinewes, and veines.

Pro. God the father hath an arme.

Ergo. God the father is one that hath a substance
of flesh, blood, bones, sinewes, and veines.

I answer: this knitting is not good, and therefore, I denie the
whole. The reason is, because it is a subtiltie, of a doubtful
word, for in the first proposition, the arme is considered to be such
a one, as a man hath, but in the second proposition, it is not so
meant, for it significth by a metaphor, the power, strength, or
might of God.

An other example.

Euill two
waies taken.

Pr. There is none euill in the Citie, sayth the Pro-
phet, which the Lord hath not done.

Re. There bee many sinners, and horrible euilles in

the Citie.

Ergo. God is the author of sinne.

I denie the consequent: Because there is doubtfulnesse in
this worde euill, for in the first proposition, euill doth signifie, the
euill of punishment, as we call commonly all calamitie euill,
and all punishment euill, which are not sinne; and in the second
proposition, euill doth signifie offence, and all iniquitie that
is committed. Therefore, the second proposition, is not agreeing
with the first, and therefore, the argument is not good. Of no one
thing riseth so much controuersie, as of this doubtfulnesse, and
dubble taking of a worde. Scholars dispute, wise men fall out,
Lawyers

The mistes
of wordes
haue blinded
all our blisse.

Lawyers agree not, Preachers warr hot, Gentlemen striv, the people mutter, good men giue counsaile, women haue their wodes, this man affirmeth, the other denieth, and yet as length, the dubble meaning being once knowne (when all things are quiet) ends the whole matter. Therefore, it is good, first to bee well grounded, and surely to stay our selues upon some one assured knowledge, before we talke of things doubtfull, wherein resteth error. Best learnest of all other, is that man onely in my mind, which seeing repugnaunt sentences, can by reason iudge the trueth, Salomon sayth in his Proverbs. God the father from the beginning created wisdom. The vnlearned, the wicked, or the sedicious Libertine may take here an occasion to proue that Christ was man onely, and reason thus.

God the father, from the beginning created wisdom.

Christ the Sonne of God, is the wisdom of his father.

Ergo, Christ the Sonne of God, was created from the beginning.

Therefore, it much auailith to knowe the dubble meaning of every doubtfull worde. In the first proposition, wisdom signifieth the worde reuealed, or preached by the mouth of man. In the second proposition, wisdom is taken for the second person in Trinitie, according to Sainct Iohns Gospel. In the beginning was the worde, and the word was with God, and God was the worde. Every one knoweth, that every worde is not GOD, and yet this worde (which passeth all wordes) is God the sonne, which otherwise is called, the wisdom of his father. A certaine person, that is no small foole, as all men full well knowe, that knowe him at all, being earnest at a time, in commending a Bishop of his acquaintance, declared to a noble personage, that this Bishop had a goodly base voice, and made at one time (quhe) as base a Sermon, as he neuer heard the like in all his life before, and therefore, worthe to be counted a great Clarke, in his foolish iudgement. Who will not say, that this Bishop was as lately praised.

William Sommer.

S.ii.

Ambi-

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Ambiguities.

The ambiguitie.

The ambiguitie is, when the construction bringeth error, ha-
uing diuers understandings in it, as when the wordes be pla-
ced doubtfully, as thus. *Cresus Halim penetrans magnā peruerteret
opum vim.* Cresus going ouer the flood Halim, shal ouerthrow a
great Empire. Here is not mention, whether he shal ouerthrow
his owne, or an other mans. By the which Oracle in deed, he be-
ing deceiued, lost his owne Kingdome, when he thought to sub-
due his enemies, and bring them vnder subiection. Therefore,
when sentences be spoken doubtfully, that they may be construed
two maner of waies, and the parts diuersly pointed, make con-
trary understanding: they are referred to this place. And the ra-
ther to make it more open, I haue made two English verses,
which being diuersly read, haue two contrary meanings.

A robberie doe not feare: thy God, thy maker,
Will punish not one: God spareth, be thou sure.
Otherwise.

A robberie doe not feare thy God, thy maker
Will punish, not one God spareth, be thou sure.

There are two verses also in Latine, which because they bee
very pretie, and may be two waies taken, I thinke it not amisse,
to set them forth here among the other.

*Laus tua, non tua frans, virtus, non copia rerum.
Scandere se fecit, hoc decus eximium.*

In English thus.

Worthinesse, not wiliness, godlinesse, not goodnes,
brought thee thereunto.

Richesse great, and much authoritie, with worldly
honour to come to.

These verses being read backward, either in English, or in
Latine, beginning at the last worde, haue a cleane contrary un-
derstanding, as thus.

To come to honour worldly, with authoritie much,
and greater riches.

Whereunto, brought thee goodnes, not godlinesse, wi-
linessse, not worthinesse.

These

Verses sent to
the Pope.

These two bottles were written to the Pope, as worthie such a one, and set upon Pasquillus in Rome, euen for very loue, as I take it: not of the Pope, but of Gods holy worde.

An example of such doubtfull writing, which by reason of pointing, may haue dubble sence, and contrary meaning, taken out of an Enterlude, made by Nicolas Vdall.

Sweete mistresse, where as I loue you nothing at all,
Regarding your richesse and substance chiefe of all,
For your personage, beauntie, brinie amour, and wit,
I commend me vnto you neuer a whit.
Sorie to heare report, of your good wellfare,
For (as I heare say) such your conditions are,
That ye be worthy fauour of no liuing man.
To be abhorred of euery honest man.
To be take for a woman enclined to vice,
Nothing at all to vertus giuing her due price.
Wherefore concerning marriage, ye are thought
Such a fine paragon as nere honest man bought.
And now by these presents I doe you aduertise,
That I am minded to marrie you in no wise.
For your goodes and substance I could be contents
To take you as ye are. If ye will be my wife,
Ye shall be assured for the time of my life,
I will keepe you right well from good raiment and fare,
Ye shall not be kept but in sorrow and care,
Ye shall in no wise liue at your owne libertie.
Doe and say what ye list ye shall neuer please me,
But when ye are merie I will be all sad,
When ye are sorie I will be very glad,
When ye seeke your hearts ease, I will be unkinde,
At no tyme in me shall you much gentlenesse finde,
But all thinges contrary to your will and minde,
Shall be done, other wise I will not be behinde,
To speake, and as for all them, that would doe you wrong,

S. iij.

I will

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I will so helpe and mainteine, ye shall not liue long;
 For any foolish dole shall comber you but I, and all else,
 I (who ere say nay) will sicke by you till I dye.
 Thus good mistresse Custaunce the Lord you saue and keepe,
 From Ropstredoster whether I wake or sleepe,
 Who fauoureth you no lesse, ye may be hold,
 Then this letter purpoiseth which ye haue vnfold.

The contrary sence of the same, in the same words.

Sweete mistresse, whereas I loue you, nothing at all
 Regarding your riches and substance, chiefe of all
 For your personage, beaute, vermeanour, and wit,
 I commend me vnto you, neuer a while
 Soe to heare reposed of your good wellfare,
 For (as I heare say) such your conditions are,
 That ye be worthe fauour: of no living man
 To be abhored: of every honest man
 To be take for a woman, inclined to vice
 Nothing at all: to vertue giuing her due price
 Wherefore concerning marriage ye are shewde
 Such a fine paragon as need honest man should
 And now by these presents I doe you aduise,
 That I am minded to marrie you: in no wise
 For your goodnes and substance: I could be content
 To take you as ye are: if ye will be my wife
 Ye shall be assured for the time of my life
 I will keepe you right well: from good raiment and fare
 Ye shall not be kept: but in sorrow and care
 Ye shall in no wise liue: at your owne libertie
 Doe and say what ye list: ye shall neuer please me
 But when ye are merie: I will be all sad
 When ye are soeie: I will be very glad
 When ye seeke your heart ease: I will be unkinde
 At no time: in my shall you much gentleness finde
 But all things contrary to your will and minde,
 Shall be done otherwise: I will not be behinde
 To speake, and do for all them, that would doe you wrong.

That

will

I will

I will to helpe and maintaine, ye shall not live long
 And any foolish dole shall comber you, but I
 I (who ere say may) will sticke by you till I dye
 Thus good mistresse Eulauance, the Lord you saue and keepe,
 From me Royserdopster, whether I wake or sleepe,
 To fauourerth you no lesse, ye may be bold,
 Then this letter purporeth which ye haue vnfold.

The three deceitfull arguments;
Coniuñtio distrahendum, a ioyning together of those
 thinges, which should be discuered, and are either to bee
 applied to the thing that goe before, or to the thing that
 followe after.

The ioyning
 of wordes
 that should
 be parted.

So that whosoever knoweth letters, now hath leard
 them.
Ergo, a Grammarian knoweth letters.
Ergo, a Grammarian now hath learned them.

Here this Abuerbe (now) if it had bene referred to the first
 point, which is as ye see in this worde (letters) and the point af-
 ter made, when this worde (now) hath bene put to it, all had
 bene well: but because the worde (now) is otherwise placed, and
 referred to the next sentence, which is (now hath learned them)
 it is a false argument, because this worde (now) should be refer-
 red to the first point, as thus.

So that whosoever knoweth letters now, hath learned them.
Ergo, a Grammarian knoweth letters now.

Ergo, a Grammarian hath learned them.
 And so this argument is good, being thus placed, but though
 this subtiltie seeme childish, yet olde babes haue vsed it, euen in
 the mightiest cause of our redemption, and thought therein to
 foile the godly reasoning in teill after this sort, and yet meaning
 good earnest.

So that whosoever workes doth iustitie, is a good man.
Ergo, a dead faith doth iustifie.

Faith with-
 out workes.

Here one may see a false parking, for, in the first proposition,
 faith standing alone, is severally referred to the last word, of the
 same

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same proposition, which is (doth iustifie) in the second proposition, faith is referred to the two wordes (without workes) so that the same faith, is not meant in the second proposition, that is meant in the first, & the reason is, that wordes are ioyned together, which should not be so ioyned, for now there are fower termes, whereas by the rules of Logike, there should bee but thre (faith) is one (doth iustifie) is the second (faith without workes) is the third (a dead faith) is the fourth terme. And the reason that there bee fower, is, that faith is first severally considered, which neuer waiteth workes following her, as fruite declaring what the tree is: not that the fruite doth purchase iustification, but rather giveth a token, that by faith it selfe, whereof such workes doe spring, iustification is attained. In the second proposition there is mentioned a dead faith, a faith without workes, which faith the Devil himself hath, whereas if the argument were true, there should be none other faith, considered in the second proposition, then was rehearsed, and mentioned in the first proposition. I have laboured the rather at large, to make this matter more plaine to the ignorant, not that it so much needed (for the evasion is easie of it selfe) but to shew that this vnlearned argument is of greater weight, then the other above rehearsed were.

Of parting wordes that should be ioyned together.

The parting
of wordes
that should
be ioyned.

D*issunctio coniunctorum*, is a deviding of thinges, which should be ioyned together, and a making of wordes severall, or els a dissevering of two parts, which should be but one: for, like as by the other place, wordes are ioyned together, which should be devided: so now by this place, that thing is devided, which should be all one.

The lawe and
the Gospell.

The lawe and the Gospell, are two diuers thinges.
The worde of God, is the lawe and the Gospell.
Ergo, the worde of God, is two diuers thinges.

In this argument (the worde of GOD) being a whole thing of it self, is devided, and where respect should bee had, to the two partes ioynely considered together, which are nothing els but the whole: partes are severally understood, and referred to the whole, not both together as they should bee, but severally
with

such their properties, as they should not bee. For the word of God is not the Lawe only, or the Gospell onely, although it stand of these two, but is the Lawe and the Gospell both ioyned together: for whereas a man is made of bodie and soule, the bodie is not man, nor yet the soule neither, and yet they both ioyned together, make up a perfect man. Again, not therefore, are the Lawe and the Gospell Gods word, because they are two diuers thinges, but because they doe both properly belong vnto Gods worde. And therefore the Lawe and the Gospell, are otherwise taken, in the first proposition, then they are in the seconde proposition, whereupon there are sower termes, contrary to the rules aboue rehearsed.

An other example.

The Articles of our faith are twelue in number. To beleue in God the father, and Iesus Christ his onely sonne, are in the Articles of our faith.

Ergo to beleue in God the father, and in Iesus Christ his onely sonne, are twelue in number.

This argument is to be denied, because the doubtfullnesse riseth of division, for to beleue in God the Father, and in Iesus Christ his onely sonne, are the Articles of our faith, and yet they two are not the whole xii. in number. Therefore, they two being of the xii. are wrongly placed, if they be diuided into xii. Again, there be sower partes or termes. For in the first proposition, this parte (the Articles of our faith) comprehended the xii. in number, but in the seconde proposition, the double repeate, that is (the Articles of our faith) doe not comprehend all the Articles, but two onely, therefore it is an euill argument.

This kinde of argument is blessed oftentimes of those, which by reporting an other mans labour, and his well doynge depraue the same rather by adding or diminishing the same, as by taking a peece of a sentence out of some doctores, and applying it for their purpose, or by adding more then they finde, as both deuines and Lawiers oftentimes full ungodly haue doen, not regarding the whole course, and order of the thing, but taking out patches and peeces, to serue their ungodly purposes, which in

C.I.

deed

Faith is a
work.

beebe made nothing for them: neither they themselves doe vnderstande what they bring, when they doe not marke the whole course of the matter. The Romish reason thus.

A Romish
reason for iu-
stification.

Workes are
good, not be-
cause men do
them, but be-
cause God al-
loweth them.

The manner
of speache.
Confession.

If thou wilt enter to heauen, kepe the commaunders. Therefore, keeping the commaunders, purchase thee heauen.

This argument is false, by leaving the best out, for the doctrine of the Gospel must first be had, our faith must be fastened, and Christ must sanctifie our doynges, before they can be good. Neither is any thing good, because we doe it, but because it pleaseth God to accept it. It is true, he that doeth well, shall haue well, but who is he? Euen the same God, which first beleueth in Christ, and apprehendeth mercy by faith, whose workes God accepteth for good: otherwise he shall neuer come where God is. Therefore, espye the subtilties of the vngodly, and flee their fraude.

The fift place



forma dictionis, called other wise in good Latine, *forma orationis*, the manner of speache, is when the phrase be- cometh error, and the properties of the tongue are not well knowne engendred ambiguously as in the eighth Chapter of Matthew. When Christ had those, which were heales of the leprosie: goe, and shew themselves to the Priest, our fathers applied this saying, to confession, thinking that every one was bounde in conscience vnder paine of damnation, to confesse his sinnes to the Priest, every yeare once, where as Christs meaning was nothing so, and therefore they were much deceived, in the manner of speaking. This order was in the old lawe, as wee may reade in Leviticus, that Lepers came not into the towne, but if any hapned to be whole, and amended, he was first commaunded, to shew himselfe to the Priest, that the Priest seying his bodie cleane, might be a witness to the congregation, of his amendment, and so the man after this, might the rather be suffered to goe abroad, and be in company with other men.

But euen as they haue fondly wrested this place, to confession, euen so might light women, and eall dispoles winde, abuse these

their housebandes fondly, expounding Saint Pauls words
 in the search of the first to the Corinthians, where he saith,
 The wife is bound to the lawe, as long as her husband liueth,
 but if her husband sleepe, she is at liberty to marry with whom
 she will. But God forbid, that women should take this aduan-
 tage of their housebandes sleeping, as the Romish folke haue a-
 bused all men waking. *Sleepe* in this text, signifieth nothing, *Sleepe what it*
 but death: and yet might women, as well abuse this text, as other *signifieth.*
 men haue abused Christes sayng, for the maintenance of con-
 fession. Therefore, the property of euery speech, and the manner
 of speaking, ought alwaies to be obserued: we say in English
 some time, to some one, with whom we are offended, ah sir ha-
 pe are an honest man in deed, and yet we doe not meane, that
 he is honest in deed, but thinke that he is a naughty fellowe. So
 like wise, Christ when he should be taken of the Iewes, saied to *Christ taken*
 his Apostles, *dormite & requiesce*, sleepe on sirs and take your *of the Iewes.*
 rest, not that he would they should so doe, but to their rebuke &
 shame hee spake it, because they were carelesse, andooke their
 rest. So Paule rebuking the Corinthians, because they made
 Heauen men their Judges, and pleaded their causes under the
 saide, if there bee no bodie among you, to heare your owne cau-
 ses, make vile persons and abjects, so bee Judges among you.
 Not that he would it should be so, but to their shame, he spake it,
 as he saith himselfe. Also unto this place maie be referred, the
 kinde of phrase proper to euery tongue. As where it is in the
 Colwell. Agree with thine aduersary quickly, whiles thou art in
 the waye with him, least that aduersary deliuer thee to a Judge,
 and the Judge deliuer thee to the minister, and then thou be cast
 into prison. Verely I saie unto thee, thou shalt not come out
 thence, till thou hast paid the uttermost farthing. The which
 matter, Saint Luke rehearsing, hath these wordes in his last ende.
 I tell thee, thou departest not thence, till thou haue made good
 the uttermostmite. *Altho* doeth not see that this last sentence,
 doeth not signifie a condition, but rather noteth, that he shall ne-
 uer come at all. For (the spiritual meaning considered, how can
 than through sinne condemned to a fire of hell, deliuer himselfe, or

*Sleepe what it
signifieth.*

*Christ taken
of the Iewes.*

*Paule rebu-
king the Co-
rinthians.*

*Hebrue phra-
ses.*

Math. v.

Luke. xii.

The Arte of Logike.

pay his ranfome to God for his faluation. Againe I reade this in the first of Mach. Joseph asfene as he awoke out of fleepe did as the Angell of the Lord bad him, and tooke his wife vnto him, and knewe her not, till she had brought forth her first sonne, and called his name Iesus. How then, did Joseph knowe her afterward, that is, did he the act of nature with her? As verely, he did not companie with her carnally at all; but she liued still a virgine, he bare the name onely of an houseband, or married man. As we read also that James & John were called the brethren of Christ, and yet were they not in blood, his naturall brethren. But some not experte in tongues, may wonder much at this exposition, notwithstanding if they would weigh other places, that are in like manner written, they should haue no neede to maruell at all. We read in the viii. Chapter of Genes. When Noe had sent a Crow out of the Arke, to bring tydings againe, he sayd that the Crowe came not till the earth was drie, and yet wee reade not in the scripture, that the Crowe came to the Arke againe at all, but did rather lie cleane awaie. And yet the text saith, until the earth was drie, the Crowe came not. The Prophet saith of God: Thou art from worlde to worlde, and yet here is no determinate tyme mentioned, for GOD is a liuing substance for euer. Yea, I thinke we haue the like phrase also, even in our English tongue. The stiffe necked say thus: I will heare no preaching, till all men be agreed. And when is that? Parte neuer I thinke. Therefore, those that bee ignorant in the tongues are easily deceived. Likewise we reade in the twelue Chapter of Saint Mathew. *Qui dixerit verbum aduersus spiritum sanctum non remittetur ei, neque in hoc seculo, neque in futuro.* He that speaketh a worde against the holie Ghost, shall not be forgiven neither in this world, nor yet in the world to come, that is to saie, he shall neuer be forgiven, for moose whereof, and full confirmation, that this meaning is true, and ought not other wise to be taken. Saint Marke also speaking of the same matter, hath these wordes. Verely I say vnto you, all finnes shall be forgiven vnto mens children, and blasphemy whet with thy blasphemy. But he that blasphemeth the holy Ghost, shall neuer haue forgiveness

giueneth; but shall be guiltie of eternall damnation. Thus we see, that the maner of speech used in Mathew, is plainly opened here in Marke. Sainct Luke in like maner, whosocuer Luke. xii.] speaketh a worde against the sonne of man, it shall be forgiven him. But unto him that blasphemeth the holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven. And yet notwithstanding all this, the weakelined, referre this place to Purgatorie, most vainly and without all reason. The maner of speech causeth ambiguitie, by reason of the affinitie in wordes, and when one hath lost all the money in his purse, and for lacke of copie, is faine to holde the candell. An other man when he seeth the same bodie doe his duety with his cap on, to his better might say merilie by the waie of a suite, to the which person: I pray you sir, let this good fellowe be covered, he is bare, wher as bare, signifieth a bare purse, as well as a bare head: and is properly so saide. Againe and most openlie this subtiltie taketh place, when sentences bee euill pointed, and the sence thereby depraued, as some that maintaine Justification by workes, haue straungely abused a text of Sainct Augustine, making the point plaine; whereas it should be an interpretation, and hath been of late yeares so founde in an old written hand. The sentence is this. *Qui facit se sine te, non potest seruare te sine se.* He that made thee, without thee, can not be saue thee: Where as making it a plaine poynt in Latine, it hath a cleane contrary understanding, & maketh asmuch for the maintenance of false religion. For it is asmuch, as who should saie: he that made thee without thee, can not saue thee, without thee. Moreover, wordes spoken by imitation, that is to saie, when one reherleth that, which an other man saith, must diligently be observed. Paule writeth to the Collosians, beware the naughtynesse of some men, that will keepe simple folke in subjection with their traditions, and trouble the consciences of the weakelined, sayng; doe not touch, doe not tast, doe not handle meate, which Paule reherleth, in rebuke to the hypocrites and obstinate Iherosolymites, and yet some notwithstanding, fondly haue misconstrued the same, perswading themselves that Paule gaue such commandement. There fore those thinges, which are spoken by

Bare, two
waies taken.

Augustines
saying de-
praued.

Words spokē
by imitation.

The Arte of Logike.

inication, following an other mans speech; must offer will bee
 vnderstanden, then those wordes, which a man speaketh of him-
 selfe, and giue such instruction certainly thereby. Thus farre haue
 I handled these subtile arguments, which are in the wordes:
 now will I rehearse all such false conclusions as are in the
 matter. And first this is to bee noted, that the faultes of euerie
 argument, are either in the wping or lining, and not well set-
 ting forth the nature of any thing; or els not aptly deuising, or
 fastly, not aduisedly weping the causes of thinges, but heaping
 them vp without order or reason. The other subtilties aboue
 rehearsed, may either bee auoyded, by well marking the true
 distinction, or els hauing respect to the diuision, by declaring se-
 uerally howe large euery worde may be taken, and what error
 may rise by the false vnderstanding of some one worde, the sub-
 tilties following, containe such aburdities, and rise not vpon the
 nature of some one worde, but take their grounde of the matter,
 and thing it selfe:

There be seauen in number about yd wordes

i. From the act done.

ii. From thar, which is partly and after

soit so, to be full and whole so.

iii. The mistaking of sentences gain saying.

iiii. The consequent.

v. The cause that is not, pur for the cause.

vi. The Cuckooe song, or thinge done full,

to proue thinges that are adoubefull.

vii. As any questions asked for one saying.

The first deceipt.

Attacta accidentis, the deceptifullnes of the accident,

when diuers things are ioyned together, in one

substance, that is to say, when one of the same thing,

is referred both to the substance, and also to the ac-

cident; or els when the accidentes (which are not of the verie

substance of man, but may be away, the man liuing still) are

not well ioyned together, or els, when we make an argument,

ad vniuersis, thas is to say, by that thing; which supposeth can

The accident



a man casually, and pronounce the same, to be the very proper cause why, and wherefore, this or that is so. Of the first, this may be an example.

That same which flesh is, fish is not.

Flesh & fish.

Flesh is foode.

Therefore fish is none.

In the first proposition, I understande the substance of flesh, and in the second proposition, I meane the accident or propertie, which is in them both, and therefore mine argument is not lawfull, because I referred both the substance and the accident, to one, and to the same subiect. For although flesh and fish, be not all one in substance, because flesh is one thing, & fish is another, and either of them hath their proper being, & distinct substance, yet they agree both in their accident, that is to say, in foode, to serue for the sustenance, of man.

No sinne may be committed.

Wicked men, when they execute iustice, doe sinne.

Wicked men
sinne, even in
executing iustice.

Therefore wicked men may doe no iustice, being set in authority.

The first proposition is true, and the second also, for what soeuer is not of faith, the same is sinne. Neither can any thing bee well, how soeuer it seemeth in our eyes, except our faith be first fastened vpon the free mercy of Christ. Therefore the Iewes how soeuer they liue, keeping order, obseruing lawes, forbearing riot, yet all their doings, are nothing but sinne, whatsoeuer they doe, seeme it neuer so honest, or goodly, to the sight of man. And yet this argument is not truly layd vp. For in the first proposition (sinne) is considered by himselfe, and therefore it is truly said, that no sinne may be committed. In the second proposition, where execution of iustice is reported to bee sinne, it is not so of it selfe, but because the person is euill himselfe, which executeth the law, & therefore the offence cometh casually, and as the Logicians say, *per accident*, where as sinne before was considered, according to the substance. And therefore, though the officer being naughty, offendeth when he ministreth iustice, (because faith maketh all workes good) yet must he doe iustice, because

The Arte of Logike.

because it is commaunded, euen as he must assuredly beleue, that
Jesus is the Messias, and the promised sauour sent of GOD.
And though the doyng bee euill to him, yet it is good to other.
Againe, thus reason some.

The Articles
of our faith.

By faith we are iustified.

Faith is a worke.

Ergo by workes we are iustified.

This proposition is false, considering that faith, in the first
proposition, is the same, through which we are iustified, not by
the worthinesse of our beleuynge, but through the free mercy of
Christ, the which wee apprehend through faith. And therefore we
must in this saying consider, that faith is referred by relation to
Christ, though whom onely, all mercy is attained, & that grace
commeth, not because faith is a worke, but because mercie goeth
before, and receiueth freely all beluers, without worthinesse ei-
ther of beleuynge, or els of doyng any other worke. Therefore in
the first proposition, faith being not so taken, as in the second,
we may saie well, it springeth from this deceitfull place, and is
therefore not lawfull.

Another argument.

This man is a wolcie fellowe.

This man is lame.

Ergo this same man hath a lame wife.

This is euidently false, because the accidentes of the bodie
are referred to the substance of the mynde, as by this last argu-
ment, ye may see the lamenesse, which of the body, is attributed
to the mynde, whereby the reason is vaine.

The third deceipt is, when many thinges are referred to one
subject, we make that to be the very next and chiefe cause, which
is a casual thing, and cometh by way vnto any body, as thus.

Dauid is a blessed man.

Dauid is an adulterer.

Ergo adulterers are blessed men.

I deny the consequence, because it is a deceitfull argument,
by that, which is the accident. For when many thinges chaunce
to one man, we must see what the verie causes are of the thing

which

which we attribute to the subject. David is a blessed man. And wherefore? Not because he was an adulterer, for, that happened to him casually, but because he was chosen of God, and had the feare of God before his eyes, and although this happened by the instinct of the Deuill, yet he called for grace, repented soze, and trusted in Gods mercie, as the Psalmes plentifully beare witness, and this was the cause why he was blessed. so that in the first proposition, David is otherwise considered, then he is in the second proposition, seeing an accident casually happening; is mentioned in the second part, whereas in the first proposition, a naturall power of God, and his especiall grace are both together rehearsed and comprehended. And therefore, ye must obserue that in such deceitfull arguments, although many thinges are referred to one subject, yet are they not after one soze, comprehended in the same subject, but diuersly considered, as when I ioyne accidents, both of body and mynd together, as thus.

¶ This fellowe is a Gospeller.

¶ This fellowe is blinde.

¶ Ergo, this fellowe is a blind Gospeller.

Here ye may see the accidents of the minde and body, ioynd together, which should not bee so. And as for men blinde by nature, I haue knowne such, that might more worthely haue beene Bishoppes, then other, with all the eyes they haue. For, though their sight fayled, yet their tongue serued to set forth the glorie of God. But some of our pastours see ouer well for their owne profite, and ouer little for our saufe conduite.

The Anabaptistes reason thus.

¶ That which is nothing, deserueth no punishment.

¶ Sinne is nothing.

¶ Ergo, sinne deserueth no punishment.

Sinne is nothing.

In the first proposition, that thing is meant, which is not at all, but is cleane gone from nature, or els neuer was within the nature of thinges. In the second proposition (sinne) is reported to bee nothing, because it selfe being nothing worth, spoylth a man of his other vertues, and so ouerthroweth nature, as much as it can. Wee may see a man blinde, we iudge that he hath lost his

sight,

ll.

The Arte of Logike.

Sight, herein we esteeme the sight, to bee a gift giuen of God, and blindnes to be the taker away of that, which was giuen of God. In like case, sinne is the destruction of that, which was being of it selfe nothing. And so in this case, to vse well, is a thing, the want whereof, is nothing, the which, is sinne. And thus, we see that this word (nothing) is two waies taken, first, when a thing is nothing at all, neither yet euer was, againe, when a thing is nothing, which before was some thing. As before sinne, was grace, which sinne is here called nothing, and yet before nothing which is mentioned in the first proposition, was neuer yet any thing, the one is called in Latine, *Nihil prius*, the other is named, *Nihil negatiu*.

Moses lawe
encreaseth
sinne-

Whatsoever encreaseth sinne, is not to be taught.
The Lawe of Moses encreaseth sinne.
Ergo, the Lawe of Moses is not to be taught.

I aunswere, the Lawe encreaseth not sinne, by the owne nature, but casually. For, when man himselfe, is corrupted with vice then the Law maketh his sinne appeare hainous, and encreaseth the knowledge of sinne in him. So that in the first proposition, the nature of encreasing sinne, is considered: in the second proposition, the casual happening is rehearsed, and the knowledge thereof induction, when things are made open vnto our eyes, and the feeling of sinne euident to our hearts, which before for want of skill, was not seene, nor yet knowne at all. All such arguments must be answered by distinction, that is, ye must declare the double meaning in the two propositions, and then ye haue soluted the subtiltie.

The second.

From the part
to the whole.

From that, which is partly, and after a sort so, to bee full, and wholly so, and by colour of the part, to giue iudgement of the whole.

Of this deceipt there be fouer kindes.
1. When the sentence propounded, repugneth to that, which followeth, as this.
A dead boile lieth in the ditch. Ergo, it is a boile. Such hoists were

were good to be let for hire, when men runne away with them. It is rather called the carrion, or carcase of a horse. Who calleth a dead man, such a one as he was before?

ii. Again, when fantasie frameth some wonder in a mans head, and a thing is conceiued by imagination, which is not at all.

Antiques or gargayles are deuised by Painters.

Ergo, there are such creatures in deede.

iii. Thirdly, when a thing may bee, and is already in power to say straight, it is,

A ragged Colt may proue a good horse.

Ergo, the Colt is already a good horse.

iiij. Euen in weightie matters of religion, this reason hath bene used, as ye shall see hereafter.

v. Fourthly, when the part is taken for the whole.

Wine is euill for those that be sicke of an Ague.

Ergo, wine is euill for all men.

This argument is from the particular, to the vniuersall, the which is easie to be auoyded. Therefore, errors doe often chaunce, when we comprehend the whole, speaking onely of the parte, or when we make the signe, to be the very selfe thing, and although ye haue had chilonly examples before, onely to make the matter plaine, ye shall see that in weightie matters, this deceitfull argument hath been used.

We haue many now a daies crye out, and say the Lawyers are naught, they meane no truth, but only seeke for lucre, whereas no man I thinke, condemneth all Lawyers, although he haue iust cause, to accuse some wretched Lawyers. Some say againe that Priests haue left fornicarij gaspy wel, & are neuer suspected now a daies for adulterie; being poked full of mariage; but some spare not to say againe, that they haue made an ephe and; leaving up the home, and following rade business, the deuil and all: But God forbid, that all Priests should so doe: And in deede, if any one should so reason, I would recken his argument to be now prehended, within the compasse of this false conclusion. Thus reason the Anabaptistes.

or

A.ii.

Unrigh-

The Arte of Logike.

Unrighteous-
nesse in euery
kingdome.

{ Unrighteousnesse is altogether reprobod.
In euery kingdome is much unrighteousnesse ded.
Ergo, euery kingdome is altogether reprobod.

By this meanes we shall haue no kingdome, no lawe, no politi-
ticall order, no trade, no discipline, no iudgement for offenders.
But this argument is to bee reiected, because it is to be deriued
from the part to the whole. For, although many thinges bee a-
misse, in a politicall body, yet the whole therefore must not bee
dissolued, the lawes must not be abrogated, nor yet good order a-
bandoned: for the chief thing that is in euery Empire, is a thing
ordained of God, and a righteous thing, as for an example. Poli-
ticall order, lawes, statutes, iudgement, execution, and punish-
ment of offenders, beene altogether ordained of God, and there-
fore, they reason amisse; that for there is an abuse in a politicall
order, therefore, wee shall haue no order at all, in any Common-
weale, and againe ye shall perceiue, that there is more in the con-
clusion, then was rehearsed in the two propositions: for in the se-
cond proposition, the vices generally are rehearsed, but in the
conclusion, the Realme selfe is altogether named. Therefore, we
ought diligently to note the circumstance of the thing, if wee
will auoyde this subtiltie, and when a thing is spoken in part,
we must not thereby iudge the whole: or measure the vniuersall,
by that, which is comprehended vnder the generall.

{ A man may forsake an adulterous wife.
Ergo, he may forsake his wife.

This is from the inferiour, to the vniuersall, which is not wel
gathered, as it standeth here: for, although a man may forsake his
wife, being naught of her body, yet may he not forsake an honest
woman, when it liketh him to chaunge. For, this worde (wife)
in the first proposition, is hedged with her circumstance, that is
to say, adulterie, which causeth deuicement. Neither is this ar-
gument good, the King may put to death euery euill man: Ergo,
the King may put to death euery man. Againe, if we will reason
negatiuely, as wee did before affirmatiuely, wee shall frame our
argument amisse: as thus.

No wife should be put away.
Ergo, neither a naughty wife should be put away.

Againe,
No wine is euill.
Ergo, no mingled wine is euill.

This is from the vniuersall to that, which is inferior, and as ye would say, hedged with his circumstance, and compassed with that, which before was neither in wife, nor yet in wine, for a wife so long as she keepeth her selfe to her husband, she is no adulteresse, & he that drinketh of it self, is not mingled, and therefore, the argument is not good, because that thing is in the lesse, or inferior, which was not in the generall. There is a figure in Rhetorike, called Hyperbole, that is to say, when a thing is spoken beyond measure incredibly, and yet is not so largely meant. As when I will praise a man for his strength, I will say, he hath slain Hercules in manhood, meaning that he excelleth in manhood and valiantnesse. If wee knowe one that runneth well, either dogge, man, or horse, we vse to say, he is as swift as a swallowe, he flieth like an arrowe out of a bowe: meaning onely that he is exceeding swift. Therefore, we must diligently take heede, when such speeches are used, that wee take not them as they bee spoken, but as they are ment, neither take the whole for the part, when the whole is expressed in wordes, and the part ment in understanding. And alwaies bee wise in our mounting, that ascending ouer high, wee bee not commounded to come downe as fooles. A noble man had a childe, which was very toward in learning, and partly for such worthinesse as was in the childe, and partly to get fauour of such a peere, as the father was, diuers commended the childe wonderfully well, and one aboue all other, thinking to say the most, not content with right excellency, or marvellous witte, or too toward, sayd thus after other mens iudgement, and report giuen. Surely in my mynd, the childe is euen a very monster. With that the noble man laughed, to heare his folly, and all the other likewise that were there. Therefore, it is good in vsing such passing reports, discretely to weigh them before hand alwaies.

Things spokē
aboue mea-
measure.

A monster.

An other argument

The Church doth not erre

The Pharisees are the Church

Ergo, the Pharisees doe not erre

The deceptis, from the particular to the vniuersall. As who

shauld say, Some doe not erre in the Church. Ergo, no body doth

erre at all, that is of the Church; which is false, for the Church is

as well of the euill, as of the good. The good men that are tray-
ned in the truth of God, and taught the true loue of God, by oft

reading and following his worde, haue the true light, and erre

not. Other that be fleshly, carelesse, drowned in ambition, and

all worldly lust, both can erre, and doe erre, from synners synne.

Therefore, whereas I say, the Church doth not erre, it is called

Synechdoche, that is to say, when the part is vsed for the whole.

An other argument made by the

Anabaptistes.

To the iust, there is no lawe set.

The ryotous sonne after his conuersion, is iust.

Ergo, to him there is lawe set.

This argument is from the part to the whole: he is deliuered

from the law, for so much as pertaineth to his condemnation, but

he is not free, for so much as belongeth to the due obedience,

which he oweth vnto God: for, this order standeth for euer most

stedfastly, that euery creature be obedient to God the creatour.

Againe, forasmuch as euery iust man, that is conuerted from his

euill waies, there remaineth a wicked inclination, the same must

alwaies be bridged and kept it, euen with the terror of the law,

as though it were a mousetroll.

The signe is often tyme turned into the thing it selfe, as I

rehearsed before.

There is Saint George vpon the windowe.

Ergo, it is Saint George himselfe.

This argument men haue vsed, when they haue seene a man

painted on a wall, or grauen in a stone, but as well they might call

the picture of the horse Saint George, as the picture of the man.

This is Saint Christopher. This is Saint Ioseph. This is the

picture

The Church
doth not erre.

The iust is
free from the
lawe.

Images taken
for Saints,

picture of Christ: *Ergo*, it is Christ. This is an Image of our Ladie: *Ergo*, it is our Ladie, and here she will worke wonders, more then in an other place, as she did at Wallingham, at Boston, at Lincolne, at Ipswich; and I cannot tell where, when Priests gathered money, and poore folkes were mocked. Here ye must denie the consequent, because the signe is not the thing signified, neither is God bound to any place, to the which he hath not bound himselfe by his worde, nay yet any Sainct neither. This rule overthroweth all manner of Idolles, which haue beene in all ages, from tyme to tyme. In this kinde of subtiltie, ye must diligently obserue fower circumstances, the person, the tyme, the place, and the manner of comparing thinges together, all which are false, and deceiptfull reasons.

The person.

An Officer appointed by the King, may sende an of-
fender to ward, by authoritie.

Ergo, every man may.

The tyme.

It is not lawfull to walke in the streets of London
after the watch is set.

Ergo, it is not lawfull to walke in London at all.

The place.

It is not lawfull to giue a blowe within the Court
gates.

Ergo, it is not lawfull at all in myne owne defence.

The manner of reasoning.

It is the Image of a man.

Ergo, it is a man.

Compare these two together, and marke the accident adioy-
ned to a man, and ye shall perceiue that it taketh away all sub-
stance, and leaueth only the shadowe; for, this word painted, re-
straineth the other, and compasseth him within his boundes, so
that a painted man, can no more be called a man, then an adulte-
rous wife, can bee called a wife: for so long is a woman called a
wife, as she keepeth her self, within the boundes of Matrimonie,
other wise she is no wife, although men be so call them wiues.

The

The three deceptfull.

S*ecundum non causam, ut causam*, that is, when a cause that is not able to proue the matter, is brought in, as though it were of force, and strength, but the ground being considered the faulte easily espied. A cause that is not put for a cause.

Drunkenesse is euill:

Ergo wine is nauyge

Wine is not to be repproued altogether, although some adme the same, for it is a good thing ordained of God, for the sustenance of man.

An other argument.

Some young men when they come to the landes fall to vntychritenes.

Ergo riches are not good.

In all such arguments, wherein good thinges are repproued, because euil bodics abuse the same, the euill will and the naughty enclination of the man, which abused, such thinges is to bee rebuked: and therefore when it is otherwise, it may be said, that a cause which is not, is put for a cause. As some abuse Pauls meaning, when they goe about to depraue Philosophie.

Paul warned that we should not be decciued by philosophie.

Ergo Philosophie is nauht, say some.

Philosophie.

The argument doeth not followe, for a good thing may bee much abused, and yet the thing it selfe may not be altogether reiected as nauht: therefore Paul doeth not condemne demonstrations, and principles, which are assured trueiths, taught by sciences, as in Arithmetike. iiii. and. iiii. make. viii. In Philosophie, the whole is greater then the parte, doe as thou wouldest bee doen vnto, but he repproued the abuse of sciences, when there is made a mingle mangle of them, & one confounded with an other, as some haue said that Philosophie will teach a Christian, as much for his profession, as the Prophetes, and the whole Bible besides will doe: this made Paul bid men take heed that they be not decciued by Philosophie.

Now a daies they will say, I cannot tell, here is much preaching

Good preaching & euill liuers.

E. i.

ching

The Arte of Logike.

ching, much teaching of Gods word, but I see few followers of it, it was a better world, when we had not halfe so many Preachers, Heresies were neuer more ripe, naughtinesse neuer more abounded, therefore geue vs the old learning again, and take you the newe.

This reason is not worth a strawe. The wickednesse of the Preachers cometh not of their learning, but of their vicious natures, and naughtie desires: for out of one and the same flower the Bee sucketh Honey, and the Spider draweth Popson. By these and such other examples, ye may easely espie, wherefore the argument is not good, if ye marke whether the true cause be in the former proposition, or some counterfeit reason, which seemeth to proue, and yet in deed doeth not proue the matter at all, for if I reason thus.

{ Jobson and Robson looked through an hedge, and the one sawe the other.
Ergo they two are both nigh of kindred.

That man seeth not, that doeth see any jot at all, that this geare hangeth together like a broken pot shearde, and that the Antecedent doeth nothing at all, proue the Consequent: and yet the other arguments aboue rehearsed (if they be narrowly marked) are as foolish and as worthy to be laughed at, as is this foolish fond reason, and madly inuented argument.

An other argument.

{ Feare not the signes of the Element.
Ergo they signifie none euill to come.

The consequent is false, for Christ doeth forbid his disciples, to feare the signes, not because they signifie none euill to come, but because that where as they signifie harme, and punishment to the world, & wicked persones: yet he will be a present succour to his church, and neuer leaue it comfortlesse. As when the godlie heare this (feare not death) it doeth not followe, but that death is an horrible thing, and much repugnant to mans nature.

This deceiptfull argument is much used in this our life, & made a buckler for diuers matters. As whye I am loth to be of a quest,

Bad excuses.

or that any such businesse shoulde trouble me, being sent for, I Riche man.
 saue my selfe sicke, because I would not gladly come. Or when Bishop.
 one that is rich shoulde helpe a poore man, to say: God helpe you
 sir I haue a great charge my selfe, I can not doe for you. Or wh^t Lawier.
 a Bishop shoulde be desired to teach or preach, to say, he is sicke.
 Or when a Lawier being desired to helpe a poore man and pro-
 ferred there vpon, a litle money, euen so much as the poore man
 can not well spare, & yet not halfe so much as the Lawier would
 haue: streight to say, I am sorry, I can not doe for you, if I were
 not called vpon otherwise by diuerse men, I would not faile to
 doe you good, that is as they say in English, better a bad excuse,
 then none at all, in Latine it is called *Non causa pro causa posita*.
 And the vsing of such excuses among the Rhetoricians, is called
translatio, that is to say a shifiting of the fault from one to an o-
 ther. As we reade that Demades vsed a wonderfull good shifte, Demade.
 when it was laied sore to his charge, that he had written a very
 naughtie decree and vnbonest, for the obteyning of the peace at
 Alexanders hand. He answered that the same decree was not
 writte with his owne writing penne but with Alexanders war-
 ring speare, which is asmuch to say, feare did driue him to take
 such & such condicions of peace. We reade a notable Historie of
 a yong child in Rome, called Papirius, which because both it is Papirius.
 pleasaunt, and much to be wondered at, and also serueth for this
 purpose right aptly, I thinke it meete to be rehearsed in this
 place. This Papirius being a yong lad, of ten or twelue yeres
 old, and sonne to one of the Senatours in Rome (which were
 then, as noble men be now in Englande, Lords of the counsaill)
 went euery day with his father, to the Parliament house, and
 heard fro time to time, all matters that were debated there. His
 father euer more charged him, that he should not utter any thing,
 which he heard, to any body liuing. It happened afterward, that
 vpon vrgent causes and weightie affaires, the counsaill did so sit
 much longer, then they were wont, and continued so, for the space
 of seuen nightes. Euery body marvelled, what this matter shoulde
 be. This child Papirius knewe all. His mother being most of
 all desirous, to know what it shoulde be, when she could not attaine
 Woman desirous to know things.

The Arte of Logike.

the knowledge thereof, by her husbande, she called the boye to confession, and hauing the Instrument of absolution by her, that is, a very good birchen rodde, charged her sonne, truely to tell her, euery whitte that was debated in the Parliament house, or els he should smart for it surely: For, what with thy secretenesse of the thing, and what with the silence of her sonne, she was wonderfully with childe, till she had gotten somewhat of the boy. The boy himselte, first remembring his fathers commaundement, and considering how he should be paid at his hand, if he told all things in deede, as they were: and againe on the other side, seeing present paine before him, the rodde at hande, his mother with childe, till she were somewhat satisfied, thought it better, prettily, and by the way, to mocke his mother, and so to stoppe her mouth, with some forged tale: then falsely to bewray his father, his friends, and all his countrie. And therefore thus he began craftely to shape his tale: Mother, if you will promise mee to keepe that close, which I shall disclose vnto you, and tell it no body liuing, you shall heare the whole matter, euen as it is. She answered, she would not tell it againe, whatsoeuer it were. Then said he, mother the matter wholly concerneth marriage, and the counsaill haue long debated, whether it were better, for one man to haue two wiues, or one woman to haue two husbandes, and as yet, the matter hangeth in suspence. When she heard this, her heart burned, and her stomache was ouercharged wonderfully, that except shee had layd it, in one of her neighbours lappes, it was like she would haue burst. But she goeth, and maketh much speede with her tongue, as she dooth with her feete, and telleth it immediately to her next neighbour, & from one to another, till at length a number knewe it, where vpon they agreed wholly, to go altogether to the counsaill house, to create the Senatours, to sit no longer vpon this matter, but clerely to determine with one assent and consent, that it were best and most expedient for euery woman, to haue two housebands, and not otherwise, for no wyllos good any thing heretofore to the contrarie notwithstanding. By this example ye may see the subtiltie of this deceypt. For when the mother asked her sonne, what the cause was of their

Patricius answered to his mother.

Woman hardly keepe counsaill.

their so long sitting he told her a cleane contrarie thing, which the counsaill neuer thought, nor yet once minded, this is, *non causa pro causa posita*, A cause that is not put for a cause.

The fowerth deceit.

F *Alacia consequentis*, when the consequent, that is to say, The consequent. the latter proposition is euill gathered by the antecedent, which goeth before. And the way to knowe the faulte, of this deceitfull argument is to examine the argument, with the precepts of Logike, aboue rehearsed.

¶ Euill deedes purchase death.

¶ Ergo good deedes purchase life.

This argument is not good, first considering, we can not fulfill the Lawe, by our selues. Again, workes are wicked, that are doen without faith, so that first wee must bee in the state of grace by faith, and assured through faith to liue euer, before our workes shalbe accepted for good, neither can our doings be perfect, in any part, to fulfill Gods will, and his commaundments, and therefore, though euil deedes deserue death, yet good deedes can neuer purchase life, so long as we be not able to fulfill the Lawe, as *G D D* knoweth we shall neuer be: Scripture, our consciences, the worlde, and all, bearing witnesse against vs: Of signes that be not proper, neither tary longer, no strong argument is made, as thus.

¶ He is pale in countenance.

¶ Ergo he is in loue.

Palenesse may come of studie, of care, and thought, of abstinence, of watching, of some distemperature in the body, and many other wayes besides.

Again, there is another rule, *A posse adesse, non est boma consequentia*. Because a thing may be, it shall not therefore follow that it is. As the Catholikes haue serued vs, for the Sacrament saying, that because God is omnipotent, and may be in the Sacrament, by his power really: ergo he is there really. For so may I say, God may feede euery Christian, both in body and soule, with the might of his worde. Ergo hee doth so. The Prophete saith I neuer sawe a iust man forsaken of *G D D*, nor his seede

¶.iii.

begging

dragging his bread. And yet God doeth not forbe all Christians, with his worde onely, but with his appointed will generally. Likewise in the Sacrament, God feedeth vs spiritually, because the flesh eaten, profiteth nothing, and they that eat the Sacrament in faith, cary in God, and God in them spiritually, and haue life euerslasting, whereas other that eat it without faith, haue it not at all, for lacke of faith, considering God is no wicked man. But in the old worlde, many wonders were wrought, and because things might be, all things should be, as they would haue it, and yet I cannot be perswaded to thinke that, because all priestes may be honest, therefore they all be honest.

The Sacra-
ment of Chri-
stes bodie.

From the generall to the inferiour, affirmatiuely, is no good argument made.

He is a man of power.

He is a good man of power.

We may not withstanding, be an euill man, yea, and soner euill, then good, for none can tell almost now a daies, where the good men doe dwell. Or if they haue dwelling places still, yet fewe can finde them at home. Againe, to make an argument, from those things, which happen to a man, and may be away: the reason can not of necessity followe.

Good men
be hard to
come by.

This old man goeth gassy, and like a young man.

He is in loue with some woman.

In this reason, a likelihode is made necessarie, as though it could not other wise be, but that he were in loue, because he was in such apparell, yong man like. But for this whole capricious cause, I thinke it best, that ye marke the rules, aboue rehearsed, and ye shal not faile to espie the fault, for the deceit is sore seen if ye call the argument to accompt.

The fifth deceit.

Many questi-
ons.

Places interrogatiues, many questions, that is, when I go about to deceiue one, asking him this, and that, and he thin-
king not to what ende he asketh him, as length is brought to an inconuenience, by his former granting, of things particu-
larly. And it is .ii. wayes confuted, first when we aske of many things, one, and again when we aske of one thing, many things, and

Questions
asked two
wayes.

and put forth diuers questions, before we come to the purpose.
For the first, this may be an example:

Is water and wine hotte or no?

The question is asked, so that he must answer to them both,
which he cannot doe at one time, and geue one resolute answer
directly, according to the demanders will. But this is a trifle,
and one that hath but a sponefull of wit, may answer to this
question, vling a distinction, and seuerally shewing the quali-
ties of both Wine and water, otherwise he cannot be able, to
make any reasonable answer, as the question is propounded.

Is worshipping of Saintes, and praying to God himselte,
allowes among Christians or no?

Where ye see, that for two diuerse things, one certain question
is directly required, where as no man can iustly answer a word:
and therefore the question being twane made ioyntly, must se-
uerally be soluted.

I will merely adde another, which agreeth to the second ma-
ner of asking and I will adde the same, rather to geue matter of
laughing, then that there is any grate weight in it. A Lawier
took paynes in a matter of Lawe, for a certain gentleman, that
was some time a scholer. The gentleman promised him a horse
for his labour, the Lawier after paines taken, required his horse,
the gentleman denigged his debt, although the Lawier had wit-
nesse. And thus the gentleman reasoned merily for himselfe:
he saith, all horses bee not of one colour, but of diuerse co-
lours, some blacke, some white, some baye, some dapple: if I owe
you any by promise, I owe you no more of one colour, then I doe
of another, considering, I did promise you no more of one colour,
then I did of another, and I may be discharged of my promise,
atwill in deliuering one certain coloured horse, as an other.
Therefore, either I owe you horses of all colours, or els I owe
you none at all: but I doe not owe you horses of all colours (con-
sidering I promised you but one) therefore, I owe you none. Yea,
I owe you me so, quoth a Lawier. Make this schole point, much
passeth al our Lawe payntes. Well sir, as it pleaseth you, quoth
he if you be at that point. When the gentleman sawe hym so

A horse pro-
mised to a la-
wier.

reaso-

The Arte of Logike.

reasonable, and heard him say so, he gaue him, according to his promise, considering, he referred the whole matter so gently, to his pleasure.

For this second maner of asking, when of one thing, many are asked, one may easely be enueigled and brought to an inconuenience, before he be ware, and of this kinde of asking there is also another example in Tully, where hee speaketh in his booke *De inuentione*. of this figure *inductio*, which is by things not doubtfull, to proue that thing true, which is doubtfull. Socrates therewith that Aspasia had this talke with Zenophon, and his wife, in maner and forme following, after other communication had before. And tell mee in fayth (quod Aspasia) if thy neighbour had more precious Jewels, then thou nowe hast, wouldest thou wish to haue hers or thynne owne? She answered, I would haue hers. What if he had more costly garments, more fine apparell, wouldest thou not haue it also? Yes Marie would I (quod she.) Ah well I say, what if thy neighbour had a better houseband, then thou nowe hast, whether hadst thou rather keepe thine owne still, or haue hers? with that shee blushed. Then Aspasia, when opportunitie serued, spake to Zenophon like wise, and sayde merily vnto him, he not knowing of this, that was spoken before. I pray thee tell me Zenophon: what if thy neighbour had a better house then thine is, haddest thou rather haue thine owne, or thy neighbours? I would haue his sayeth hee. What if he had better land then thou hast, wouldest thou haue his, or thine owne, I would haue his sayeth hee. What if he had a better wife then thou hast, wouldest thou chaunge or no? Here Zenophon sayde neuer a word. Then spake Aspasia. Forasmuch as both of you, onely haue not answered mee, in that point, which I most desire to knowe: I my selfe will shewe what both you thinke. For you being a woman, first desired a very honest man to your houseband, and Zenophon being a man, desired to haue a right honest woman. Therefore, excepte you both shal so behaue your selues, that there may be found, neither man, nor woman, more honest vpon earth then you two bee, undoubtedly you both will euermore most earnestly

Socrates,
Aspasia,

Zenophon.

earnestly desire that, which you thinke principall and best of all, both that thou being a husbaude, mightest haue a right honest wife, and you also being a woman, might bee married to a right honest husbando.

The sixth deceipt.

Repetito principij, the Cuckowes song, that is, repeating of that wholly in the conclusion, which before was onely spoken in the first proposition: or els by thinges doubtfull, to proue thinges that are as doubtfull.

The Cuckowes song.

Every slanderer must be banished the Court.

Such a man is a slanderer.

Ergo, every slanderer must be banished the Court.

The conclusion is not well gathered, for it should not be vniuersall, but particular, and therefore, seeing the same is repeated that was spoken before, without any good probation in my mind it may be called the Cuckowes song. Self willed folke that followe lust, and forsake reason, vse oft the Cuckowes song. As being asked why they will do this and that, they answer straight, Many, because I will doe it, or because it pleaseth me best so to doe. The poore men being thus answered of the wealthie, shall hardly escape daunger. For, though it be a plaine deceipt, and by reason should be overthrowne, yet so long as might beareth rule, and right is set a side, reason is out of reason, and doth but little helpe. Some women are subiect to this answer, which in wit doe excell, though in the eight partes of reason, fewe Schollers can hardly finde them. Tell God graunt all our willes, to stand euer with his will, and then I doubt not, but this harme shall with ease be avoided, and all deceipt for euer set apart. Again, when an unknowne thing, is proved by a thing, that is alwaies unknowne, as the other is.

A reason without reason.

In Purgatorie, sinnes be forgiven to the dead.

Purgatorie.

Ergo, we must say Masse for the dead.

This wils reason, fond Preacher heretofore haue made, that therefore, we must say Masse for the dead, because in Purgatorie, sinnes be forgiven the dead. And yet doubt I as much of this place of Purgatorie, as I must of this foolish saying, and to

P. J.

say

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say truth, it is sinne to like either of them both, and as for *Paragatoie*, I thinke there was neuer any such, but only inuented to feare the simple, as children haue been made afraide with a *Tisard*, or els found out to picke mens purses. An other.

Praying to
Saints.

Thus many hundred yeres haue men vled to pray to
Saints departed.

Ergo, they doe not amisse, that pray to the dead still.
I aunswere, whoseome hath been vled these many hundred
yeares : *Ergo*, it is lawfull, both to haue *Stewes*, and to goe to
the *Stewes* still.

Customs,
Nurse vnto
naughtinesse.

Euery man may see, how foolish this argument is, and yet it
is as good as the other, euery inch of it. For, although men haue
prayed, men haue gon our *Pilgrimage* thus long; and thus long;
yet it is not therefore true, that the people did well therein. For,
we English men knowe (not onely by heare say but also by good
experience) that custom is the mother, and the sucke of
all errour. And therefore, when such arguments are made, wee
say, *Dubium per id quod æque dubium est, confirmatur*. That
which is doubtfull, is proued by that, which is as doubtfull, and
so we doe not allowe the argument.

Anabaptists.

Thirdly, when that thing is taken to proue, as though it were
indoubted, and euery body agreed therunto, where as yet it is
in controuersie.

The Anabaptistes haue the holy Ghost, the teacher
of all changes.
Ergo, they neede notes heare the Gospel, nor yet
be bound to followe it.

Who knoweth not, that hath alip knowledge of the truth,
that the first may be lawfully doubted, and rather denied, then
graunted.

Infants.

Fourthly, this deceipt is then vled, when that which follo-
weh, proueth that, which goeth before, as though the Cart went
before the horse: for, often times that thing, which is proued, is
more assured then that, which doth proue, as thus.

Infants haue faith.
Ergo, they must be Baptized.

The

The consequent is undoubtedly true, for asmuch as we finde it so in the Scripture, that in the Primative Church, whose families were Baptised, children, and all: for, we reade not that they were excepted, & yet some doubt, and that of the greatest Clerks, whether children haue faith, or no.

The sixth deceipt.

Ignoratio elenchi (that is the mistaking of contradictorie propositions) is a deceiptful argument, which comprehendeth in it selfe, all other about rehearsed subtilties. The occasion of this error riseth, for not knowing what is contradiction. Contradiction therefore, is a repugnancie of one and the same not substance onely; nor yet name onely, but of the substance, and name both together. Aristotle notwithstanding, hath compassed this deceipt within his boundes. First, when respect is not made to one and the same thing, but diuersly applied.

Mistaking of
contradictorie
proposi-
tions.

To eate flesh, is good for health sake.
To eate flesh is not good, when offence may follow.
Ergo, to eate flesh is good, and not good.

Truth it is, and yet shall it not followe, that whosoever eateth, the same man doth offende: considering to eate is lawfull, and is none offence to God at all, being once allowed by the Magistrate, in whose hand lieth the whole ording of this matter.

Again, this deceipt is used, when contradiction is made, according to diuers respects, as thus.

The Lawe is to be followed in Morall preceptes,
and not in Ceremonialles, nor yet alwaies in iudicialles neither.

Ergo, the law is to be followed, & not to be followed.

It is euen so, and yet not true neither, that the law is alwaies to be reiected, and to be followed, as it pleaseth our phantasies.

Thirdly, this subtiltie is fashioned, when a contradiction is used, and yet not used of like force, so that the latter part, doth not scape the former, in one manner of understanding, as thus.

I knowe the worde of God.
And I doe not knowe it.

Those that liue licenciously, and feare not the generall reur-

rection,

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rection, may iustly be here included, and the two sentences, which seeme to gainsay, may both be true in them: for, some knowe, that the Scriptures are of God, or at least thei know, that the Scriptures are commonly taken for the worde of GOD, and yet they themselves, knowe not one worde of Gods will, nor yet passe a whit for it. Or we may say, that those poore soules in the Popes reigne, knewe the worde of God onely by heare say, when they heard the Gospell read in Latine, and could not tell one worde what it meant.

Fourthly, the tyme may alter thinges, and make two diuers thinges to be both true. As thus.

To worke vpon the Sabbath is forbidden, and yet
 not to worke vpon other daies, is also forbidden.
Ergo, to worke, and not to worke, are both forbidden.

It is an easie matter to auoid all such deceipts. Therefore, there is a rule in Logike, that two contradiCTIONS can neuer be both, either false or true, at one and the same time, and that in one respect, as thus.

All true believers shall attaine saluation.

Some true believers shall not attaine saluation.

These two propositions can neuer be both together, either true or false. Now, the other which were made before, may be both true, at one and the same tyme, and therefore, they are not contradiCTories, because they are not considered in respect of one and the same thing, at one and the same tyme, but diuersly applied and considered, as thus.

To preach in the Congregation is meete for a man,
 and not for a woman.

Ergo, to preach is meete, and not meete.

All things being diuersly considered, first a woman may not preach, and yet a man may, and so the sentence is true, and it may well be said, to preach is meete, and not meete, without any contradiction at all, because of the diuers respects, which bee had both to the man, and to the woman. If the rule of contradiCTorie propositions before rehearsed be well marked, all these deceipts may easily be auoided.

Of particular auoyding false arguments, which are deriued from the place.

When I see an argument deriued, from these subtile places, or els from the places of inuention, which I haue before at large declared: I ought to obserue diligently, the generall rules and precepts there giuen: for, if one reason thus from the general word, such a man followeth naughtinesse: Ergo, he is a theefe, the argument is not good, and the error appeareth the rather, by this generall rule, From the general to the kinde, the argument is not good. For, though one bee naught otherwise, yet may he liue naughtily long enough, and yet bee no theefe at all, as he may bee an adulterer, a swearer, or such like.

Particular auoyding false arguments.

False reasons made through the euill framing of an argument.

The wrong framing, may with ease be espied, if the rules be once learned, that are before set forth for the same purpose. And againe, all other kind of arguments, haue rules especiall and proper to themselves, whereby the true ordering of an argument, is better knowne.

False reasons through euill framing.

Of obiections made to an argument.

Obiections are then used, when wee doe not dissolue the argument, by the rules of Logike, or directly auoyde the danger, but bring an other thing, as an example, to ouerthrowe that, which was spoken before, and this manner is for many waies used.

Obiections.

i. By taking occasion of the selfe same thing, that is put forth and wresting it otherwise.

ii. By using the same example in an other matter.

iii. By making a cleane contrary example.

iiii. By standing so much on the, or using sentences of the sage.

For the first, this example may serue, riches are good, because they bring pleasure. The answer: Nay Marie, riches are euill, because they bring woe.

Of the second, thus. Such a one is an honest man, for, I saw him once give almes to the poore. The answer: Such a one is

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no thankard, for I sawe him once sober.

Of the third, thus. Such an honest man hath once receiued a great displeasure, of his friend and neighbour. Ergo, he may hate him deadly for euer. Nay, not so, for the wicked man will sometimes forgie, receiuing displeasure, and therefore, the good man must much more forgie.

Of the fourth, thus. Forgiue him, because he is a childe. Nay, not so, for Salomon biddeeth, that the rodde should not goe from the childe, therefore, it is good to beate him, when he offendeth.

I haue tranayled thus farre, to disclose vntruthes, and to open cloked errors, wherein though sometimes, the examples bee but slender, yet in greater matters, the same deceit hath taken place. Therefore, though to the English eare, they may seeme strange, yet I hope they will be better taken, when this is knowne, and fully seene, that they giue light to greater matters, and that Logike by good order, and perfect reason, doth rule all; and espieth faultes, which otherwise would breede offence; where what false argument is vsed, the same may with ease be founde in some one of these deceitfull corners; or els where in the places of inuention, and therefore, may by art easily be auoyded: especially, if the other rules aboue rehearsed be once well digested. For, the rules are touch stones, to trye vntruthes, and to frame matters right. And generally, good heede ought to be had, that the matter, and forme of euery argument be true, according to the rules: for, by these two pointes, all errors are espied. The faulte is in the matter (called in Latine *Materia*) when wordes are doubtfull, and may diuersly be taken, and also when the pith or substance of the matter is confounded, and straungely vsed by wordes ioyned together, and thinges not orderly placed: in all which kinde of arguments, ye must vse either a flat denyall of the proposition, or els vse a distinction, to shew how the argument may be true, and how it may be false, according as it is vnderstande. We vse a denyall, when of two propositions in the argument, we denye either the proposition at large, or the seuerall, by shewing the fault to be in

the

Faulte in the
matter.

the definition, in the deuision, in the causes, or some other place:
As thus.

I had good cheere in such a mans house.

Ergo, he is an honest man.

Here the fault is in the definition, for, if I would goe about to define an honest man, euery bodie would laugh me to scorn if I would thus define him. That man, whosoever he be, that maketh mee good cheere at his house, is a very honest man: but I must rather say thus. Whatsoeuer he is, that doth as he would be done unto, and amongeth no bodie, but liueth still vprightly, godly, and continently, the same is an honest man, or els not. For vertue is gotten by long practise, and by well doing of many good things, not by making a good dinner, and therefore the other aboue rehearsed definition, because it is not lawfull, nor agreeing with the rules of a definition, is betterly to be denigged, this reason appli'd thereunto, that the definition is not lawfull. Notwithstanding, in taking of honest men, euermore the wealthie are considered, and therefore, thus and such like talke is commonly vsed. Of what opinion is such a man? An honest man surely, sayth an other; for he will eate his meate, I warrant you, he is none of these scrupulous consciences, he hath the Byble in his house, ye may be sure talke with him of the Sacrament when you will, and he is able to aunswere *ad omnia quæ*. As though whose Religion stood in these pointes onely. I asked once a fellowe in Latine, if he could doe any thing in the Scriptures, whose learning I was then commaunded to examine. He answered me thus. *Etiã, possum fabulari de Sacramento, si placet*. That is, yea sir, I can babble of the Sacrament if it please you. Yea (q. I) Wry then you haue enough, and I warrant you against all men, and so bad him farewell, being well instructed of his great worthines. Remember of an other, and that no small bird, which was better learned then wise, and yet not so well learned in deed, as he thought himself (in his owne opinion) wise, and vsed an other more dangerous reason. For, whereas it chaunced by occasion of talke, that she in his companie enueigled against the same mans friend, speaking things nothing to the purpose,

Good cheere.

Gospell preachers, taken for good men.

and

The Arte of Logike.

and other wise then he would gladly heare, although not greatly missing the quillen, in reporting truth, he tooke the matter very hot, and like a freend spake earnestly in his freendes cause, testifying for his honestie, with most constant wordes, and to perswade him the better, he used this for reason. **Thou art to blame** (quoth he) **to depraue such a mans estimation;** for by Gods might, he is a very honest man, for he is my special friend, I would thou shouldest know it, and therfore, cease thy prating with that, other came to part them, for they fell to reasoning with arguments, that were neither in figure, nor in moode, but stood in plaine buffers, which is a sobriety that is not mentied within the compasse of this booke, and therfore will neglect it, neither can it be answered, except one haue a heape of some weapon in his hand, to beate of such deceiptes, and so saue himselfe harmelesse. Some call such rough dealing, **Carters Sophistrie**, when the first reasoneth a matter by buffers, which the tongue should proue by arguments. Again, for the deduction when it is not well made, to is to be denyed in like maner, the cause thereof why, and why for, as thus;

Rege ouer-
throweth
reason.

Carters So-
phistrie.

Every man is either wastfull or conseruous.

Cicero is a man.

Ergo, Cicero is either wastfull or conseruous.

This deduction is not good, for many men offend in neither, but live moderately, content with their owne, be it neuer so little. Moreover, when no true cause is applied, but a false reason forged, ye may auoid the daunger by denying it, as thus.

Honey maketh vnchristes.

Ergo, money is naught.

Or thus.

Fire burneth houses.

Ergo, what shall we doe with it.

Or thus.

Water drowneth whole Cities.

Ergo, water is nothing profitable.

In all such arguments, the true cause is omitted, and a counterfeit cause used. For, neither money, nor fire, nor yet water doe

harme

harme of themselves, but the mightinesse of nature, which abusereth them, and the negligence of man, which forsleeth not so them: is the very true cause of their euill doing: and yet in weightier matters, such fond reasons haue been vied, as for the reading of Gods word, for women to be learned, for Rhetorike to be taught, or the temporall lawe at this day, in this our Reahners bee frequented, or occupied.

Gods words
Rhetorike.
Temporal lawe

A distinction must be vsed, when any worde is doubtfull, and may be taken diuersly. As thus.

{ Tyme healeth sicke folke.
{ Ergo, it is very good.

Here a distinction must be vsed, for tyme as well signifieth an hearbe, as it signifieth the space, which is an houre, day, or yeare. A freend of mine was called Harris: one not well knowing his name, called him Harrissonne. I denigh the sonne (or he) not meaning the second person in Trinitie, but the addition of this word (sonne.)

A learned man a Philition (some knowe whom I meane) hauing at a certaine time a coate of Ueluet, that was much worne, and bare at the breast, being then also poore withall, and hauing a thin purse, sitting at a table, & laying his hand vpon his breast, sayd thus merely to his freend: Tellel (quoth he) for all this hard world, at the worst I am thus much worth, euen in bare Ueluet. The same man afterward, sitting at a table, not hauing elbowe rounne, but being troubled, and his coate somewhat araled, which was dyessed of the Schiermans, not past two or thre daies before, sayd merely: I pray you my masters, bee good to my coate, for I promise you, within these two or thre daies, it hath scraped a scouring.

A Philition

A young man of Cambrige, standing in a Galerie ouer the water, and looking on his Booke, hauing the water on the one side, and a garden on the other side, wherein (as it chaunced then) were diuers maidens of the towne, (for it was about Easter, at what tyme maidens gadded abroade; after they had taken their Baker, as they call it) he being thus beset, one of his fellows being abroade, and seeing him there, bad him come ouer to him.

A young man,
of Cambrige.

He answered, I cannot come. The other demanded why: He re-
 rie (q^{ue}) because I am compassed with fire and water. Meaning
 the maidens to bee fire, and a prouocation to lust, burning woul-
 den fire: and so all good Autho^{rs} haue vsed this worde fire. As
 Terence: *Accede ad ignem hunc, iam calefces plus satis*. Come to
 this fire, saith Parmeno to Phedria, meaning Thais the Harlot,
 and thou shalt be as hot as coales, by and by. Therefore, where such
 speech is vsed, it is alwaies called in Latine, *Metaphora*. That
 is to say, a turning from the proper signification to that which is
 not proper, wherein the old Philosophers haue wonderfully ex-
 celled, as Diogenes, Socrates, and in our time, Sir Thomas
 More, a man for his wit, very singular.

Fault in the
 making of an
 argument.

The fault that is in the forme, or manner of making, as we call
 it, may bee dissolved, when wee shew that the conclusion, is not
 well proued by the former propositions, and that the argument,
 is either not well made, in figure or in moode, or in both: for of
 true things, none other thing can be concluded but truely, if the
 due forme of concluding be obserued, and the iust placing of set-
 ting of the parts or termes, called in Latine, *termini*, as ye heard
 before, be truely kept, as the rules before haue taught. Notwith-
 standing of false propositions, and vndoubted truely may well e-
 nough be concluded, as thus.

Every sinne may be suffered in a Common weale.

Every execution done by a lawe is sinne.

Ergo every execution done by a lawe, may be suffer-
 ed in a Common weale.

The two first propositions are manifestly false; and yet the
 conclusion is very true. So that ye may see, after two false pro-
 positions, a true conclusion may followe, and not contrariwise,
 of two true propositions, a false conclusion can be made. For as
 we say in Latine, *Ex veris nil nisi verum sequitur*, that is to say,
 of true things, nothing doth folowe but truely. Therefore, when
 the conclusion seemeth not good, ye may iustly suspect the other
 two propositions, although they seeme neuer so true, for vndoubt-
 edly, the fault is either in the euil knitting (when the argument
 is not in his mood and figure accordingly) or els in the confound-
 ing

ding of wordes either cuill placed, or not well applied, or els in the doubtfullnesse of some worde.

{ All rpot is an offence.

{ No couetousnesse is rpot.

{ Ergo, no couetousnesse is any offence.

Thus we see a false conclusion, made of two vndoubted true propositions, and yet I sayd before, of true sayings nothing doth followe but onely truth. But abide, ye must examine this argument with the rules, and then ye shall see, that the fault is in the forme, or maner of making an argument. For it is in no moode in the first figure, although it be an argument of the first figure.

Sometime the fault is only in the matter, and not in the maner of making an argument, whereof there are diuers examples aboue rehearsed. Sometimes the fault is both in the matter, and in the maner of making an argument, as thus.

Fault in the matter of an argument.

{ The earth is profitable, and causeth much plentie.

{ All men are in the earth.

{ Ergo, all men are profitable, & causeth much plentie.

First, it is in no figure, because the dubble repete in the first proposition, is the substance of the earth, and in the second proposition, is the being in the earth, and so there bee fower termes in the two propositions. Again, it is in no moode, because the first proposition in the first figure, is not vniuersal. And this may suffice, which heretofore I haue rehearsed for the solution of an argument, forasmuch as he that can deuise, define, and make his argument in moode and figure, according to the rules before mentioned, and diligently marke doubtfull wordes: shall soon espie the faulces in an euill argument, forasmuch as it cannot o-ther wise be, but that he which knoweth the best, shall easily iudge and without difficultie espie the worst.

And now the rather to delight the Reader, I will ad here certaine wittie questions and arguments, which can hardly be auoyded, being very pleasant, & therefore not vnworthie to be knowne.

They are called trapping arguments, because se we that answered vnto them, can auoyde daunger, and thus they are named in straunge wordes.

Trapping arguments.

Z.ij.

Crocodilites.

The Arte of Logike.

Crocodilites.

Anistrophe.

Ceratine.

Assistation.

Cacosistation.

Vitis.

Pseudomenas.



Crocodile.

Crocodilites, the Serpents guile. *Crocodilites*, is such a kinde of subtiltie, that when we haue graunted a thing to our aduersarie, being as ked before what he will say: the same turneth to our harme afterward, and causeth an incontinentie thereupon to ensue. Auctours doe feigne, that the *Crocodile* being a Donster in Egypt, did take a womans childe from her, and spake with the mother in this wise: woman, I will giue thee thy childe againe, if thou wilt say truely to me, and tell me assuredly, whether I will giue thee thy childe againe or no: She answered, I know assuredly, thou wilt not giue me my childe againe, and therefore it is reason I haue my childe againe, because I haue sayd truely. Nay sayd the *Crocodile*, I will not giue thee thy childe againe, because thou mayst be sene to haue sayd truely: least that if, I giue thee thy childe againe, thou shouldest haue made a lye: neither yet would I haue giuen thee thy childe againe, if thou haddest sayd other wise, because then thou haddest not sayd truely. And hereof this argument hath his name, called *Crocodilites*. Notwithstanding, Lucian telleth this tale after an other sort, and maketh *Crissippus* to aske an other man, what he would say, in case he should be asked a question of the *Crocodile*, as I haue before rehearsed.

Anistrophe.

The rebounding or turning againe of an argument.

Pithagoras and his scholar Euathlus.

A *Nistrophe* is nothing els, then to turne a mans saying into his owne necke againe, and to make that which he sayeth for his owne purpose, to serue for our purpose, in Latine it may be called *Inuersio*. Aulus Gellius hath a notable example of Pithagoras, a noble Sophist, and Euathlus Scholer to the same Pithagoras. This Euathlus was a very pong man, and

and glad to learne Eloquence, and to plead causes in the Common place. This young man therefore, considering Pithagoras to be a singular man in this behalfe, and a meete Schoolemaster for his purpose, desired to bee his Scholer, and promised to give him a great somme of money for his paines, euen as much as he would aske, and gaue him vpon a greement halfe in hand before he learned, and couenaunted therevpon, that he should haue the other halfe, euen at the first day that he stood at Barre, & by pleading, got the ouer hand in iudgement of his aduersary. After this, when he had been a good while Pithagoras Scholer, and profited very much in the lawe, and yet notwithstanding, came not to the Barre, but still shifted him of, and tracted the time (of like be- cause he would not pay that residue of his money) Pithagoras taketh aduilement, as he himselfe thought, very subtilly, & charged him with his promise, hauing an action of debt against him, and therefore he called him to the lawe. Where, when he had him before the Iudges, he beginneth his tale in this wise.

Here I haue thee now (sayth Pithagoras) and learne therefore foolish fellow as thou art, and marke this point for thy learning: whether the iudgement be giuen with thee, or against thee, I shall haue my money euer y groate of it. If thou art cast in the lawe, I haue waie by vertue of the law: if thou art not cast, but gettest the ouerhand, by iudgement of these men, yet must I haue it nevertheless, because our bargaine was so made, when I first began to teach thee. Euathlus hearing this, answered as ye shall heare. I could easily auoyde this your crooked subtiltie, and bee without all daunger, if I would not stand at the Barre my selfe, but get some aduocate for me: for by such meanes, you could not charge me with any debt, considering I my self pleaded no cause. Notwithstanding, I like it better a thousand fold, that I my self am here personally, and speake in mine owne cause: seeing that not only, I will get the ouerhand of you in this our matter, whereby I shall be discharged of debt, but also euen in this argument I will turne your owne wordes into your owne necke againe, and so triumph both waies. And therefore learne you againe, as wise as ye are, and marke this point for your learning, whether the

Pithagoras
reason to his
Scholer.

Euathlus an-
swere to his
master,

3. iij.

iudge.

The Arte of Logike.

iudgement be giuen with you, or against you, I shal saue my me-
ney euery groat of it. For if you be cast in the Law, I haue won
by vertue of the Law, and so I owe you nothing. If you be not
cast, but get the ouerhand of me, by the iudgement of these men:
then according to my bargaine, I shall pay you nothing, because
I haue not gotten the ouerhand in iudgement. The Iudges see-
ing the matter so doubtfull, and so hard to determine for either
partie: fearing to doe amisse, left the matter raw without iudge-
ment for that tyme, and deferred the same to an other season.
Thus ye see that the yong man being the Scholer, gaue his ma-
ster a boane to gnawe, and bet him with his owne rod, which the
master had made for his Scholers taile.

Aristophanes

There is in Aristophanes a wonderfull pretie talke, betwixt
the father and the sonne, which serueth wel for this purpose. For
where as the sonne had beaten his father, contrary to all order
and honestie: yet notwithstanding, the sonne thought he had as
good authoritie to beate his father, if he did amisse, as the father
had to beate him. And therefore he sayd, wherefore should my fa-
ther beate me? His father made answer, Wary (or he) because I
loue thee, and would thou shouldst do wel. Wary therefore (quoth
the sonne) will I beate thee to, because I loue thee also good fa-
ther, and would thou shouldst doe well: & with that sayd on stro-
kes surely, till he made his father graunt y it was as lawfull for
the sonne to beate his father, as for the father to beate his sonne.

Ceratina.

Horned ar-
guments.

C*eratina argumentationes*, are called horned arguments,
the which are so dangerous to aunswere vnto, for both
parts propounded, that it will be hard to escape a foyle. E-
uen as when ye see a Bull, and would catch him by the hoznes, ye
see as much daunger in the one hozne, as in the other, and so you
feare to take him on either side. In like case, when these horned
arguments are propounded, a man vneeth can tel what to answere.
As we reade in the Gospel of Mathewe, the xxix. Chapter, when
the Pharisies did send their Disciples (which did pretende holi-
nesse, and beare a face of true Religion) to take Christ in a snare.
And therefore, first they came, giuing him a name of authoritie,

and

Pharises
sought to
take Christ in
a trippce.

and called him master, flatteringly, as though he might speake his minde freely to them, because there was none but his Scho- lers, and such as sought unfeignedly to bee edified in the truth: secondly, they praise him for his goodnes, that he is true in al his dealings, and bleth no dissimulation: and againe they say, that not onely he is true, but also teacheth the way of trueth, and then thus they begin to question with him, and to feele his mind what he will say (for truely they thought to take him in a trappe, whether he held his peace, or spake) and therefore they sayd, Sir, may we lawfully pay tribute to Caesar or no? Or how thinke you, doth it stand with Gods worde, that we may pay, or no? Here Christ was beset two waies. First, it was dangerous for him, to hold his peace: for then he might seeme by so doing, to haue respect to the person of men, & for feare, not open the truth in such a weightie matter, and so staine the glorie of God. Of the other part, if he should answer, it were a dangerous peece of worke in like manner: for they thought he would either speake on Caesars side, and allowe paying of tribute, and so incurre the hatred of all the people, whereby they might boldly afterward put him to death: or els they thought he would speake against Caesar, and so he should commit treason, and bee apprehended therevpon as a traytour. Christes answer. But Iesus knowing their naughtie purpose, and plainly seeing where about they went, disappointed them of their will, that they could take none aduantage of him at all. And therefore he said, because he would publish their falshood, what tempt you me, ye hypocrites? Shew me the copie of the tribute. And they tooke him a penie, and he sayd vnto them: whose is this Image and superscription? They sayd vnto him, Caesars. Then sayd he, giue therefore vnto Caesar the things which are Caesars, and vnto God, those things which are Gods. Christ did not at the first, whē they propounded their question vnto him, plainly say, giue vnto Caesar the things which are Caesars, but whē he had asked them, whose copie it was, and that they by their owne confession, had graunted it to bee Caesars, whereby they bare witnesse of themselves, that they were subiect to Caesar: he said, forasmuch as you graunt your selues, by the vertue of this copie, to be tributaries, pay on swere.

Gods

Gods name to Caesar, the things that pertaine to Caesar, and due to God, those things that are Gods.

Cacosistata.

Full arguments, that make as well against one, as with one.

C*acosistata* are such arguments, that being proponed betwene two persons, they serue as well for the one part, as the other, as thus, You must forgive him, because he is but a child: no Parie, therfore will I beate him, because he is but a child. Or thus, This man should not bee iudged to dye, by any temporall lawe, because he is a Priest, yea Parie, therfore should he be adiudged to dye, because he is a Priest, and hath offended, which should haue giuen good example to other of wel liuing. Alas saith one, it is pitie such a mā should be hanged, considering he is a gentle man. And why not gentlemen, as well as other pooze men, if they deserue it? Yea, why not they rather then any other, if they more deserue it then any other.

Asistata.

Absurde reasoning.

A*sistata* are such arguments, as are impossible to be true, as when a child of two yeres old, should be accused of adultrie, as though it were like, that he could offend in such filthinesse, or els thus, if one say, he holdeth his peace, and yet doth speake still.

Vtis.

Vncertaine reasoning.

V*tis* is nothing els, but when one goeth about to proue a thing, and makeeth that which should proue, to bee as vncertaine, as a thing which is proued, as thus, In Purgatorie sinnes are forgiven, by vertue of the Masse, Ergo, wee must say Masse still. Whereas I thinke there is no godly wise man, but doubteeth asmuch that Purgatorie is, as he may iustly say, that the Masse sauerh no man.

Pseudomenos.

A lising.

This is called a lising argument, for whatsoeuer ye shall say, it must needs say amisse. Epimenides a man bozne in Crete, sayd that the people bozne in Crete, were lvers, sayd he true or no? If ye say that he sayd trueth, I may well say that cannot bee well sayd: for if the people in Crete be lvers, then lied Epimenides, and so his saying cannot be true, because he was a mā there bozne, and one of Crete, and sayd they were lvers. Again, if ye iudge

saue that the people there be no liars, then Epimenides say
truth, even when he say, this people of Crete are liars, because
he himself was a man of Crete. But this subtiltie is thus anoy-
ned, if ye will say, that where as mention is made of the people
in Crete, yet all are not comprehended under the same, neither is
the proposition vniuersall, but indefinite, that is to say, not com-
prehending all, but certaine, as thus. The people of Crete are
liars, true it is, that many of them be liars, and yet Epimeni-
des may be excepted, and be a true man of his word notwithstanding.
As also he that was warned in his sleepe, not to giue cre-
dite to any dreames, did not thinke that dreame baine, although
he iudged many other to be little esteemed, and small heede to be
giuen to them. For by this dreame, he was warned not to beleue
greatly other dreames, and yet notwithstanding he was warned
to beleue this dreame.

One warned
not to beleue
dreames,

But which I craue, as the first setting forth of this
booke, the same request make I now, in conseruing of
the same, I desire of al men their favourable helpe, to
support my weaknesse, or as the least to giue me none
evil report for my well meaning, and then I shall thinke myself
sufficiently rewarded. But if offence should becede through la-
bour suffered, & no fauour gotten, when gentlenesse had been of-
fered, it had been as good (in my mind) to play and lose nothing,
as to take paines, & lose all. But my trust being fixed vpon the
honour & godly affected, I haue traualled without feare, hoping
well my doings shall be taken without blame. And therefore this
obtained, I shall desire of al men, for the loue of God, to embrace the
truth, & not to wed themselves to any opinion, without some stay,
or sure foundation of Gods truth. And where as God is the au-
thour of peace & concord, and loue them that are true, shall be
pon him in truth. I shall beseech you to God, that all we may
draw after one line, and seek one vniuersall and sound doctrine,
to the praise of God, and the comfort of our soules. And because
some heades are very bold to enter farther, then witte can reach,
or els haue a mynde vaine to question, of thinges not needfull:
I thought it not a nuffe, to set forth here Aristotles mynde, as

As. 1.

touching

Lower things
not to be exa-
mined by rea-
son.

Touching things that should not be brought in question. There be
four things, saith he, which should not be examined by reason.

- i. And first no man ought to argue of these things, wherein if a-
ny one put doubt, he deserueth punishment. As to reason whether
there be a God, or no. And therefore, Tullie saith very well, it is a
wicked & an vngoodly custome, to dispute, or talke against God,
either in earnest or yet in sport. Againe, it is a fondnesse, to rea-
son of those things, which our senses iudge to be true. As to know
by reason, whether fire be hot, or no. The which were madnesse
to aske, and surely, if any one should reason with me, I would
bid him put his finger in it. Thirdly, it is euill to reason of those
things, which cannot be knowne by mans wit. As to know what
God the father is in person, what the holie Ghost is, how they sit
and are placed in heauen, or of what making the soule of man is.
- ii. Fourthly, to talke & dispute of those things, which are vndoubt-
edly true. As in Arithmetique, three & three are sixe. In Philo-
sophie, The whole is greater then the part. In which matters, to
moue any earnest question, or to doubt ouermuch in things no-
thing doubtful, were either sturke madnesse, or els plaine foolish-
nesse. Therefore I will of God, that all our reasoning, might be
fastened vpon such matters, as are necessarie, both for the hearer
to learne, and also good, for the godly reasoner to teach. Wherin
though I haue done nothing so well my selfe, as my good will
was therevnto, yet I trust all honest hearts will relike with me,
that I haue most earnestly minded the glorie of God, and the set-
ting forth of his holy name throughout the whole course of this
my rude and simple Booke. The which once done and knowne,
I hope the gentle Reader, will beare with me in other things,
and rather helpe me then hate me, when I seeke to helpe all, and
hurt none. I aske in reward, but louing reporte, for inces-
saunt labour: the one is easie for all men to graunt,
the other was busie for me to compasse. Thus
I liue in hope, yea I hope well: for tho-
rough hope, behold I trauaile.
God be praised.

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